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THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA



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CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

A.Bh.	= Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabharatī*, cf. Preface, p. XIII.
A.G.	= Abhinavagupta.
D	= S.K. De, cf. Preface, p. XV.
Daśarūpa, Haas	= Haas, George C. O., *The Daśarūpa, A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy by Dhanaṃjaya*, Columbia University Press, New York 1912.
Dasgupta, *H. I. Ph.*	= Dasgupta, Surendranath, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 5 voll., Cambridge 1932-1955.
De, *S.P.*	= De, Sushil Kumar, *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Lusac, 2 voll., London 1923, 1925.
Dh.Ā.	= Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyālokā* with the *Locana* and *Bālapriyā* commentaries by Abhinavagupta and Rāmaśāraka, ed. by Pandit Pattābhirāma Śāstri, Chowkhambā, Benares 1940.
Dh.Ā.L.	= Abhinavagupta's commentary (*locana*) on the *Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana.
G	= Kavi's edition of the *Abhinavabharatī*, cf. Preface, p. XV.
H.C.	= Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana*, cf. Preface, pp. XIII, XV.
Ind. Th.	= Chandra Bhan Gupta, *The Indian Theatre*, Motilal Banarasidass, Banaras 1954.
Ī.P.V.	= Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, K.S. T.S., 2 voll., Bombay 1918-1921.
Ī.P.V.V.	= Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, K. S.T.S., 3 voll., Bombay 1938-1943.
J.	= Jayaratha, the commentator of the Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*.
JBORS	= *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*.
JBU	= *Journal of Bombay University*.
JOR	= *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras.
K. Ād.	= Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*, edited and translated by O. Böhtlingk, Leipzig 1890.
Kane, *S.D.V.*	= Kane, P. V., *The Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha* (Paricchedas I, II, Arthālaṅkāras), with exhaustive Notes and the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Bombay 1951.
K.M.	= Rājaśekhara's *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda 1916.
K.P.	= Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*, cf. Preface, p. XIV.

ABBREVIATIONS

K.S.T.S. = Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

Mahimabhaṭṭa, *Vyaktiviveka* = *The Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa, ed. with a comm. of Ruyyaka and the Madhusūdanī comm. by Madhusūdana Miśra, Chowkhamba, Benares 1936.

M.C. = Māṇikyacandra, cf. Preface, pp. XIV, XV.

N.M. = *The Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. by Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla, Benares 1936.

N.Ś. = *Nāṭya Śāstra*, cf. Preface, p. XIII.

P = Pandey, cf. Preface, p. XV.

Pandey = Pandey, Kanti Chandra, *Indian Aesthetics*, Chowkhamba, Banaras 1950.

Pandey, *A.G.* = Pandey, Kanti Chandra: *Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study*, Chowkhamba, Banaras 1935.

P.T.V. = Abhinavagupta's *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*, K.S.T.S., Bombay 1918.

P.V. = Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* with a commentary of Manorathanandin ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to *JBORS*, vol. XXIV-XXVI, 1938-1940.

P.V., svavṛtti = MS. of the commentary by Dharmakīrti on the ch. I (*svārthānumānapariccheda*) of his *Pramāṇavārtika*. This MS. belongs to prof. Giuseppe Tucci.

R.T. = Kalhana's *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, ed. by M. A. Stein, Bombay 1892.

S. Kā. = *The Sāṅkhyā Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Sānkhya Tattvakaumudī of Vāchaspati Miśra, Bombay 1940.

Somānanda, *Śivadṛṣṭi* = Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* with the *vṛtti* of Utpaladeva, Śrīnagar 1934.

Spandanirṇaya = Kṣemarāja's *Spandanirṇaya*, K.S.T.S., Srinagar 1925.

Stavacintāmaṇi = *The Stava-Chintāmaṇi* of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with commentary by Kṣemarāja, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1918.

T.Ā. = Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*, with the commentary of Jayaratha, K.S.T.S., 12 voll., Bombay 1918-1938.

Vijñānabhairava = *The Vijñānabhairava* with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja and partly by Śivopādhyāya, K.S.T.S., Bombay 1918.

V.P. = Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapādīya* ed. by Cārudeva Śāstrī, Lahore 1939.

ZDMG = *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.*

PREFACE

The commentary by Abhinavagupta on the famous *sūtra* by Bharata, *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ* (*Nāṭya Śāstra*, VI, prose after v. 33) constitutes the most important text in the whole of Indian aesthetic thought. It forms part of the *Abhinavabharatī*, the commentary written by Abhinava Gupta on Bharata's *Nāṭya Śāstra* [1]. Apart from the teaching of Abhinavagupta, which is given its most lucid expression in these pages, this work is particularly valuable in that it contains a summary of the principal theories on poetics enunciated by the predecessors of Abhinavagupta, whose works have been lost or have not yet come to light.

A great part of later Indian poetics draws its inspiration, in the matter of aesthetic experience, from this commentary. The 4th Chapter in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*—and, by implication, all the works that stem from it—is nothing but an epitome of it. The commentary (*viveka*) added by Hemacandra, the great Jaina poligraph (12th century), to his own *Kāvyānuśāsana* reproduces it word for word (except for a few variations) [2]. While

1) The *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata with the commentary by Abhinavagupta (the *Abhinavabharatī*) has been edited by Manavalli Ramakrishna Kavi, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda (Vol. I, no. XXXVI, 1926; vol. II, no. LXVIII, 1934; vol. III, no. CXXIV, 1954. The fourth volume is still to come). The commentary on the aforesaid *sūtra* is to be found in the first volume, pp. 274 to 287.

2) The *Kāvyānuśāsana* of Hemacandra, with the commentaries *Alaṅkāracuḍāmaṇi* and *Viveka*, edited by Rasiklal C. Parikh, Bombay 1938.

Māṇikyacandra (13th century) in his commentary on Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* does no more than copy and simplify, at the very most, the *viveka* of Hemacandra [1].

Abhinavagupta's commentary was edited for the first time by S.K. De [2]. This edition is full of mistakes and, in many places, is completely incomprehensible.

It was also published a second time in Kavi's edition of the *Abhinavabharatī*. This edition represents, undoubtedly, a notable advance on that of De. Nevertheless, it contains many mistakes.

Another edition, in which a great part of Abhinavagupta's commentary is reproduced, is that of the *viveka* added by Hemacandra to his *Kāvyānuśāsana*. Māṇikyacandra quotes several passages from this *viveka* in his *Kāvyaprakāśasaṃketa*.

Certain passages of Abhinavagupta's commentary are quoted with corrections that are not always very happy in the sanskrit appendix to K. Ch. Pandey's book, *Indian Aesthetics* (Banaras 1950).

My edition is based, in the main, on that of the *Abhinavabharatī* and on Hemacandra's *viveka*. *Abhinavabharatī*'s edition was prepared from several manuscripts all of which were fragmentary. The edition of Hemacandra's *viveka*—which is nearly always correct—has allowed me to reconstruct, with certainty, several passages whose meaning seemed to have been hopelessly corrupted. In the critical apparatus I have quoted the following readings:

1) The *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa with the commentary (°*saṃketa*) by Māṇikyacandra, edited by Dr. R. Shama Sastry, Mysore, 1922.

2) *The Theory of Rasa*, Appendix, *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes*, Vol. III, *Orientalia*, Part II, pp. 240-253.

D: the edition of S.K. De [1].

G: Kavi's edition of the *Abhinavabharatī* [2].

H.C.: the edition of the *viveka* by Hemacandra.

M.C.: the edition of the *Kāvyaprakāśasaṃketa* by Māṇikyacandra.

P: the passages quoted by K. Ch. Pandey in his *Indian Aesthetics*.

Where I was in doubt, I have given the preference, in general, to the reading accepted by the *Abhinavabharatī*'s edition. I have not quoted the many places where I have made changes in punctuation of the earlier editions. These changes speak for themselves.

Until new manuscript material in a better state of preservation than that available at present has been found, the collation of the fragmentary and often corrupt MSS. now in existence can only be in my opinion of scant help in re-establishing the doubtful passages. It can only confirm the readings accepted by M.R. Kavi. For this reason, I have preferred to put my trust above all in the data banded down by tradition and accepted in other works and in a critical study of the text itself.

1) Where it is not specifically stated otherwise in the critical apparatus De's readings agree with those of Kavi or are variations or misprints of no importance.

2) Some passages of Kavi's edition are enclosed between round or square brackets. I have quoted them in the critical apparatus. With regard to these brackets, Mr. Kavi says: "Wherever corrections are only suggested the letters are enclosed in brackets with a question mark following the incorrect letters or words and wherever letters or words are thought to be understood they are merely enclosed in brackets so that the reader may read along ignoring the paranthesis ... The square brackets indicate that the portion which they enclose is redundant" (*A.Bh.*, I, Pref., p. 11).

It is not improbable that a few passages were added to the text under the influence above all of Hemacandra. The original form of the text is probably that published by S.K. De. In his edition certain minor passages are omitted and the first words only of some stanzas appear. The object of these additions was to complete and elucidate certain passages. They do not alter in any way the thought of Abhinavagupta. I have therefore considered it best to leave them in the text [1].

In the notes to the translation—the first to appear of these pages—I have sought to justify my interpretation of all the most difficult points and to give an explanation of the concepts involved quoting such texts as appeared to me of value for the understanding of the passages in question and, thus, of the aesthetic thought of one of the most profound and keenest minds that India has ever known.

As to the brief introduction, I have confined myself to discussing the most salient points of Abhinavagupta's thought.

The language used by Abhinavagupta is a splendid example of erudite mediaeval sanskrit. In comparison with the same author's philosophical works, there is to be found in these pages a more studied elegance, both in the choice of words and in the structure of the sentences (cf., for example, the abstract nouns ending in *iman*, which

1) Passages probably added are: 1) the first two *pada* of the stanza *vivṛddhātmāpy agādho 'pi*, p. 4; 2) the two last *pada* of the stanza *śokena kṛtastambhas*, p. 4; 3) the last three pada of the stanza *bhāti patito likhantyās*, p. 5; 4) the stanza *maṇipradīpaprabhāyor*, p. 5; 5) the two stanzas *abhidhā bhāvanā cānyā* (on the position of these two stanzas, cf. the critical apparatus, p. 12); 6) the sentence *atra hi* . . . *°svabhāveyam iti*, p. 16; 7) *na viṣayāveśavaivaśyam* and *na tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvam*, p. 25.

have a literary and poetic resonance, used twice by Abhinavagupta in this commentary: *kaṭukiman*, p. 20, and *śabaliman*, p. 22).

I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci for his innumerable acts of kindness, encouragement and advice. He allowed me free use of his precious library and read with me the proofs of text and translation. His assistance in helping me to solve some difficult points was invaluable.

I would also like to thank most particularly Prof. T.R.V. Murti, of the University of Benares, who has very kindly given me the benefit of his experience and learning.

RANIERO GNOLI.

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INTRODUCTION

In India, the study of aesthetics – which was at first limited to the drama—has its origins in no abstract or disinterested desire for knowledge but in motives of a purely empirical order. The most ancient text that has come down to us is the *Nāṭya Śāstra* (4th or 5th Century A.D.?), which tradition attributes to Bharata. This is a voluminous collection of rules and instructions concerned, in the main, with the production of drama and the education of the actors. Drama is considered as a form of synthesis between the visual and aural arts. In it both collaborate at arousing in the spectator, more easily and forcibly than by any other form of art, a state of consciousness *sui generis*, conceived intuitively and concretely as a juice or flavour, called Rasa.

This Rasa, when tasted by the spectator, pervades and enchants him. Aesthetic experience is, therefore, the act of tasting this Rasa, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of all else. Bharata, in a famous aphorism, which, interpreted and elaborated in various ways, forms the point of departure of all later Indian aesthetic thought, says, in substance, that Rasa is born from the union of the play with the performance of the actors. The essence of this Rasa, of which Bharata speaks, became the subject of study and analysis to a whole series of thinkers, each of whom was anxious to contribute to a clearer understanding of the words of the Master. The earliest of these about whom we have any knowledge

(Daṇḍin and Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa [1], who lived respectively about the 7th and 9th Centuries) thought, curiously, that Rasa was none other than an ordinary movement of the mind (anger, pain, etc.) developed to the highest degree by the combined effect of the play, the production and the actors, etc. Rasa, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa declared, is to be found in the represented character and, by extension and then metaphorically only, in the imitating actor. Śaṅkuka [2], who lived a short time after Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, disagrees decisively with the theory of his predecessors. According to him, Rasa is not an intensified but an imitated state of mind. The actor imitates the state of mind of the characters he is portraying and this imitated state of mind is perceived by the spectators in the form of Rasa. This perception is free of any relation to the concepts of reality and non reality. A horse imitated by a painter, Śaṅkuka observes, does not appear to the spectator as being either real or false: it is nothing more than an image which precedes any judgement of reality or non reality.

The theories of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka were violently criticised by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka [3], one of the most important figures in Indian aesthetic thought.

Aesthetic experience, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says, does not depend either upon the intensification nor the imitation of a state of mind. According to him, these two theories (put forward respectively by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka) are not enough to justify the special nature of aesthetic experience. The essence of Rasa, he says, is a pleasure

1) Cf. pp. 30-32, below.
2) Cf. pp. 32 ff., below.
3) Cf. pp. 53-56, below.

which has no relationship with any particular ego. The aesthetic state of consciousness—whether its material is anger, love, pain, etc.—does not insert itself into the texture of everyday life but is seen and lived in complete independance of any individual interest. The images contemplated on the stage or read in poetry are seen by the spectator independently of any relationship with his ordinary life or with the life of the actor or of the hero of the play or poem and appear, therefore, in a generalized (*sādhāraṇīkṛta*, *sādhāraṇa*) way, that is to say, universally and freed of individuality.

The universality of the aesthetic experience, which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka discovered, was accepted and elaborated upon by Abhinavagupta [1]. This state of generality, implies the elimination of any measure of time and space (time and space belong to discursive thought) and, by implication, of the limited knowing-subject, who is conditioned by these but who, during the aesthetic experience, raises himself momentarily above time, space and casuality and, therefore, above the stream of his practical life, the *saṃsāra* [2]. Aesthetic experience marks a definite break

1) Abhinavagupta, son of Narasiṃhagupta, alias Cukhula, was born in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th. century from a illustrous brahmin family. He is one of the chief representatives of the religious speculation, thought and rhetoric in mediaeval India. His most important works in these fields are 1) the *Tantrāloka*, a vast encyclopedia, written in verses and dealing with the religious concepts and the rites of the *śaiva* schools; 2) the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, a detailed commentary to the *ṭīkā* of Utpaladeva on his own *kārikās*, finished in 1014 A.D.; 3) the *Abhinavabhāratī*, a commentary on the *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata and the *Dhvanyālokalocana*, a commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. His principal masters were Śambhunātha in tantrism, Lakṣmaṇagupta disciple of Utpaladeva in philosophy, Bhaṭṭa Tota and Bhaṭṭendurāja in rhetoric.
2) Cf. pp. 63 ff., 112, below.

with *saṃsāra*, which is dominated and conditioned by the law of cause and effect. It opens like a flower born of magic, without relationship, in time or space, with the practical life which precedes it and which, after it, renews itself and returns to its normal course [1]. In this way, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta rescued the idea of Rasa from the primitive and too concrete form which it had been given by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka. Rasa is not a thing in itself, formed previous to the act of consciousness by which it is perceived, but the consciousness itself (and therefore the perception) which, freed from external interference and from all practical desires, becomes Rasa or aesthetic consciousness [2]. The subject, when immersed in this state, finds, in it, the fulfilment of all his desires: in this sense, therefore, Rasa is pleasure, beatitude, rest, lysis. Aesthetic consciousness has no end outside itself. It is completely self-sufficient and is therefore pleasure, bliss, rest [3]. Aesthetic experience postulates, of necessity, the extinction of every practical desire and, therefore, the submersion of the subject in the aesthetic object to the exclusion of all else. The appearance on the horizon of consciousness of practical desires and needs, etc., breaks, *ipso facto*, the compactness of the aesthetic experience by intruding upon it external and dispersive elements, *i.e.*, the so-called obstacles, which are raised by the disturbing influence of the ego [4].

The examination of the relationship between aesthetic experience and religious and mystic experience, to which

1) Cf. p. 59, n. 1, below.
2) Cf. pp. 77, 96, etc., below.
3) Cf. *e.g.*, p. 77, below.
4) Cf. pp. 77 ff., below.

Indian thought always returns with especial interest, is one of the aspects peculiar to the aesthetic thought of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and, with a clearer understanding, to that of Abhinava. In India, thinkers have never dissociated abstract speculation from a concrete realization of its complicated metaphysical structure, which they felt themselves attracted by their nature to translate into living reality. This position, at once metaphysical and psychological, led them, with the passage of time, to conceive reality in an idealistic form. Indian thought, following different if not opposed lines to those of Western idealistic thinkers, perceived, at a certain moment, that reality is consciousness or thought and that everything which is around us rests, in the last analysis, on the Self. Aesthetic speculation, which was born and grew up on the edge of metaphysical thought, did not omit, therefore, to enquire into the relations and differences existing between it and religious experience. The first to face this problem was, in all probability, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, who maintained that aesthetic experience, being characterised by the immersion of the subject in the aesthetic object, to the exclusion of all else and therefore by a momentary interruption of his everyday life is akin to the beatitude of ecstasy or the experience of *brahman* [1]. Any form of pleasure is an epiphany, even if distant and colourless, of the divine beatitude, which is the very essence of consciousness [2]. Aesthetic experience, being characterised by disinterested and impersonal pleasure, is a modality *sui generis* of the unbounded beatitude that appears to the yogin in

1) Cf. pp. 54 ff., below.
2) Cf. p. 87, n. 2, below.

his ecstasy and, in his eyes, transforms *saṃsāra* into *nirvāṇa*. The mysterious conversion of pain into pleasure, which accompanies the full realization of one's own Self, is to be found equally in aesthetic experience, which possesses the magical power of transfiguring the greatest sadness into the disinterested pleasure of contemplation. Pain, which is mobility, inquietude, has no place in aesthetic experience, which is rest, lysis and the fulfilment of all desires—unless it is converted magically into pleasure[1]. Abhinavagupta, while accepting, on the one hand, the solution put forward by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, did not fail, on the other, to show up clearly the boundary lines which separate the state of mystical consciousness from that of aesthetic consciousness. Religious experience, he argued, marks the complete disappearance of all polarity, the lysis of all dialexis in the dissolving fire of God: Sun and Moon, day and night, good and evil are consumed in the ardent flame of consciousness. The yogin remains, as it were, isolated in the compact solitude of his consciousness, far beyond any form of discursive thought[2]. In aesthetic experience, however, the feelings and the facts of everyday life, even if they are transfigured, are always present. In respect of its proper and irriducible character, therefore, which distinguishes it from any form of ordinary consciousness, aesthetic experience is not of a discursive order. On the other hand, as regards its content—which is nothing but ordinary life purified and freed from every individual relationship—aesthetic consciousness is no different from any other form of discursive con-

1) Cf. p. 90, below.
2) Cf. p. 100, below; *I.P.V.V.*, III, pp. 350-1.

sciousness. Art is not absence of life—every element of life appears in aesthetic experience—but it is life itself, pacified and detached from all passions[1]. Further devotion (which is a preliminary and unaivoidable moment of religious experience) postulates the complete abandon of the subject to the object of worship, God, *Parameśvara*[2], who, although being immanent and consubstantial, according to Abhinavagupta, with the thought which thinks Him, becomes in the religious moment as if transcendent to it and separate from it[3]. The purpose of the yogin is to identify himself with this transcendental object. Religious devotion implies therefore a constant drive towards an end which is outside it and, as such, is the very antithesis of aesthetic experience, which is perfect self-sufficiency.

What is the nature of poetic language? This problem attracted the attention, in the 9th century, of a rhetorician and philosopher by the name of Ānandavardhana[4]. In a justly famous book, on which Abhinavagupta was to comment a century and a half later, called the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana reached certain conclusions which were accepted, with some rare exceptions, by all later Indian aesthetic thinkers. Poetic language, he says, is dif-

1) *A. Bh.*, I, p. 340 (cf. Raghavan, p. 104): *tatra sarvarasānāṃ śāntaprāya evāsvādaḥ, viṣayebhyo viparivṛttyā* |
2) The *bhakti*, religious devotion, is *parameśvaraviṣayavaivaśyasamāveśarūpā* (*I.P.V.V.*, I, p. 25). Cf. p. 100, below.
3) In the very moment that thought (*vimarśa*, *saṃvit*, etc.), which, in reality, is nothing but subject, becomes the object of thought (*i.e.*, when it is taught, meditated upon, etc.), it transforms itself into the images of Ego (*aham*), Self (*ātman*), Consciousness (*saṃvid*), God (*Īśvara*, *Parameśvara*, *Śiva*), etc. This concept is fully developed and discussed in the *I.P.V.V.* and in the *I.P.V.*, I, 5, *śl.* 15-17. Cf. also the *I.P.V.V.*, I pp. 55, 56.
4) Cf. p. 59, n. 1, below.

ferent from the language of prose: it arouses in the reader echoes and feelings—in a word, aesthetic experience—foreign to prose, whose value is purely informative and didactic. The words in a prose text have, according to Indian linguistics, two or, in the view of some writers, three powers, of which the chief one is the power of denotation (*abhidhā*), the faculty, that is, of denoting a given object. Clearly, the power to arouse aesthetic experience cannot be reduced to this. Ānandavardhana conceives aesthetic experience in terms of a power (of a function, *vyāpāra*, *vṛtti*) which makes manifest, unexpectedly and without any noticeable bridge, a new sense, independent of the conventional sense. To this new sense, which is none other than Rasa, this school gave the name, which is difficult to translate, of *dhvani*, sound, or, more specifically, *rasadhvani*, the sound of Rasa. In his commentary, Abhinavagupta goes on to specify the relationship which exists between the words and Rasa. This is neither a naturalistic relationship between cause and effect nor a gnoseological relationship between the communicating sign and the thing communicated, but a relationship between what he calls—so as to distinguish the aesthetic fact from any other—manifestor and manifested. Rasa is neither caused nor made known by the poetic word, but is manifested by it. Aesthetic experience, manifested (and not produced nor expressed) by the poetic word, is not in a relationship of cause and effect with that which precedes and follows it, but marks, as it were, a magical break in the web of relationships of which everyday life, *saṃsāra*, is woven. The prose word, Abhinava says, is simply an instrument of information and, once it has fulfilled its tasks, that is to say, once it has been perceived, has no

further usefulness. The poetic word, on the contrary, is an end in itself and, once read and tasted, loses nothing of its intrinsic value, but remains, as it were, virgin and intact [1]. Art, Abhinavagupta says, in contradiction to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and to tradition in general, is not instructive, except indirectly, in so far as it sharpens the aesthetic sensibility and, therefore, the consciousness [2].

While the aesthetic experience, which concerns the spectator above all, was receiving so much attention, Indian thought did not neglect to examine the creative moment, in which the poet gives life and breath to his work. The chief thinkers to study the nature of the birth of a work of poetry were Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Tota and later Abhinavagupta, his immediate disciple. "In the infinite sea of poetry"—writes Ānandavardhana—"the poet is the true and sole creator and as it pleases him to create so the whole grows and is transformed" [3]. The poet is at once he who sees (the seer, *ṛṣi*) and he who is able to express that which he sees (*varṇanānipuṇa*) [4]. Rasa, the aesthetic state of consciousness, belongs, in reality, to the poet alone; it is nothing but his "generalized" consciousness [5]. It fills him entirely with itself and is translated spontaneously into poetic expression, like a liquid which overflows from a vase or like the natural or pre-discursive manifestation of a state of mind (interjections, exclamations, etc.) [6]. In other words, ar-

1) Cf. p. 59, n. 1, below.
2) Cf. p. 114, n. 2, below.
3) *Dh.Ā.*, p. 498.
4) Cf. the stanzas by Bhaṭṭa Tota, quoted by H.C., p. 432.
5) *A.Bh.*, I, p. 295: *kavigatasādhāraṇībhūtasaṃvinmūlaś ca kāvyapuraḥsaro naṭavyāpāraḥ, saiva ca saṃvit paramārthato rasaḥ* |
6) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 86: *rasaparipūrṇakumbhoccalanavac cittavṛttiniṣyandasvabhāvavāgvilāpādivac ca* ... Poetry, says A.G., is *rasasamuccalanasvabhāvā* (cf.

tistic creation is the direct or unconventional expression of a feeling or passion "generalized", that is, freed from all distinctions in time and space and therefore from all individual relationships and practical interests by an inner force within the poet himself, the creative or artistic intuition (*pratibhā*)[1]. This state of consciousness expressed in the poem, etc., is transferred to the actor, or the reciter, and to the spectator[2]. Born in the heart of the poet, it flowers, as it were, in the actor and bears fruit in the spectator[3]. All three, in the serene contemplation of the work of art form in reality a single knowing subject, fused together by the same sensations and the same purified joy[4].

Some theorists who came after Abhinava say that the moment of creation is not only joy but also toil and inner anxiety and, in this sense, they distinguish two phases, In the first of these phases—and this is the moment which

Dh.Ā.L., p. 87). A verse by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, quoted by A.G. (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 87) says:

yāvat pūrṇo na caitena tāvan naiva vamaty amum |

1) *A. Bh.*, I, p. 346: *kaveḥ varṇanānipuṇasya yaḥ* (scil. *bhāvo*) *antargato 'nādiprāktanasaṃskārapratibhānamayo, na tu laukikaviṣayajaḥ, deśakālādibhedābhāvāt sarvasādhāraṇībhāvenāsvādayogyas taṃ bhāvayan āsvādayogyīkurvan* . . . The text given by *A. Bh.* is in a poor state of preservation. The insertions *sādhāraṇam tadāpi* (for *sādhāraṇatayā*?) after *kaveḥ* and *rāgānta eva* after *viṣayajaḥ*, which I have omitted, are incomprehensible. I have quoted the text as it has been handed down by tradition (cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, comm., p. 498).

2) In the *A.Bh.*, II, p. 339, A.G. says that aesthetic sensibility (*sahṛdayatva*, literally the consent of the heart) is none other than the capacity to identify oneself with the heart of the poet (*kavihṛdayatādatmyāpattiyogyatā*).

3) Cf. *N.Ś.*, VI, v. 42. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 295: *tato vṛkṣasthānīyaṃ kāvyam* | *tatra puṣpādisthānīyo 'bhinayādivyāpāraḥ* | *tatra phalasthānīyaḥ sāmājikarasāsvādaḥ* |

4) Cf., for example, the verse by Bhaṭṭa Tota, quoted by A.G. (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 92):

nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuh samāno' nubhavas tataḥ |

may properly be called creative—the poet is fully occupied by the fatiguing necessity to give birth; in the second, he steps outside himself, as it were, and contemplates his own work with serenity in the same way as the ordinary spectator[1].

The force which makes possible the magical conversion of the passions into Rasa, freeing them thus of time and space, is the creative intuition, *pratibhā*. This power is none other than the same consciousness, the same Self. In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light—to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints[2]. The creation of a work of art is equal to the creation of a whole world which all at once opens in the creative intuition of the poet.

1) Cf. H.C., *viveka*, p. 4: *kaver api bhāvakāvasthāyām eva rasāsvādaḥ saṃpadyate pṛthag eva hi kavitvād bhāvakatvam* |

M.C. observes (ad *K.P.*, p. 7) that, in the moment of creation, the poet is immersed in pain, harassed by the thought of his work (*kāvyārthacintanapara*). It is not to be excluded that this concept also goes back to A.G. (it was discussed perhaps in his *Kāvyakautukavivaraṇa*, now lost, which treated fully of artistic creation). In the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 96, A.G. says that the poet cannot suffer—in the sense that he cannot be a prey to any ordinary passion—but this does not mean to say that he cannot be, at the same time, worried and harassed, as it were, by the effort of creation.

2) This concept is expressed in the *T.Ā.*, XI, pp. 60-62 (cf. *M.V.V.*, vv. 1031 onwards):

yathā yathā cākṛtakaṃ tadrūpam atiricyate |
tathā tathā camatkāratāratamyaṃ vibhāvyate ||
ādyamayīyavarṇāntarnimagne cottarottare |
saṃkete pūrvapurvāṃśamajjane pratibhābhidaḥ ||
ādyodrekamahattve'pi pratibhātmani niṣṭhitāh |
dhruvaṃ kavitvavaktṛtvaśālitāṃ yānti sarvataḥ ||
yāvad dhāmani saṃketanikārakalanojjhite |
viśrāntaś cinmaye kiṃ kiṃ na vetti na karoti ca ||

This creative intuition is the same consciousness, in the form of a creative vocality [1], which gives life to the lifeless and withdraws life from the living [2]. It is an inexhaustible treasure and source of new forms and new fantasies [3], no less real, although on a different plane, than those which populate and vary everyday life, the *saṃsāra*. From this point of view, artistic intuition is a particular hypostasis of universal or total intuition, that is to say, of consciousness as a force which creates and continually renews the Universe [4]. Three stanzas, quoted by Hemacandra and probably taken from Bhaṭṭa Tota, clearly define the unmistakeable characteristics of intuitive con-

1) Consciousness in so far as *parā vāk*, voice, supreme vocality, creative word; cf. *A.Bh.*, p. 4.

2) Cf. *Dh.Ā.*, p. 498:

bhāvān acetanān api cetanavac cetanān acetanavat |
vyavahārayati yatheṣṭam sukaviḥ kāvye svatantratayā ||

3) *Pratibhā* is defined thus in a famous verse by Bhaṭṭa Tota

prajña navanavollekhaśālinī pratibhā matā |

Pratibhā is a form of *prajñā*, intuitive consciousness. *Prajñā* and *pratibhā*, in the ordinary (not aesthetic) sense of the word describe the sudden knowledge of a future thing (for example, 'Tomorrow I shall see my brother', cf. *infra*, p. 58). Rājaśekhara (*K.M.*, IV) distinguishes between three forms of consciousness; *smṛti*, memory, which is the consciousness of things passed; *mati*, consciousness which refers to things present and *prajñā*, intuition, which refers to things future. Aesthetic intuition is like a form of direct perception (*pratyakṣakalpa*; on this term. cf. *infra*, p. 70, n. 1) of a non-discursive character (*nirvikalpa*); cf. H.C., *viveka*, p. 380, which derives without doubt from A.G.

4) Ānandavardhana (*Dh.Ā.*, p. 91) says that poetic intuition is a particular form of *pratibhā* (*pratibhāviśeṣam*). A.G.'s comment (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 92) is:

pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā | *tasya viśeṣo*
rasāvesavaiśadyasaundaryaṃ kāvyakṣamatvam |

The concept of *pratibhā* is identified in *śaiva* metaphysics with that of consciousness as creative emission (*visarga*); cf., p. es., *T.Ā.*, V., p. 432:

... *visargānandadharayā* | *siktam tad eva sad viśvam śaśvad navanavāyate* ||

sciousness and discursive consciousness [1]. In these stanzas, consciousness is described as being of two sorts; discursive consciousness, which is consciousness of the universal, and direct consciousness, which precedes the activity of the mind, transcends the domain of language and is thus consciousness of the particular. "The object of direct perception"—says the last of these stanzas—"is the particular. This and no other is the object of the language of good poets, gifted with intuition". Intuition is therefore a form of direct perception (*prajñā*), says another stanza, which—while the poet is completely absorbed in the labour and the search that precede poetical creation—is born unexpectedly from contact with the thing *in se* (*svarūpa* = *svalakṣaṇa*), that is to say, before any mental construction. In an image borrowed from mystical thought, poetic intuition is described as the third eye of Śiva, in virtue of which one perceives by direct intuition, independently, that is, of discursive knowledge, every form of existence, past, present and future [2]. The logical and practical categories of language are a diaphragm, an obstacle which comes between the reality and our consciousness. The difference between the poetical and the

1) H.C., *viveka*, p. 380:

ucyate vastunas tāvad dvairūpyam iha vidyate |
tatraikam anyasāmānyaṃ yad vikalpaikagocaraḥ ||
sa eva sarvaśabdānāṃ viṣayaḥ parikīrtitaḥ |
ata evābhidhīyante dhyāmalaṃ bodhayanty alam ||
viśiṣṭam asya yad rūpam tat pratyakṣasya gocaraḥ |
sa eva satkavigirāṃ gocaraḥ pratibhābhuvām ||

2) H.C., *viveka*, p. 380:

rasānuguṇaśabdārthacintāstimitacetasaḥ |
kṣaṇaṃ svarūpasparśotthā prajñaiva pratibhā kaveḥ ||
sā hi cakṣur bhagavatas tṛtīyam iti gīyate |
yena sākṣātkaroty eṣa bhāvāṃs traikālyavartinaḥ ||

ordinary language consists in this, that the former is devoid of these categories and therefore attains the reality before its solidification into the modes of discursive thought. In this sense, the poetical language is related to other unconventional forms of expression, namely interjections, intonation of voice and, on the religious plane, the mantras [1].

After Abhinavagupta, the study of aesthetics continued in India up po the present day, but without receiving any further creative stimulus. Ānandavardhana, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Bhaṭṭa Tota and Abhinava are still the most characteristic exponents of this subject and their thought, although at times uncertain and ingenuous, reaches, with Abhinavagupta, conclusions which are still valid today and even relatively novel to western thought. The conception of art as an activity and an independent spiritual experience, freed of practical interest, which the intuition of Kant perceived for the West, was already, in 10th century India, an object of study and controversy. Poetry, said Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is inextinguishable: it exists and will exist for ever. Like love, it has kindled and will continue to kindle the hearts of man with new and pulsing life [2]; it is an essential and independent part of human nature and the poets, who will never cease to tap its source, far from exhausting it, only purify and enrich it with new and ever-changing experiences [3].

1) Cf. *P.T.V*, p. 202: *eta eva hi* [scil. *svarāḥ*] *cittavṛttisūcakā nādātmakāḥ karuṇāśṛṅgāraśāntādikāṃ cittavṛttim ākrandanacāṭukastutyādau kevalā vā yonivarṇaniviṣṭā vā tiryaktattadaharjātādiṣv api prathamata evāpatantaḥ saṃketavighnādinairapekṣyeṇaiva saṃvidāsannavartitvāt svarakākvādirūpatām aśnuvānāḥ prakāśayanti* |

2) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 540.

3) *Dh.Ā.*, pp. 545-6.

TEXT

[*A. Bh.*, I, pp. 274–287]

evaṃ kramahetum abhidhāya rasaviṣaya[1]lakṣaṇasūtram āha[2] "vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ"[3] | atra bhaṭṭalollaṭaprabhṛtayas tāvad evaṃ vyācakhyuḥ[4] | vibhāvādibhiḥ saṃyogo 'rthāt sthāyinaḥ, tato rasaniṣpattiḥ | tatra vibhāvāś[5] cittavṛtteḥ sthāyyātmikāyā utpattau kāraṇam | anubhāvāś ca na rasajanyā atra vivakṣitāḥ, teṣāṃ rasakāraṇatvena gaṇanānarhatvāt, api tu bhāvānām eva ye 'nubhāvāḥ | vyabhicāriṇaś ca cittavṛttyātmakatvād yady api na sahabhāvinaḥ sthāyinā, tathāpi vāsanātmateha tasya vivakṣitā | dṛṣṭānte 'pi vyañjanādimadhye kasyacid vāsanātmakatā sthāyivad anyasyodbhūtatā vyabhicārivat[6] | tena sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacito rasaḥ | sthāyī tv[7] anupacitaḥ | sa cobhayor api mukhyayā vṛttyā rāmādāv anukārye 'nukartari ca naṭe rāmādirūpatānusaṃdhānabalād iti[8] |

cirantanānāṃ cāyam eva pakṣaḥ[9] | tathā hi daṇḍinā svālaṃkāralakṣaṇe 'bhyadhāyi[10] "ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṃ gatā rūpabāhulyayogena[11]" iti,

ity āruhya parāṃ koṭiṃ kopo raudrātmatāṃ gataḥ[12] |

ityādi ca[13] |

[1] D; G reads *rasaviṣayam* || [2] *evaṃ*... is omitted by H.C. || [3] *N.Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 33 || [4] G; H.C.: *tatra bhaṭṭalollaṭas tāvad evaṃ vyācakṣate* || [5] I prefer; G, etc.: *vibhāvaś*, equally good || [6] Cf. *N.Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 33 (*A. Bh.*, I, pp. 288 ff.). H.C. omits *dṛṣṭānte 'pi*... || [7] H.C.; G: *sthāyī [bhava]tv anupacitaḥ*; D: *sthāyī bhavaty anupacitaḥ* || [8] G, etc.; D: *sa cobhayo 'py' anukārye 'nukartary api [vi]cārānusaṃdhānabalād iti* || [9] G; *cirantanānām*... is omitted by H.C. || [10] G; D: ...*daṇḍināpy alaṅkāra°*; H.C. gives only: *tathā cāha daṇḍī* || [11] *K.Ād.*, II, v. 281: *prāk prītir darśitā seyaṃ ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṃ gatā | rūpabāhulyayogena tad idaṃ rasavad vacaḥ* || H.C. replaces *°yogena* with *°yogataḥ* || [12] *K.Ād.*, II, v. 283; G: *adhiruhya*...; H.C.: *āruhya ca*... These readings are also admissible || [13] G; *ityādi ca* is omitted by H.C. ||

etan neti śrīśaṅkukaḥ |[1] vibhāvādyayoge sthāyino liṅgābhāvenāvagatyanupapatteḥ, bhāvānāṃ pūrvam abhidheyatāprasaṅgāt, sthitadaśāyāṃ lakṣaṇāntaravaiyarthyāt, mandamanda tara mandatam amādh yasthyādyānantyāpatteḥ [2], hāsyarase ṣoḍhātvābhāvaprāpteḥ, kāmāvasthāsu daśasv asaṅkhyarasabhāvādiprasaṅgāt, śokasya prathamaṃ tīvratvaṃ kālāt tu māndyadarśanaṃ, krodhotsāharatīnām amarṣasthairyasevāviparyaye hrāsadarśanam iti viparyayasya dṛśyamānatvāc ca | tasmād dhetubhir vibhāvākhyaiḥ kāryaiś cānubhāvatmabhiḥ sahacārirūpaiś ca vyabhicāribhiḥ prayatnārjitatayā kṛtrimair api tathānabhimānyamānair anukartṛsthatvena liṅgabalataḥ pratīyamānaḥ sthāyibhāvo mukhyarāmādigatasthāyyanukaraṇarūpaḥ, anukaraṇarūpatvād [3] eva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadiṣṭo rasaḥ | vibhāvā hi kāvyabalād anusaṃdheyāḥ[4], anubhāvāḥ śikṣātaḥ, vyabhi-
A. Bh., I, p. 275 cāriṇaḥ kṛtrimanijānu*bhāvārjanabalāt | sthāyī tu kāvyabalād api nānusaṃdheyaḥ | ratiḥ śoka ityādayo hi śabdā ratyādikam abhidheyīkurvanty abhidhānatvena, na tu vācikābhinayarūpatayāvagamayanti | na hi vāg eva vācikam api tu tayā nirvṛttam, aṅgair ivāṅgikam | tena |

vivṛddhātmāpy agādho 'pi duranto 'pi mahān api |
vāḍaveneva jaladhiḥ śokaḥ krodhena pīyate [5] ||

iti | tathā |

śokena [6] kṛtastambhas [7]
tathā sthito yena vardhitākrandaiḥ [8] |

[1] G; H.C. and M.C. p. 65 add *tathā hi* || [2] H.C.; G: *mandataratama°*, non inadmissible (*manda-°tara-°tama*) || [3] G, etc.; D: *mukhyarāmādigatasthāyyanukaraṇarūpatvād* || [4] D, H.C.; G: *kāvyabalānu°* [5] Unidentified stanza. D omits the two first *pada* of this stanza || [6] Metre: *āryā* || [7] H.C.; G: *kṛtaḥ stambhaḥ* || [8] H.C.; G: *yo 'navasthitākrandaiḥ*; D: *yo 'vasthitākrandaiḥ* ||

hṛdayasphuṭanabhayārtai
roditum [1] abhyarthyate sacivaiḥ [2] ||

ityevamādau na śoko 'bhineyo 'pi tv abhidheyaḥ |

bhāti [3] patito likhantyās
tasyā bāṣpāmbuśīkarakaṇaughaḥ |
svedodgama iva karatala-
saṃsparśād eṣa me vapuṣi [4] ||

ity anena tu vākyena [5] svārtham abhidadhatā udayanagataḥ sukhātmā ratiḥ sthāyibhāvo [6] 'bhinīyate na tūcyate | avagamanaśaktir hy abhinayanaṃ [7] vācakatvād anyā | ata eva sthāyipadaṃ sūtre bhinnavibhaktikam api muninā noktam [8] | tena ratir anukriyamāṇā śṛṅgāra iti tadātmakatvaṃ tatprabhavatvaṃ ca yuktam [9] | arthakriyāpi mithyājñānād dṛṣṭā [10] |

maṇipradīpaprabhayor maṇibuddhyābhidhāvatoḥ |
mithyājñānāviśeṣe 'pi [11] viśeṣo 'rthakriyāṃ prati [12] ||

iti | na cātra nartaka eva sukhīti pratipattiḥ, nāpy ayam eva rāma iti, na cāpy ayaṃ na sukhīti, nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti [13], na cāpi tatsadṛśa iti | kiṃ tu samyaṅmithyāsaṃśayasādṛśyapratītibhyo vilakṣaṇā citraturagādinyāyena [14] yaḥ sukhī rāma asāv ayam iti pratītir astīti | yad [15] āha |

[1] H.C.; G, D: *arditum*; D, in a note *āditum* || [2] Unidentified stanza. The two last *pada* of this stanza are omitted by D || [3] Metre: *āryā* || [4] Harṣa, *Ratnāvalī*, II, 11 || [5] D reads: *bhāti patito likhantyā iti anena tu vākyena* || [6] H.C.; G: *ratisthāyī(yi?)bhāvo* || [7] G; H.C.: *avagamanā śaktir hy avagamanaṃ* || [8] G; H.C.: *nopāttam* || [9] G; *iti*... is omitted by H.C. || [10] H.C.; G: *mithyājñānadṛṣṭā*; D: *mithyājñānādṛṣṭā* || [11] H.C.; G: *°viśeṣo 'pi* || [12] *P.V.*, II, v. 57. This stanza is omitted by D; G quotes it in round brackets. [13] *nāpi rāmaḥ*... is omitted by D || [14] *samyaṅmithyā°*... is omitted by D || [15] H.C.; G: *tad* ||

pratibhāti na saṃdeho na tattvaṃ na viparyayaḥ |
dhīr asāv ayam ity asti nāsāv evāyam ity api ||
viruddhabuddhyasaṃbhedād [1] avivecitaviplavaḥ [2] |
yuktyā paryanuyujyeta sphurann anubhavaḥ kayā || [3] iti |

tad idam apy antastattvaśūnyaṃ na [4] vimardakṣamam ity upādhyāyāḥ [5] | tathā hy anukaraṇarūpo rasa iti yad ucyate tat 1) kiṃ sāmājikapratītyabhiprāyeṇa, 2) uta
A. Bh., I, p. 276 naṭābhiprāyeṇa, 3) kiṃ vā * vastuvṛttavivecakavyākhyātṛbuddhisamavalambanena yathāhur "vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti [6]" iti, 4) atha bharatamunivacanānusāreṇa |

1) ādyaḥ [7] pakṣo 'saṃgataḥ | kiṃcid dhi pramāṇenopalabdhaṃ [8] tad anukaraṇam iti śakyaṃ vaktum | yathā evam asau surāṃ pibatīti surāpānānukaraṇatvena payaḥpānaṃ pratyakṣāvalokitam pratibhāti | iha ca naṭagataṃ kiṃ tad upalabdhaṃ yat sa ity anukaraṇatayā [9] bhātīti cintyam | taccharīraṃ tanniṣṭhaṃ pratiśīrṣakādi romāñca [10] gadgadikādi bhujākṣepacalana [11] prabhṛti bhrūkṣepakaṭākṣādikaṃ ca na rateś cittavṛttirūpatayā [12] nukāratvena kasyacit pratibhāti | jaḍatvena bhinnendriyagrāhyatvena bhinnādhikaraṇatvena ca [13] tato 'tivailakṣaṇyāt |

[1] H.C.; G, P, p. 417: *viruddhabuddhisaṃbhedād* || [2] H.C., M.C., p. 67; G: °*saṃplavaḥ*, equally good; some texts (cf., e.g., *K.P.*, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, LXXXVIII, p. 107) give °*vikriyaḥ* || [3] On these stanzas see translation, p. 38 || [4] *na* is omitted by D || [5] G; D: *ity upādhyāyaḥ*; H.C.: iti *bhaṭṭatotaḥ* || [6] *P.V.*, *svavṛtti*, MS., leaf 23 *b*, l. 2 (cf. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition, p. 170): *vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ | te tu svālambanam evārthakriyāyogyaṃ manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekīkṛtya pravartante* | This passage belongs to the commentary to stanzas 70–72. [7] G; H.C. adds *tatra* || [8] D, H.C.; G: *pramāṇopalabdhaṃ* || [9] M.C., p. 69, H.C., in a note; G: *tadanukaraṇatayā*; D: *sad anukaraṇatayā*; H.C.: *yad ratyanukaraṇatayā*; P, p. 417: *yad anukaraṇatayā* || [10] H.C.; G: *romāñcaka*° || [11] H.C.; G: °*valana*° || [12] G; H.C.: *rateś cittavṛttirūpāyā anu*°; M.C., p. 69: *cittavṛttirūparater anu*° || [13] G; *ca* is omitted by H.C. ||

mukhyāmukhyāvalokane [1] ca tadanukaraṇapratibhāsaḥ | na ca rāmagatāṃ ratim upalabdhapūrviṇaḥ kecit | etena rāmānukārī naṭa ity api nirastaḥ pravādaḥ | atha naṭagatā cittavṛttir eva pratipannā satī ratyanukāraḥ śṛṅgāra ity ucyate tatrāpi kimātmakatvena sā pratīyata iti cintyam | nanu pramadādibhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ kaṭākṣādibhiḥ kāryaiḥ dhṛtyādibhiś ca sahacāribhir liṅgabhūtair yā laukikī kāryarūpā kāraṇarūpā [2] sahacārirūpā ca cittavṛttiḥ [3] pratītiyogyā tadātmakatvena sā naṭacittavṛttiḥ pratibhāti | hanta tarhi ratyākāreṇaiva [4] pratipanneti dūre ratyanukaraṇatāvācoyuktiḥ | nanu vibhāvādayo 'nukārye pāramārthikā, iha tv anukartari na tatheti viśeṣaḥ | astv evam, kiṃ tu te [5] vibhāvādayo 'tatkāraṇātatkāryātatsahacararūpā [6] api [7] kāvyaśikṣādibalopakalpitāḥ [8] kṛtrimāḥ santaḥ kiṃ kṛtrimatvena sāmājikair gṛhyante na vā | yadi gṛhyante, tadā taiḥ kathaṃ rater avagatiḥ | nanv ata eva tat pratīyamānaṃ ratyanukaraṇam | mugdhabuddheḥ [9] | kāraṇāntaraprabhaveṣu hi kāryeṣu suśikṣitena [10] tathājñāne [11] vastvantarasyānumānaṃ tāvad yuktam | asuśikṣitena [12] tu tasyaiva prasiddhasya kāraṇasya | yathā [13] vṛścikaviśeṣād gomayasyaivānumānaṃ vṛścikasyaiva [14] tat paraṃ [15] mithyājñānam | yatrāpi li-

[1] G; H.C.: *mukhyāvalokane* || [2] G, M.C., p. 70; *kāraṇarūpā* is omitted by H.C. || [3] H.C., M.C., p. 70; *cittavṛttiḥ* is omitted by G || [4] G, etc.; D: *ratyādikāraṇaiva* || [5] H.C.; G: *te hi*; D: *tarhi* || [6] H.C. (G gives the same reading in a note); G, M.C., p. 70, P, p. 418: *anantakāraṇānantakāryānantasahacararūpā* || [7] *api* is omitted by D || [8] G, etc.; D: *anukāryaśikṣādi*° || [9] H.C., M.C., p. 70; G: *ratyanukaraṇaṃ buddheḥ kāraṇam*; P, p. 418: *ratyanukaraṇabuddheḥ kāraṇam* || [10] H.C.; G adds [*na*] after *suśikṣitena*; D: *śikṣitena na* || [11] G; H.C. °*jñāte* || [12] G, etc.; D: *astu, śi*° || [13] G, etc.; D: *tathā* || [14] G: *gomayasyevānumānaṃ* . . .; D: *vṛścikaś caiva*; H.C.: *vṛścikasyaiva vā*; P, p. 418 paraphrases: *gomayasyaivānumānaṃ, vṛścikaviṣayatvena tajjñānaṃ kevalaṃ mithyājñānam* || [15] G, etc.; D: *para*°. *paraṃ* = *kevalam*; cf. *Ī.P.V.*, II, p. 73: *tat* [scil. *pramāṇaṃ*] *paraṃ* [= *kevalaṃ*] *miśrikāreṣu teṣu ābhāseṣu gṛhītagrāhi na pramāṇam* ||

ṅgajñānaṃ [1] mithyā tatrāpi na tadābhāsānumānaṃ yuktam [2] | na hi bāṣpād [3] dhūmatvena jñātād [4] anukārapratibhāsamānād api liṅgāt tadanukārānumānaṃ yuktam [5] | dhūmānukāratvena [6] hi jñāyamānān nīhārān nā-
A. Bh. I, p. 377 gnyanukārajapāpuñjapratītir [7] dṛṣṭā | * nanv akruddho 'pi naṭaḥ kruddha iva bhāti | satyam, kruddhena sadṛśaḥ | sādṛśyaṃ ca bhrukuṭyādibhir gor [8] iva gavayena mukhādibhir iti naitāvatānukāraḥ kaścit | na cāpi sāmājikānāṃ sādṛśyamatir asti | sāmājikānāṃ [9] ca na bhāvaśūnyā nartake pratipattir ity ucyate | atha ca tadanukārapratibhāsa iti riktā vācoyuktiḥ [10] | yac coktaṃ rāmo 'yam ity asti pratipattiḥ, tad api yadi tadātve' tiniścitaṃ [11] taduttarakālabhāvibādhakavaidhuryābhāve kathaṃ na tattvajñānaṃ syāt | bādhakasadbhāve vā kathaṃ na mithyājñānam | vāstavena ca vṛttena bādhakānudaye 'pi mithyājñānam eva syāt | tena "viruddhabuddhyasaṃbhedād [12]" ity asat | nartakāntare 'pi ca [13] rāmo 'yam iti pratipattir asti | tataś ca rāmatvaṃ sāmānyarūpam ity āyātam | yac cocyate vibhāvāḥ kāvyād [14] anusaṃdhīyante tad api na vidmaḥ | na hi mameyaṃ sītā kācid iti pratipattir [15] naṭasya | atha sāmājikasya tathā pratītiyogyāḥ kriyanta ity

[1] D, H.C., M.C., p. 70; G: *dhūmaliṅgajñānam* ‖ [2] G; H.C.: *tatrāpi... ayuktam*; P, p. 418: *tatrāpi... yuktam*; D: *abhyāsānumānam* ‖ [3] G, etc.; D: *bāṣpa°* ‖ [4] G, etc.; D: *jñānād* ‖ [5] H.C. paraphrases: *na hi bāṣpād dhūmatvena jñātād agnyanukārānumānaṃ, tadanukāratvena pratibhāsamānād api liṅgān na tadanukārānumānaṃ yuktam...* ‖ [6] G, etc.; D: *dhūmākāratvena* ‖ [7] H.C., M.C., p. 70; G: *nāṭyā(gnya?)japāpuṣpapratītir*; D: *naṭye' nukārajabāpuṣpapratītir* ‖ [8] H.C., M.C., p. 71; G: *gaur* ‖ [9] G, etc.; M.C., p. 71 paraphrases: *ato hetoḥ sabhyānāṃ...* ‖ [10] G, etc.; M.C., p. 71 paraphrases: *atha ca tadanukārapratipattir iti svavacanavirodhaḥ* ‖ [11] D (the *avagraha* added by me); G: *tadātveti niścitam*; P, p. 458: *tadātve iti niścitaṃ*; H.C. *tadāt-ve niścitaṃ* ‖ [12] D, H.C.; G: *°buddhi(ddhya?)saṃbhedāt*. Cf. *supra*, p. 6 ‖ [13] G; *ca* is omitted by H.C. and M.C. ‖ [14] G, etc.; D: *kāryād* ‖ [15] G; H.C., M.C., p. 71 *svātmīyatvena pratipattir* ‖

etad [1] evānusaṃdhānam ucyate, tarhi sthāyini sutarām anusaṃdhānaṃ syāt | tasyaiva hi mukhyatvena asminn ayam iti sāmājikānāṃ pratipattiḥ | yas tu [2] vāg vācikam [3] ityādinā bhedābhidhānasaṃrambhagarbho mahīyān abhinayarūpatāvivekaḥ [4] kṛtaḥ sa uttaratra svāvasare carcayiṣyate [5] | tasmāt sāmājikapratītyanusāreṇa sthāyyanukaraṇaṃ rasa [6] ity asat |

2) na cāpi naṭasyetthaṃ pratipattiḥ rāmaṃ taccittavṛttiṃ vānukaromīti | sadṛśakaraṇam hi tāvad anukaraṇam anupalabdhaprakṛtinā [7] na śakyaṃ kartum | atha paścātkaraṇam anukaraṇam, tal loke 'py anukaraṇātmatātiprasaktā [8] | atha na niyatasya kasyacid anukāraḥ, api tūttamaprakṛteḥ śokam anukaromīti [9], tarhi keneti cintyam | na tāvac chokena tasya tadabhāvāt | na cāśrupātādinā śokasyānukāraḥ, tadvailakṣaṇyād ity uktam | iyat [10] tu syāt, uttamaprakṛter ye śokānubhāvās tān anukaromīti | tatrāpi kasyottamoprakṛteḥ | yasya kasyacid iti cet, so 'pi viśiṣṭatāṃ vinā kathaṃ buddhāv āropayituṃ śakyaḥ | ya evaṃ roditīti cet, svātmāpi madhye naṭasyānupraviṣṭa iti galito 'nukāryānukartṛbhāvaḥ [11] | kiṃ ca naṭaḥ śikṣāvaśāt svavibhāvasmaraṇāc cittavṛttisādhāraṇībhāvena [12] hṛdayasaṃvādāt kevalam [13] anubhāvān [14] pradarśayan kāvyam upacitakākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa [15] paṭhaṃś ceṣṭata ity etāvanmātre 'sya [16] pratītir na tv anukāraṃ vedayate | kān-

[1] G; H.C., M.C., p. 71: *etāvad* ‖ [2] D; G: *yat tu* ‖ [3] Cf. *supra*, p. 4 ‖ [4] I propose; G: *°garbhamahīyān ...*; D: *bhedāabhidhānasāraḥ... hīnayābhinaya°* ‖ [5] *yas tu vāg vācikam...* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [6] G; H.C.: *rasā* ‖ [7] G, etc.; D: *°prakṛtīnāṃ* ‖ [8] G, etc.; D: *anukaraṇātmiketi prasaktā* ‖ [9] H.C., M.C., 71; G: *anukarotīti* ‖ [10] G; H.C.: *yat tu syāt...* ‖ [11] G, etc.; D: *°bhedaḥ* ‖ [12] G; H.C.: *svavibhāvasmarac-citta°* ‖ [13] G; H.C.: *kevalān* ‖ [14] H.C.; G: *anubhavān* ‖ [15] G, H.C.; D: *kāvyasamucitakākuprabhṛtyupasaṃskāreṇa* ‖ [16] G; H.C.: *etāvanmātrasya* ‖

taveṣānukāravad dhi na rāmaceṣṭitasyānukāraḥ | etac ca prathamādhyāye 'pi darśitam asmābhiḥ [1] |

3) nāpi vastutvānusāreṇa [2] tadanukāratvam [3], asaṃvedyamānasya [4] vastuvṛttatvānupapatteḥ | yac ca vastuvṛttaṃ tad darśayiṣyāmaḥ [5] |

4) na ca munivacanam evaṃvidham asti kvacit sthāy-
A. Bh., I, p. 273 yanukaraṇam rasa [6] iti | * nāpi liṅgam atrārthe [7] muner upalabhyate | pratyuta dhruvā [8] gānatālavaicitryalāsyāṅgopajīvanaṃ nirūpaṇādi viparyaye [9] liṅgam iti saṃdhyaṅgādhyāyānte vitaniṣyāmaḥ [10] | "saptadvīpānukaraṇam" [11] ityādi tv anyathāpi śakyagamanikam iti | tadanukāre 'pi ca kva nāmāntaraṃ kāntaveṣagatyanukaraṇādau [12] |

yac cocyate varṇakair haritālādibhiḥ saṃyujyamāna eva gaur ityādi, tatra yady abhivyajyamāna ity artho 'bhipretas tad asat | na hi sindūrādibhiḥ pāramārthiko gaur abhivyajyate [13] pradīpādibhir iva, kiṃ tu tatsadṛśaḥ samūhaviśeṣo nirvartyate | ta eva [14] hi sindūrādayo gavāvayavasaṃniveśasadṛśena saṃniveśaviśeṣeṇāvasthitā gosadṛg iti pratibhāsasya viṣayo [15] naivaṃ vibhāvādisamūho ratisadṛśatāpratipattigrāhyaḥ [16] | tasmāt bhāvānukaraṇaṃ rasa ity asat [17] |

[1] *etac ca...* is omitted by H.C. Cf. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 37 ‖ [2] G; H.C.: *vastuvṛttānusāreṇa* ‖ [3] G, H.C.; D: *tadanusāratvam* ‖ [4] H.C.; G: *a[nu]saṃvedyamānasya*; D: *anusaṃvedyamānasya* ‖ [5] *yac ca...* is omitted by H.C. Cf. *infra*, pp. 14 ff. ‖ [6] G; H.C.: *rasā* ‖ [7] Corr.; G: *liṅgamātrārthe* ‖ [8] G: *dhruva°* ‖ [9] D; G: *nirūpaṇādi°* ‖ [10] *A. Bh.*, III, ch. XIX ‖ [11] *N.Ś.*, I, v. 120 ‖ [12] G; D: *tad anukāre picatvanāmāntaraṃ* (?)... Text doubtful. *kiṃ ca nataḥ...* is omitted by M.C.; *nāpi liṅgam atrārthe...* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [13] G, etc.; D: *gaur iti vyajyate* ‖ [14] H.C., etc.; G, P, p. 418: *ata eva* ‖ [15] H.C.; G has *gosadṛśiti*, perhaps intended for *gosadṛśā iti*, which reading would be better than that adopted by me in the text. P, p. 418: *gosadṛśatāpratibhāsasya viṣayāḥ*; M.C., p. 72 paraphrases: *gosadṛg iti pratibhāsam utpādayanti* ‖ [16] G, etc.; D: *sadṛśatāpratigrāhyaḥ* ‖ [17] G, etc.; H.C.: *rasā* ‖

yena tv abhyadhāyi sukhaduḥkhajananaśaktiyuktā viṣayasāmagrī bāhyaiva sāṃkhyadṛśā sukhaduḥkhasvabhāvo rasaḥ | tasyāṃ ca sāmagryāṃ dalasthānīyā vibhāvāḥ, saṃskārakā anubhāvavyabhicāriṇaḥ, sthāyinas tu tatsāmagrījanyā āntarāḥ sukhaduḥkhasvabhāvā iti | tena "sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneṣyāma" [1] ityādāv upacāram aṅgīkurvatā granthavirodhaṃ svayam eva budhyamānena dūṣaṇāviṣkaraṇamaukharyāt [2] prāmāṇiko janaḥ [3] parirakṣita iti kim asyocyate | yat tv anyat tatpratītivaiṣamyaprasaṅgādi tat kiyad atrocyatām [4] |

bhaṭṭanāyakas tv āha | raso na pratīyate, notpadyate, nābhivyajyate | svagatatvena hi pratītau karuṇe duḥkhitvaṃ syāt | na ca sā pratītir yuktā sītāder avibhāvatvāt, svakāntāsmṛtyasaṃvedanāt, devatādau sādhāraṇīkaraṇāyogyatvāt, samudrollaṅghanāder asādhāraṇyāt | na ca tadvato [5] rāmasya smṛtir anupalabdhatvāt | na ca śabdānumānādibhyas tatpratītau lokasya sarasatā yuktā [6] pratyakṣād iva | nāyakayugalakāvabhāse hi pratyuta lajjājugupsāspṛhādisvocitacittavṛtty [7] antarodayavyagratayā kā sarasatvakathāpi syāt [8] | paragatatvena tu pratītau tāṭasthyam eva bhavet [9] | tan na pratītir anubhavasmṛtyādirūpā rasasya yuktā | utpattāv api tulyam etad dūṣaṇam |

[1] *N.Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 50 (in a note); D: *sthāyibhāvānurasatvam ityādāv...* ‖ [2] H.C.; G, P, p. 419: *°maurkhyāt* ‖ [3] G, etc.; H.C.: *pramāṇikajanaḥ* ‖ [4] H.C., G (in round brackets followed by a note of interrogation); G, P, p. 419: *yat tv atyantaṃ naḥ pra°*; D: *...tat kiṃ yad atrocyatām* ‖ [5] G; H.C.: *tattvato*. Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 181: *na cotsāhādimān rāmaḥ smaryate ananubhūtatvāt* ‖ [6] H.C., P, p. 419; G: *lokasya* (G: *laukasya*) *sarasatā prayuktā* ‖ [7] G, P, p. 419; H.C.: *°svocitavṛtti°* ‖ [8] H.C.; G: *lajjājugupsāspṛhādisvocitacittavṛttyantarodayaḥ | avyagratayākāśāsatvam athāpi syat tan na*; D: *...°antarodayamavyagratayākaśa* (?) *rasatvamathāpi syāt*; P. p. 419 paraphrases: *lajjājugupsāspṛhādisvocitacittavṛttyantarodayaḥ syāt, tan na pratītir anubhavasmṛtyādirūparasasya yuktā* ‖ [9] H.C.; G and D omit this sentence, which has been probably added by H.C. ‖

śaktirūpatvena pūrvaṃ sthitasya [1] paścād abhivyaktau viṣayārjanatāratamyāpattiḥ | svagataparagatatvādi ca pūrvavad vikalpyam | tasmāt kāvye [2] doṣābhāvaguṇālaṃkāramayatvalakṣaṇena, nāṭye [3] caturvidhābhinayarūpeṇa nividanijamohasaṃkaṭatānivāraṇakāriṇā [4] vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanābhidhāto dvitīyenāṃśena bhāvakatvavyā-
A. Bh., I, p. 279 pāreṇa bhāvyamāno * raso 'nubhavasmṛtyādivilakṣaṇena [5] rajastamo'nuvedhavaicitryabalād [6] drutivistaravikāsātmanā [7] sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayanijasaṃvidviśrāntilakṣaṇena [8] parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena paraṃ bhujyata iti | yat saivāha [9] |

abhidhā bhāvanā cānyā tad bhogīkṛtam [10] eva ca |
abhidhādhāmatāṃ yāte śabdārthālaṃkṛtī tataḥ ||
bhāvanābhāvya eṣo 'pi śṛṅgārādigaṇo hi yat [11] |
tad bhogīkṛtarūpeṇa vyāpyate siddhimān naraḥ || [12] iti |

tatra pūrvapakṣo 'yaṃ bhaṭṭalollaṭapakṣānabhyupagamād eva nābhyupagata iti taddūṣaṇam anutthānopahatam eva [13] | pratītyādivyatiriktaś ca saṃsāre ko bhoga iti na vidmaḥ | rasaneti cet, sāpi [14] pratipattir eva, kevalam upāyavailakṣaṇyān nāmāntaraṃ pratipadyatām, darśanānumitiśrutyupamitipratibhānādināmāntaravat | niṣpādanābhivyaktidvayānabhyupagame ca nityo vā 'san [15] vā rasa iti na [16] tṛtīyā

[1] G, etc.; D: *pūrvasthitasya* || [2] G, etc.; P, p. 419: *kāvyena* || [3] G, etc.; P, p. 419: *nāṭyena* || [4] G, etc.; D: °*saṅkaṭanivāraṇa*° || [5] G, etc.; D: *'nubhavās smṛty*° || [6] G, etc.; P, p. 419: *rajastamo'nanuvedha*°. Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 183 || [7] H.C.; G, P, p. 419: *hṛdi vistāravikāsalakṣaṇena*; D: *ativikāsavistara*°. Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, pp. 183 and 189 || [8] H.C., D; G, P, p. 419: °*vilakṣaṇena* || [9] H.C.; G puts the following two stanzas after *iti kā tritveneyattā* (*infra*, p. 13). They are omitted by D || [10] G; H.C.: *bhogīkṛtir*, admissible || [11] G; H.C. replaces *hi yat* with *mataḥ* || [12] On these stanzas see translation, p. 57 || [13] G, etc.; D: °*pagatam eva* || [14] G, etc.; D: *sāpy atra prati*° || [15] H.C.; G: *'sad* || [16] H.C. etc.; *na* is omitted by G ||

gatiḥ syāt | na cāpratītaṃ vastv asti vyavahāre yogyam [1] | athocyate pratītir asya [2] bhogīkaraṇam, tac ca drutyādisvarūpam [3] | tad astu, tathāpi na tāvanmātram | yāvanto hi rasās tāvatya eva rasanātmanaḥ [4] pratītayo bhogīkaraṇasvabhāvāḥ | sattvādiguṇānāṃ [5] cāṅgāṅgivaicitryam anantaṃ kalpyam [6] iti kā tritveneyattā |

bhāvanābhāvya eṣo 'pi śṛṅgārādigaṇo hi yat | [7]

iti tu yat [8] kāvyena bhāvyante rasā ity ucyate, tatra vibhāvādijanitacarvaṇātmakāsvādarūpapratyayagocaratāpādanam [9] eva yadi bhāvanaṃ [10] tad abhyupagamyata eva | yat tūktam |

bhāvasaṃyojanāvyaṅgyaparasaṃvittigocaraḥ |
āsvādanātmānubhavo rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate [11] ||

iti tatra vyajyamānatayā vyaṅgyo rakṣyate [12] | anubhavena [13] ca tadviṣaya iti mantavyam | nanv evaṃ kathaṃ rasatattvam | āstām, kiṃ kurmaḥ |

āmnāyasiddhe [14] kim apūrvam etat
saṃvidvikāse 'dhigatāgamitvam |
itthaṃ svayaṃgrāhyamahārhahetu-
dvandvena kiṃ dūṣayitā na lokaḥ ||

[1] G; H.C.: *astitāvyavahārayogyam*, admissible; the author perhaps wrote *astītivyavahārayogyam* | [2] G, etc.; D: *pratītir iti rasasya* || [3] H.C.; G: *ratyādisvarūpam* || [4] Read. G, D: *tāvanta eva rasanātmanaḥ* [G adds (*rasā?*) after *rasanā*]; H.C.: *tāvatya eva rasātmānaḥ* || [5] G, etc.; D: *guṇānām* (without *sattvādi*°) || [6] G, etc.; D: *akalpyam* || [7] H.C., D; cf. p. 12, n. 9 || [8] H.C.; *tu* is omitted by G || [9] H.C.; G: °*gocaratāpānam* || [10] G; H.C.: *yadi bhaved bhāvanaṃ* || [11] This stanza is quoted in this form in the *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 74 (read *parasaṃvitti*° for *parisaṃvitti*°). G: *saṃvedanākhyavyaṅgya(sva)parasaṃvittigocaraḥ*, etc.; D: *saṃvedanākhyavyaṅgya[s tu] parasaṃvittigocaraḥ | āsvādanātmānubhāvo rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate* || Cf. P, p. 449. H.C. quotes a different stanza: *saṃsargādir yathā śāstra ekatvāt phalayogataḥ | vākyārthas tadvad evātra śṛṅgārādī raso mataḥ* || *iti* | *tad asmākam abhimatam eva* || [12] G; D: *lakṣyate* || [13] G; D: *anubhāvena* || [14] Metre: *indravajrā* and *upajāti* of *indravajrā* and *upendravajrā* ||

A. Bh. I, p. 280 *ūrdhvordham āruhya yad arthatattvaṃ
dhīḥ paśyati śrāntim avedayantī [1] |
alaṃ tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānāṃ
vivekasopānaparaṃparāṇām ||
citraṃ nirālambanam eva manye
prameyasiddhau prathamāvatāram |
tanmārgalābhe sati setubandha-
purapratiṣṭhādi na vismayāya ||
tasmāt satām atra na dūṣitāni
matāni tāny eva tu śodhitāni |
pūrvapratiṣṭhāpitayojanāsu
mūlapratiṣṭhāphalam āmananti [2] ||

tarhy ucyatāṃ pariśuddhatattvam [3] | uktam eva muninā, na tv apūrvaṃ kiṃcit | tathā hy āha "kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāḥ" [4] iti tat [5] kāvyārtho rasaḥ | yathā hi "rātrīr āsata" [6], "tām agnau prādāt [7]" ityādāv arthitādilakṣitasyādhikāriṇaḥ pratipattimātrād atitīvraprarocitāt [8] prathamapravṛttād anantaram adhikaivopāttakālatiraskāreṇaivāste 'pradadāmi' [9] ityādirūpā saṃkramaṇādisvabhāvā yathādarśanaṃ bhāvanāvidhiniyogādibhāṣābhir [10] vyavahṛtā pratipattiḥ [11], tathaiva kā-

[1] G; D: *avedayanti* || [2] *iti tatra vyajyamānatayā*... is omitted by H.C. || [3] G; H.C.: *pariśuddhaṃ tattvam*, equally good || [4] *N.Ś.*, prose at the beginning of the ch. VII. H.C.; G: *kāvyārthān bhāvayanti iti tat*... || [5] G; H.C.: *tasmāt* || [6] Read. G: *rātrim āsata*; D: *rātrīr asata* || [7] Unidentified quotations taken from the *śruti*. [8] G; D: *pratipattir mātrāditīvra(?)parocitāt* || [9] P, p. 160 (p. 423: *pradadāti*); cf. translation, p. 64, n. 1. G: *pradadāti*; D: *pradadāni* || [10] I propose; G: *prati bhāvanā°*; D: *yathā darśanaṃ pratibhāvanādi viddhyudyogādi* (?) *bhāṣābhir*. The integration of P, p. 432, *pratīti°*, according to me, cannot be upheld. Perhaps to read *pratyāyana* (cf. *Dh. Ā. L.*, p. 62). In my opinion, however, *prati* is simply a note by some reader, who has not understood the expression *yathādarśanaṃ* and which later was incorporated in the text || [11] *yathā hi "rātrīr āsata"*... is omitted by H.C. ||

vyātmakād api śabdād adhikāriṇo [1] 'dhikāsti pratipattiḥ | adhikārī cātra vimalapratibhānaśālihṛdayaḥ [2] | tasya ca "grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam" [3] iti "umāpi nīlālakā" [4] iti "haras tu kiṃcit" [5] ityādivākyebhyo vākyārthapratipatter [6] anantaraṃ mānasī sākṣātkārātmikā apahastitatattadvākyopāttakālādivibhāgā tāvat pratītir [7] upajāyate | tasyāṃ [8] ca yo mṛgapotakādir bhāti tasya viśeṣarūpatvābhāvād [9] bhīta iti trāsakasyā[10]pāramārthikatvād bhayam eva paraṃ deśakālādyanāliṅgitam, tata eva bhīto 'haṃ bhīto 'yaṃ śatrur vayasyo madhyastho vetyādipratyayebhyo duḥkhasukhādikṛtahānādibuddhyantarodayaniyamavattayā vighnabahulebhyo vilakṣaṇaṃ [11] nirvighnapratītigrāhyaṃ sākṣād iva hṛdaye niviśamānaṃ [12] cakṣuṣor iva viparivartamānaṃ bhayānako rasaḥ | tathāvidhe hi bhaye nātmā [13] tiraskṛto na viśeṣata [14] ullikhitaḥ | evaṃ paro 'pi | tata eva [15] na parimitam eva sādhāraṇyam api tu *vitatam, vyāptigraha iva dhūmāgnyor bhayakampayor eva vā | tad atra sākṣātkārāyamāṇatve [16] paripoṣikā naṭādisāmagrī, yasyāṃ vastusatāṃ kāvyārpitānāṃ ca deśakālapramātrādīnāṃ niyamahetūnām anyonyapratibandhabalād [17] atyantam apasaraṇe sa eva [18] sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ sutarāṃ puṣyati | ata eva sāmājikānām ekaghanataiva pratipatteḥ sutarāṃ rasaparipoṣāya sarveṣām anādivāsa- A. Bh. I, p. 281

[1] H.C. paraphrases: *evaṃ kāvyātmakād api śabdāt sahṛdayasyā°* || [2] *adhikārī cātra*... is omitted by H.C. || [3] Kālidāsa, *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*, I, 2 || [4] Kālidāsa, *Kumārasaṃbhava*, III, 62 || [5] Kālidāsa, *op. cit.*, III, 67. *ity "umāpi nīlālakā"*... is omitted by H.C. || [6] G, etc.; D: *°pratīter* || [7] G, etc.; D: *vibhāgāt pratītir* || [8] G, etc.; D: *tasyāś* || [9] G, etc.; D: *viśeṣarūpatvāt* || [10] G, etc.; D: *grāhakasyā°* || [11] G; H.C., D: *vilakṣaṇa°* || [12] G, etc.; D: *nidhīyamānam* || [13] H.C.; G: *nātyanta(nātmā?)*. Perhaps the true reading is *nātyantam ātmā* || [14] G, etc.; D: *nirviśeṣata* || [15] H.C.; G: *evaṃparo 'pi tata eva*... Perhaps to read *evaṃ pare 'pi* || [16] I propose; G: *°māṇatvena*; H.C., D: *°māṇatva°* (D: *°māṇatvapoṣikā*) || [17] G, etc.; D: *anyonyasaṃbandhabalād* || [18] G, etc.; D: *sa eva ca* ||

nāvicitrīkṛtacetasāṃ vāsanāsaṃvādāt | sā cāvighnā saṃvic camatkāraḥ | tajjo 'pi [1] kampapulakollukasanādir [2] vikāraś camatkāraḥ | yathā

ajja [3] vi harī camakkaí
kaha kaha vi na maṃdareṇa kaliāiṃ |
caṃdakalākaṃdalasac-
chahāiṃ lacchīiṃ aṃgāiṃ [4] ||

tathā hi sa cātṛptivyatirekeṇācchinno bhogāveśa [5] ity ucyate [6] | bhuñjānasyādbhuta [7] bhogātmaspandāviṣṭasya camataḥ karaṇaṃ [8] camatkāra iti [9] | sa ca sākṣātkārasvabhāvo mānasādhyavasāyo [10] vā saṃkalpo vā smṛtir vā tathātvenāsphurantī [11] astu | yad āha |

ramyāṇi [12] vīkṣya madhurāṃś ca niśamya śabdān
paryutsukībhavati [13] yat sukhito 'pi jantuḥ |
tac cetasā smarati nūnam abodhapūrvaṃ
bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntarasauhṛdāni [14] ||

ityādi [15] | atra hi smaratīti yā smṛtir upadarśitā sā na tārkikaprasiddhā, pūrvam etasyārthasyānanubhūtatvāt, api tu pratibhānāparaparyāyasākṣātkārasvabhāveyam iti [16] | sarvathā tāvad eṣāsti pratītir, āsvadātmā yasyāṃ ra-

[1] H.C.; G: *sā cāvighnā saṃvit, camatkāras tajjo 'pi* || [2] G, etc. (cf. *N.Ś.*, VI, v. 96); D: *°llasanādivikāraś* || [3] Metre: *āryā* || [4] H.C.; G: *ajja vi harī cama° kai kahakaha vi na maṃdareṇa kaliāiṃ | caṃdakalākaṃdalasa °chahāi la° chīi aṃgāi* || *chāyā* (H.C., p. 504): *adyāpi hariś camatkaroti kathaṃ katham api na mandareṇa kalitāni | candrakalākandalasacchāyāni lakṣmyā aṅgāni* || Unidentified stanza || [5] H.C.; G: *bhā(bho?)gāveśa* || [6] *tathā hi sa...* is omitted by H.C. || [7] G, etc.; D: *°ādbhuto* || [8] P, p. 421; G: ca *manaḥkaraṇam*. I think the conjecture of P is right; however the reading of G is not unadmissible. [9] H.C. paraphrases: *adbhutabhogātmaspandāveśarūpo hi camatkāraḥ* || [10] H.C.; G: *manasā°*, admissible (cf. *N.Ś.*, VI, v. 36) || [11] H.C.; G: *tathātvena sphuratya(nna?)stu*; D: *tathātvenāsphuratyas tu* || [12] Metre: *vasantatilakā* || [13] H.C., etc.; G: *paryutsoko bhavati* || [14] Kālidāsa, *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*, V, 96 || [15] G; *ityādi* is omitted by H.C. || [16] H.C.; G brackets *atra hi... iti*. D omits this sentence ||

tir eva bhāti | tata eva viśeṣāntarānupahitatvāt sā rasanīyā satī na laukikī na mithyā nānirvācyā na laukikatulyā na tadāropādirūpā | eṣaiva [1] copacayāvasthāstu [2] deśādyaniyantraṇāt | anukāro 'py astv anugāmitayā [3] karaṇāt | viṣayasāmagry [4] apy bhavatu vijñānavādāvalambanāt | sarvathā rasanātmakavītavighnapratītigrāhyo bhāva eva rasaḥ | tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛtayaḥ | tathā hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā saṃvittir eva [5] camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhīyate | vighnāś cāsyām [6] 1) pratipattāv ayogyatā * saṃbhāvanāviraho nāma [7] 2) svagatatvaparagatat- A. Bh., I, p. 282
va [8] niyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśaḥ 3) nijasukhādivivaśībhāvaḥ 4) pratītyupāyavaikalyaṃ 5) sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ [9] 6) apradhānatā 7) saṃśayayogaś ca | tathā hi

1) saṃvedyam asaṃbhāvayamānaḥ saṃvedye saṃvidaṃ viniveśayitum [10] eva na śaknoti | kā tatra viśrāntir iti prathamo vighnaḥ | tadapasāraṇe hṛdayasaṃvādo lokasāmānyavastuviṣayaḥ | alokasāmānyeṣu tu [11] ceṣṭiteṣv akhaṇḍitaprasiddhijanitagāḍhārūḍhapratyaya [12] prasarakārī [13] prakhyātarāmādināmadheyaparigrahaḥ | ata eva niḥsāmānyotkarṣopadeśa [14] vyutpattiprayojane nāṭakādau prakhyātavastuviṣayatvādi [15] niyamena nirūpyate [16] | na tu prahasanādāv iti [17] | tac ca svāvasara eva vakṣyāma ity āstāṃ tāvat [18] |

[1] H.C.; G: *yathaiva*; D: *tathaiva* || [2] H.C.; G: *°āvasthāsu* || [3] H.C.; G: *anukāro '[py abhāvā]nugāmitayā*; D: *anukāro 'py anubhāvānugāmitayā karaṇāt* || [4] G etc.; D: *viṣayasāmagryām* || [5] H.C.; G: *saṃvittiḥ | evaṃ...* || [6] D; H.C. adds *sapta*; G adds *sapta* in parentheses || [7] G; H.C.: *saṃbhāvanāviraharūpā pratipattāv ayogyatā* || [8] G; H.C.: *svagataparagatatva°* || [9] H.C.; G: *°vaikalya°* || [10] G; H.C.: *niveśayitum* || [11] G, H.C.; *tu* is omitted by D || [12] G; H.C.: *°gāḍharūḍhacitipratyaya°* || [13] G, H.C., D: *°kāri°* || [14] G, etc.; D: *°tkarṣe 'pi deśa°* || [15] G, etc.; D: *°ādi°* || [16] *A. Bh.*, II, ch. XVIII. D gives *nirūpayiṣyate* || [17] G, D: *prahasanād eva* || [18] Cf. n. 16. *tac ca...* is omitted by H.C. ||

2) svaikagatānāṃ ca sukhaduḥkhasaṃvidām āsvāde yathāsaṃbhavaṃ tadapagamabhīrutayā vā tatparirakṣāvyagratayā vā tatsadṛśārjijiṣayā [1] vā tajjihāsayā vā tatpracikhyāpayiṣayā vā tadgopanecchayā va prakārāntareṇa vā saṃvedanāntarasamudgama eva paramo vighnaḥ | paragatatvaniyamabhājām api sukhaduḥkhānāṃ saṃvedane niyamena svātmani sukhaduḥkhamohamādhyasthyādisaṃvidantarodgamanasaṃbhāvanād avaśyaṃbhāvī vighnaḥ | tadapasāraṇe [2] "kāryo nātiprasaṅgo 'tra" [3] ityādinā pūrvaraṅgānigūhanena [4] "naṭī vidūṣako vāpi" [5] itilakṣitaprastāvanāvalokanena ca yo naṭarūpatādhigamas tatpuraḥsaraḥ [6] pratiśīrṣakādinā tatpracchādanaprakāro 'bhyupāyo 'laukikabhāṣādibhedalāsyāṅgaraṅgapīṭhamaṇḍapagatakakṣyādi[7]parigrahanāṭyadharmīsahitaḥ [8] | tasmin hi saty [9] asyaivā[10]traivaitarhy [11] eva ca sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ veti [12] na bhavati pratītiḥ | svarūpasya [13] nihnavād rūpāntarasya cāropitasya pratibhāsasaṃvidviśrāntivaikalyena [14] svarūpe viśrāntyabhāvāt satya[15]tadīyarūpanihnavamātra eva paryavasānāt | tathā hy āsīnapāṭhyapuṣpagaṇḍikādi loke na dṛṣṭam | na ca tan na kiṃcit, kathaṃcit saṃbhāvyatvād [16] iti sa [17] eṣa sarvo muninā

[1] H.C.; G: *tatsadṛśo jijīṣayā*; D: *tatsadṛśajjijīṣayā* ‖ [2] G; H.C.: *tadapasaraṇe*; D: *tadapakaraṇe* ‖ [3] *N.Ś.*, V, v. 165: *kāryo nātiprasaṅgo 'tra nṛttagītavidhiṃ prati* | ‖ [4] D; G: *ityādinā pūrvaraṅgavidhiṃ pratīti pūrvaraṅgānigūhanena*; H.C.: *pūrvaraṅgavidhipratītipūrva—raṅgānigūhanena*. *pūrvaraṅgavidhim prati* is surely an interpolation ‖ [5] *N.Ś.*, XX, v. 30 ff. (cf. translation, p. 80, n. 1); D gives *prastāvanāvalokānena* only ‖ [6] G; H.C.: *tatpuraḥsara°* ‖ [7] G; H.C., D: *°kakṣādi°* ‖ [8] G, etc.; D: *°nāṭyadharmasahitaḥ* ‖ [9] G, etc.; *sati* is omitted by D ‖ [10] G, etc.; D: *tasyaiva* ‖ [11] G, etc.; D: *etasyaiva* ‖ [12] G, etc.; D: *sukhaduḥkhaṃ ca* ‖ [13] H.C.; G: *na bhavati | pratītisvarūpasya...* ‖ [14] Conjectural reading for *pratibhāsaṃvidviśrāntivaikalyena* in G, *pratibhāsaviśrāntivaikalyena* in H.C. (cf. below *apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṃvid viśrāmyati*, etc.). D reads *pratibhāsandhiviśrāntivaikalyena* ‖ [15] H.C., P, p. 433; G: *satye*; D: *satyaṃ* ‖ [16] *tathā hi...* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [17] *sa* is omitted by H.C. ‖

sādhāraṇībhāvasiddhyā [1] rasacarvaṇopayogitvena parikarabandhaḥ samāśrita iti tatraiva sphuṭībhaviṣyatīti[2] tad iha tāvan no namanīyam [3] | tataḥ sa eṣa svaparanīyatātavighnāpasāraṇa[4]prakāro vyākhyātaḥ [5] |

3) [6] nijasukhādivivaśībhūtaś ca kathaṃ vastvantare saṃvidaṃ viśramayed iti tatpratyūhavyapohanāya pratipadārthaniṣṭhaiḥ sādhāraṇyamahimnā sakalabhogyatvasa-
* hiṣṇubhiḥ śabdādiviṣayamayair[7] ātodyagānavicitramaṇ- A. Bh., I, p. 285
ḍapapada[8]vidagdhagaṇikādibhir uparañjanaṃ samāśritaṃ yenāhṛdayo 'pi hṛdayavaimalyaprāptyā sahṛdayīkriyate | uktaṃ hi "dṛśyaṃ śravyaṃ ca" [9] iti |

4) kiṃ ca pratītyupāyānām abhāve kathaṃ pratītibhāvaḥ [10] |

5) asphuṭapratītikāriśabdaliṅga[11]saṃbhave 'pi [12] na pratītir viśrāmyati sphuṭapratītirūpapratyakṣocitapratyayasākāṅkṣatvāt | yathāhuḥ "sarvā ceyaṃ pramitiḥ pratyakṣaparā" [13] iti | svasākṣātkṛta āgamānumānaśatair apy ananyathābhāvasya svasaṃvedanāt | alātacakrādau sakṣātkārāntareṇaiva balavatā tatpramityavadhāraṇād [14] iti laukikas tāvad ayaṃ kramaḥ | tasmāt tadubhayavighnavighāte 'bhinayā lokadharmī[15]vṛttipravṛttyupaskṛtāḥ samabhiṣicyante | abhinayanaṃ hi saśabdaliṅga[16]vyāpāravisadṛśam [17] eva pratyakṣavyāpārakalpam iti niścesyāmaḥ[18] |

[1] *A. Bh.*, III, chapp. XIX ff. ‖ [2] G, etc.; D: *°siddha°* ‖ [3] G; P, p. 433: *nonnamanīyam* ‖ [4] H.C.; G: *vighnāpasaraṇa°* ‖ [5] *iti tatraiva...* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [6] G; H.C. adds: *tathā* ‖ [7] H.C.; G: *°viṣayamayībhi(yai?)r*; D: *°viṣayamayībhir* ‖ [8] G; *°pada°* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [9] *N.Ś.*, I, v. 11 ‖ [10] G; H.C.: *pratītiḥ* ‖ [11] G; H.C. clarifies *śabdalakṣaṇaliṅga°* ‖ [12] G etc.; D: *kathaṃ pratītiṃ sphuṭayatīti tatkāriśabdaliṅgasaṃbhave 'pi* ‖ [13] *Nyāyasūtra*, *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, I, 1, 3 (the edited text gives *sā* for *sarvā*) ‖ [14] G; H.C.: *°pasāraṇād*, admissible ‖ [15] I propose; G: *bodha(alo?)kadharmi°*; D: *abhinayabodhakadharmi°*; H.C.: *lokadharmā°* ‖ [16] G; H.C.: *śabdalakṣaṇaliṅga°* ‖ [17] Read. G: *°[vi]sadṛśaṃ*; H.C.: *°sadṛśam* ‖ [18] *A. Bh.*, II, chapp. VIII ff. *niścesyāmaḥ* is omitted by H.C. ‖

6) apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṃvid viśrāmyati | tasyaiva pratyayasya [1] pradhānāntaraṃ praty anudhāvataḥ svātmany aviśrāntatvāt [2] | ato 'pradhānatvaṃ jaḍe vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicāriṇicaye ca saṃvidātmake 'pi niyamenānyamukhaprekṣiṇi [3] saṃbhavatīti tadatiriktaḥ sthāyyeva tathā [4] carvaṇāpātram | tatra puruṣārthaniṣṭhāḥ kāścit saṃvida iti pradhānam | tad yathā ratiḥ kāma[5]-tadanuṣaṅgidharmārthaniṣṭhā, krodhas tatpradhāneṣv arthaniṣṭhaḥ kāmadharmaparyavasito 'pi, utsāhaḥ samastadharmādiparyavasitas, tattvajñānajanitanirvedaprāyaḥ śamaś ca mokṣopāya [6] iti tāvad eṣāṃ prādhānyam | yady api caiṣām apy anyonyaṃ guṇabhāvo 'sti tathāpi tatpradhāne rūpake tattatpradhānaṃ [7] bhavatīti rūpakabhedaparyāyeṇa sarveṣāṃ prādhānyam eṣaṃ lakṣyate | adūrabhāgābhiniviṣṭadṛśā [8] tv ekasminn api rūpake pṛthak prādhānyam | tatra sarve 'mī sukhapradhānāḥ svasaṃvitcarvaṇarūpasyaikaghanasya prakāśasyānandasāratvāt | tathā hy ekaghanaśokasaṃviccarvaṇe 'pi loke strīlokasya hṛdayaviśrāntir antarāyaśūnyaviśrāntiśarīratvāt | aviśrāntirūpataiva ca duḥkham | tata eva kāpilair duḥkhasya cāñcālyam eva prāṇatvenoktaṃ rajovṛttiṃ [9] vadadbhir ity ānandarūpatā sarvarasānām | kiṃ tūparañjakaviṣayavaśāt keṣām api kaṭukimnāsti sparśo vīrasyeva [10] |

[1] G; H.C.: *pratyeyasya* || [2] H.C.; G: *svātmani viśrāntatvāt*; D: *svātmani viśrāmyatvāt*. Cf. *I.P.V.V.*, III, p. 231: *arthāntaraṃ pradhānasaṃmataṃ abhilaṣyati anudhāvati na svātmani viśrāmyati yad tad eva rūpam anyonmukhatvasya* || [3] Read; G: *°saṃprekṣiṇi*, equally good; D, H.C.: *anyasukha°* || [4] G; D: *tathā ca*; *tathā* is omitted by H.C. || [5] G; H.C.: *kāmo*, equally good || [6] I propose; G: *tattvajñānajanitanirvedaprāyo vibhāvo* (*śamaś ca* is omitted by G and D) *mokṣopāya*; H.C. *śamaś ca mokṣopāya* (H.C. omits *tattvajñāna°*) || [7] D; G: *tattatpradhāne rūpake tattatpradhānaṃ*; H.C.: *tattatpradhāne rūpake tatpradhānaṃ* || [8] H.C.; G: *°dṛśas*; D: *°bhāgādiniviṣṭadṛśā* || [9] G; H.C.: *°vṛttitāṃ* || [10] Read; G: *ka kiṃ nāsti | sparśo vīrasya*; D: *kaṭuḥkiṃ nāsti sparśo vīrasya*; H.C.: *kaṭukimnā sparśo 'sti vīrasyeva* ||

sa hi kleśasahiṣṇutādiprāṇa eva | evaṃ ratyādīnāṃ prādhānyam | hāsādīnāṃ tu sātiśayaṃ sakalalokasulabhavibhāvatayoparañjakatvam iti prādhānyam | ata evānuttamaprakṛtiṣu bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti [1] | pāmaraprāyaḥ * sarvo 'pi hasati śocati bibheti paranindām ādriyate A. Bh., I, p. 284
svalpasubhāṣitatvena [2] ca sarvatra vismayate | ratyādyaṅgatayā tu pumarthopayogitvam api syād eṣām | etadguṇapradhānabhāvakṛta eva ca daśarūpakādibheda iti vakṣyāmaḥ [3] | sthāyitvaṃ caitāvatām eva | jāta [4] eva hi jantur iyatībhiḥ saṃvidbhiḥ parīto bhavati | tathā hi

duḥkhasaṃśleṣavidveṣī sukhāsvādanasādaraḥ [5] |

iti nyāyena sarvo riraṃsayā vyāptaḥ svātmany utkarṣamānitayā [6] param upahasann abhīṣṭaviyogasaṃtaptas taddhetuṣu kopaparavaśo 'śaktatayā [7] ca tato bhīruḥ kiṃcid ujjigīṣur [8] apy anucita[9]vastuviṣayavaimukhyātmakatayākrāntaḥ kiṃcid anabhīṣṭatayābhimanyamānas tattatsvaparakartavya[10]darśanasamuditavismayaḥ kiṃcic ca jihāsur eva jāyate [11] | na hy etaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāṇī bhavati | kevalaṃ kasyacit kācid adhikā cittavṛttiḥ kācid ūnā, kasyacid ucitaviṣayaniyantritā kasyacid anyathā | tat kācid eva puruṣārthopayoginīty upadeśyā | tadvibhāgakṛtaś [12] cottamaprakṛtyādivyavahāraḥ | ye punar amī

[1] H.C.; G: *bāhulyena na hāsādayo bhavanti*; D: *hāsādayo bāhulyena vartante*, equally good || [2] H.C.; G: *alpasukhabhāṣitatvena*, equally good || [3] *etadguṇapradhāna°*... is omitted by H.C. || [4] Cf. H.C., *Al. Cūḍ.*, p. 124; D: *ata* || [5] Unidentified verse || [6] H.C., D; G: *utkarṣamānitayā* || [7] Cf. D: *'śakta[taya]*; G: *'śaktau*, equally good || [8] Read; G: *ujjijīṣur*; D: *jigīṣur* || [9] G; D: *jita°* || [10] G; D: *°svakartavya°* || [11] H.C. paraphrases (cf. n. 4): *sarvo riraṃsayā vyāptaḥ svātmany utkarṣamānitayā param upahasati, utkarṣāpāyaśaṅkayā śocati, apāyaṃ prati krudhyati, apāyahetuparihāre samutsāhate, vinipātād bibheti, kiṃcid ayuktatayābhimānyamāno jugupsate, tattatsvaparakartavyavaicitryadarśanād vismayate, kiṃcij jihāsus tatra vairāgyāc chamam bhajate* || [12] H.C.; G: *tadvibhāva°* ||

glāniśaṅkāprabhṛtayaś[1] cittavṛttiviśeṣās te samucitavibhāvābhāvāj[2] janmamadhye 'pi[3] na bhavanty eva | tathā hi rasāyanam upayuktavato muner[4] glānyālasyaśramaprabhṛtayo nottiṣṭhanti[5] | yasyāpi vā bhavanti vibhāvabalāt tasyāpi hetuprakṣaye kṣīyamāṇāḥ saṃskāraśeṣatāṃ[6] nāvaśyam anubadhnanti | utsāhādayas[7] tu saṃpāditasvāvaśyakartavyatayā[8] pralīnakalpā api saṃskāraśeṣatāṃ nātivartante kartavyāntaraviṣayasyotsāhāder[9] akhaṇḍanāt | yathāba patañjaliḥ "na hi caitra ekasyāṃ striyāṃ rakta ity anyāsu viraktaḥ"[10] ityādi | tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyūtā evāmī vyabhicāriṇaḥ svātmānam udayāstamayavaicitryaśatasahasradharmāṇaṃ pratilabhamānā raktanīlādisūtrasyūtaviralabhāvopalambhana-[11]saṃbhāvitabhaṅgīsahasragarbhasphaṭikakācābhraka[12]-padmarāgamarakatamahānīlādimayagolakavat[13] tasmin sūtre sva[14]saṃskāravaicitryam aniveśayanto[15] 'pi tatsūtrakṛtam upakārasaṃdarbhaṃ bibhrataḥ[16] svayaṃ ca vicitrārthāḥ sthāyisūtraṃ[17] ca vicitrayanto 'ntarāntarāśuddham api sthāyisūtraṃ pratibhāsāvakāśam upadadhato[18] 'pi pūrvāparavyabhicāriratnacchāyāśabalimānam avaśyam ānayantaḥ pratibhāsanta[19] iti vyabhicāriṇa ucyante |

[1] G; H.C.: °*śaṅkādhṛtyādayaś* ‖ [2] G, etc.; D: °*vibhāvāj* ‖ [3] G; *'pi* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [4] G; *muner* is omitted by H.C. ‖ [5] G; H.C.: *na bhavanti* ‖ [6] G, etc.; D: °*śeṣatāntān* ‖ [7] G; H.C.: *utsāharatyādayas* ‖ [8] G; H.C., D: °*svakartavyatayā* ‖ [9] G; H.C.: *vastvantaraviṣayasya ratyāder* ‖ [10] Cf. *Yogasūtra*, *Vyāsabhāṣya*, 2, 4. Vyāsa says: *naikasyāṃ striyāṃ caitro rakta ity anyāsu strīṣu virakta iti* ‖ [11] G; D: *viralabhāvo......bhaṅā°* ‖ [12] Conjectural reading; D: °*ābhra*°; G: °*kācābhra(bhrā?)maka*° ‖ [13] G; D: °*golakādivat* ‖ [14] G, etc.; *sva*° is omitted by D ‖ [15] G; D: *abhiniveśayanto* ‖ [16] G; D: *vibhutamaḥ* (?) ‖ [17] Read; G: *vicitrārthasthāyisūtram* ‖ [18] I propose; G: *'ntarāntarā śuddham api sthāyisūtraṃ pratibhāsāvakāśamupadhayanto* [D: *upahayanto*] *'pi* ‖ [19] H.C. paraphrases: *tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyūtā evāmī svātmānam udayāstamayavaicitryaśatasahasradharmāṇaṃ pratilabhamānāḥ sthāyinaṃ vicitrayantaḥ pratibhāsante* ‖

tathā hi glāno 'yam ity ukte kuta iti hetupraśnenāsthāyitāsya[1] sūcyate[2] | na tu rāma utsāhaśaktimān ity atra hetupraśnam āhuḥ | ata * eva vibhāvās tatrodbodhakāḥ santaḥ svarūpoparañjakatvaṃ[3] vidadhānā ratyutsāhāder[4] ucitānucitatvamātram āvahanti | na tu tadabhāve sarvathaiva te nirupākhyāḥ, vāsanātmanā sarvajantūnāṃ tanmayatvenoktatvāt | vyabhicāriṇāṃ tu svavibhāvābhāve nāmāpi nāstīti vitaniṣyate caitad yathāyogaṃ vyākhyāvasare[5] | evam[6] apradhānatvanirāsaḥ sthāyinirūpaṇayā[7] "sthāyibhāvān rasatvam[8] upaneṣyāma"[9] ityanayā sāmānya[10]-lakṣaṇaśeṣabhūtayā viśeṣalakṣaṇaniṣṭhayā ca muninā[11] kṛtaḥ | *A. Bh.*, I, p. [illegible]

7) tatrānubhāvānāṃ vibhāvānāṃ vyabhicāriṇāṃ ca pṛthak sthāyini niyamo[12] nāsti, bāṣpāder ānandākṣi[13]-rogādijatvadarśanād vyāghrādeś ca krodhabhayādihetutvāt śrama[14]cintāder utsāhabhayādyanekasahacaratvāvalokanāt | sāmagrī[15] tu na vyabhicāriṇī | tathā hi bandhuvināśo yatra vibhāvaḥ paridevitāśrupātādiś cānubhāvaś[16] cintādainyādiś ca vyabhicārī, so 'vaśyaṃ śoka evety evaṃ saṃśayodaye[17] śaṅkātmakavighnaśamanāya saṃyoga upāttaḥ |

tatra lokavyavahāre kāryakāraṇasahacarā[18]tmakaliṅgadarśane[19] sthāyyātmaparacittavṛttyanumānābhyāsa eva pāṭavād[20] adhunā tair evodyānakaṭākṣadhṛtyādibhir[21]

[1] H.C.; G: °*praśnena sthāyitāsya*; D: °*praśne sthāyitāsya* ‖ [2] G; H.C.: *sūtryate* ‖ [3] G, etc.; D: °*parañjakam* ‖ [4] G, etc.; D: *ity utsāhāder* ‖ [5] *A. Bh.*, ch. VII; *vitaniṣyate*... is omitted by H.C. ‖ [6] Cf. H.C., *viveka*, p. 101 ‖ [7] H.C.; G: °*nirūpaṇāyāṃ*; D: °*nirupaṇāyāḥ* ‖ [8] G; H.C.: *sattvam* ‖ [9] Cf. note 102 ‖ [10] H.C.; *sāmānya*° is omitted by G ‖ [11] G, etc.; *muninā* is omitted by D ‖ [12] G, etc.; D: *sthāyiniyamo* ‖ [13] G; H.C.: °*rti*° ‖ [14] G, etc.; D: *bhrama*° ‖ [15] H.C.; G adds *vā* ‖ [16] H.C.; G: °*dis tv anubhāvaś*, equally good ‖ [17] D: °*daya*° ‖ [18] H.C.; G: °*sahacārā*° ‖ [19] G; H.C.: °*darśanaja*° ‖ [20] G; H.C., D: °*bhyāsapāṭavād* ‖ [21] H.C.; G: ° *vṛkṣādibhir* ‖

laukikīṃ kāraṇātvādibhuvam atikrāntair vibhāvanānubhāvanāsamuparañjakatvamātra[1]prāṇair ata evālaukikavibhāvādivyapadeśabhāgbhiḥ prācyakāraṇādirūpasaṃskāropajīvanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādināmadheyavyapadeśyair bhāvādhyāye 'pi vakṣyamāṇasvarūpabhedair[2] guṇapradhānatāparyāyena sāmājikadhiyi samyagyogaṃ saṃbandham aikāgryaṃ cā[3]sāditavadbhir alaukikanirvighnasaṃvedanātmakacarvaṇāgocaratāṃ nīto 'rthaś carvyamāṇataikasāro na tu siddhasvabhāvas tātkālika eva na tu carvaṇātiriktakālāvalambī sthāyivilakṣaṇa eva rasaḥ | na tu[4] yathā śaṅkukādibhir abhyadhīyata "sthāyyeva vibhāvādipratyāyyo[5] rasyamānatvād rasa ucyata" iti[6] | evaṃ hi loke[7] 'pi kiṃ na rasaḥ, asato 'pi hi yatra rasanīyatā syāt[8] tatra vastusataḥ kathaṃ na bhaviṣyati | tena sthāyipratītir anumitirūpā vācyā[9], na rasaḥ | ata eva sūtre[10] sthāyigrahaṇaṃ na kṛtam | tat pratyuta śalyabhūtaṃ syāt | kevalam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyī rasībhūta iti | aucityaṃ tu tatsthāyigatatvena kāraṇāditayā prasiddhānām adhunā carvaṇopayogitayā vibhāvāditvāvalambanāt[11] | tathā hi[12]
A. Bh. I, p. 286 laukikacittavṛttyanumāne kā rasatā | * tenālaukikacamatkārātmā rasāsvādaḥ smṛtyanumānalaukikasvasaṃvedanavilakṣaṇa eva | tathā hi laukikenānumānena saṃskṛtaḥ pramadādi na[13] tāṭasthyena pratipadyate, api tu hṛdayasaṃvādātmakasahṛdayatvabalāt pūrṇībhaviṣyad[14]rasāsvādāṅ-

[1] G, etc.; °mātra° is omitted by D ‖ [2] A. Bh., ch. VII; bhāvādhyāye... is omitted by H.C. ‖ [3] H.C.; G: vā° ‖ [4] H.C.; G: nanu (na? tu); D: nanu ‖ [5] G; H.C.: °pratyāyyamāno; D: °pratyayārabhyamānatvād rasa ucyata, admissible ‖ [6] G; iti is omitted by H.C. ‖ [7] H.C.; G: laukike ‖ [8] G; syāt is omitted by H.C. ‖ [9] G, etc.; D.: °rūpā prāptā ‖ [10] G; H.C. adds: muninā ‖ [11] G; H.C.; D: vibhāvāditvādilambanāt ‖ [12] H.C.; G: tarhi hi ‖ [13] Read; G: pramadādinā; H.C., D: pramodādir na. Cf. Dh.Ā.L., p. 155 ‖ [14] D, H.C.; G: pūrṇībhavad°, admissible. Cf. Dh.Ā.L., p. 155 ‖

kurībhāvenānumānasmṛtyādisopānam anāruhyaiva tanmayībhāvocitacarvaṇāprāṇatayā | na ca sā carvaṇā prāṅmānāntarād[1] yenādhunā smṛtiḥ syāt | na cātra laukikapratyakṣādipramāṇavyāpāraḥ | kiṃ tv[2] alaukikavibhāvādisaṃyogabalopanataiveyaṃ carvaṇā | sā ca pratyakṣānumānāgamopamānādilaukikapramāṇajanitaratyādyavabodhatas tathā yogipratyakṣajataṭasthaparasaṃvittijñānāt sakalavaiṣayikoparāgaśūnyaśuddhaparayogigatasvānandaikaghanānubhavāc ca viśiṣyate, eteṣāṃ[3] yathāyogam arjanādivighnāntarodayena[4] tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvena[5] viṣayāveśavaivaśyena[6] ca saundaryavirahāt | atra tu svātmaikagatatvaniyamāsaṃbhavān na viṣayāveśavaivaśyam[7], svātmānupraveśāt[8] paragatatvaniyamābhāvān na tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvam[9], tadvibhāvādisādhāraṇyavaśasaṃprabuddhocitanijaratyādivāsanāveśavaśāc[10] ca na vighnāntarādīnāṃ saṃbhava ity avocāma bahuśaḥ[11] | ata eva vibhāvādayo na niṣpattihetavo rasasya, tadbodhāpagame[12] 'pi rasasaṃbhavaprasaṅgāt[13] | nāpi jñaptihetavaḥ, yena pramāṇamadhye pateyuḥ, siddhasya kasyacit prameyabhūtasya rasasyābhāvāt | kiṃ tarhy[14] etad[15] vibhāvādaya iti | alaukika evāyaṃ carvaṇopayogī vibhāvādivyavahāraḥ | kvānyatretthaṃ dṛṣṭam iti ced bhūṣaṇam etad asmākam[16] alaukikatvasiddhau[17] | pānakarasāsvado 'pi kiṃ guḍamaricādiṣu

[1] G, etc.; D: prārthyamānāntarād ‖ [2] H.C.; G: kiñca; D: kiñcā°, equally good ‖ [3] G, etc.; D: etāsāṃ ‖ [4] H.C.; G: °dayāt, equally good ‖ [5] Read; H.C.: tāṭasthyahetukāsphuṭatvena; G: tāṭasthyasphuṭatva°; D: °sphuṭatvaṃ ‖ [6] G, etc.; D: °vaivaśyaṃ ‖ [7] H.C., G; na viṣayā... is omitted by D (G brackets it) ‖ [8] G, etc.; D: svānupraveśat ‖ [9] H.C; G; na tāṭasthyasphuṭatvaṃ (in parentheses); tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvam is omitted by D. I think that na viṣayāveśavaivaśyam and na tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvam have been added by H.C. [10] G, etc.; D: °vegavaśāt ‖ [11] ity avocāma bahuśaḥ is omitted by H.C. ‖ [12] D, H.C.; G: bodhāvagame ‖ [13] G, etc.; D: rasasaṃbhavāt ‖ [14] G; H.C.: tarhi kim ‖ [15] H.C.; G: etad dhi ‖ [16] G; H.C.: bhūṣaṇam asmākam etad ‖ [17] G, etc.; D: °siddheḥ ‖

dṛṣṭa iti samānam etat | nanv evaṃ raso 'prameyaḥ syāt, evaṃ yuktaṃ bhavitum arhati, rasyataikaprāṇo hy asau na prameyādisvabhāvaḥ | tarhi sūtre niṣpattir iti katham | neyaṃ rasasya, api tu tadviṣayarasanāyāḥ[1] | tanniṣpattyā[2] tu yadi tadekāyattajīvitasya rasasya niṣpattir ucyate na kaścid[3] atra doṣaḥ | sā ca[4] rasanā na pramāṇavyāpāro na kārakavyāpāraḥ, svayaṃ tu nāprāmāṇikī svasaṃvedana[5]siddhatvāt | rasanā ca bodharūpaiva, kiṃ tu bodhāntarebhyo laukikebhyo[6] vilakṣaṇaiva, upāyānāṃ vibhāvādīnāṃ laukikavailakṣaṇyāt | tena vibhāvādisaṃyogād rasanā yato niṣpadyate tatas[7] tathāvidharasanāgocaro lokottaro 'rtho rasa iti tātparyaṃ sūtrasya |

A. Bh. I. p. 278 *ayam atra saṃkṣepaḥ | mukuṭapratiśīrṣakādinā tāvan naṭabuddhir ācchādyate | gāḍhaprāktanasaṃvitsaṃskārāc ca kāvyabalā[8]nīyamānāpi na tatra rāmadhīr viśrāmyati | ata[9] evobhayadeśakālatyāgaḥ | romāñcādayaś ca bhūyasā ratipratītikāritayā dṛṣṭās tatrāvalokitā[10] deśakālāniyamena[11] ratiṃ gamayanti | yasyāṃ svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvād anupraviṣṭaḥ | ata eva na[12] taṭasthatayā ratyavagamaḥ | na ca niyatakāraṇatayā, yenārjanābhiṣvaṅgādisaṃbhāvanā | na ca niyataparātmaikagatatayā[13], yena duḥkhadveṣādyudayaḥ | tena sādhāraṇībhūtā saṃtānavṛtter ekasyā eva vā saṃvido gocarībhūtā[14] ratiḥ śṛṅgāraḥ | sādhāraṇībhāvanā ca vibhāvādibhir iti |

[1] G; H.C.: *tadviṣayāyā...* || [2] H.C.; G: *tasmān niṣpattyā* || [3] G; H.C.: *tan na kaścid*; D: *tena na kvacid* || [4] G, etc.; *ca* is omitted by D || [5] H.C., D; G: *svayaṃ(saṃ)vedana°* || [6] G, etc.; *laukikebhyo* is omitted by D || [7] H.C.; G: *'tas*, equally good || [8] G, etc.; D: *°balād ā°* || [9] G; H.C.: *tata* || [10] H.C.; G: *tatrāpi laukikā°* (D: *laukikāḥ*) || [11] H.C.; G adds *tatra* || [12] H.C.; *na* is omitted by G || [13] H.C.; G: *niyataparā[gā]tmakagatatayā* || [14] H.C.; G: *gocarabhūtā* ||

TRANSLATION

After explaining the reason for the foregoing succession[1], Bharata states the *sūtra* defining the nature of Rasa: "Out of the union of the Determinants (*vibhāva*), the Consequents (*anubhāva*) and the Transitory Mental States (*vyabhicārin*), the birth of Rasa takes place"[2]. This *sūtra*

1) *N. Ś.*, VI, vv. 1-33.

2) *N. Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 33. Rasa is the traditional term which designates the aesthetic state of consciousness, the aesthetic pleasure. Rasa means both tasting and what is tasted. Bharata accepts eight Rasa, corresponding to the eight principal feelings of human nature (*sthāyibhāva*, Permanent Mental State): Delight (*rati*), Laughter (*hāsa*), Sorrow (*śoka*), Anger (*krodha*), Heroism (*utsāha*), Fear (*bhaya*), Disgust (*jugupsā*), and Astonishment (*vismaya*). These eight feelings are liable to become the material of aesthetic experience, and the corresponding Rasas are: the Erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), the Comic (*hāsya*), the Pathetic (*karuṇa*), the Furious (*raudra*), the Heroic (*vīra*), the Terrible (*bhayānaka*), the Odious (*bībhatsa*) and the Marvellous (*adbhuta*). Later speculation generally admits a ninth permanent feeling, Serenity (*śama*); the corresponding Rasa is the Quietistic (*śānta*). In ordinary life each of these mental states is manifested and accompanied by three elements, causes (*kāraṇa*), effects (*kārya*), and concomitant elements (*sahacara*). The causes are the facts, images, etc., by which it is manifested, the effects the physical reactions caused by it, and the concomitant elements the accessory mental states accompanying it. The same causes, etc., when represented on the stage or described in poetry, do not arouse the corresponding sentiment, but make manifest (*vyañj*) a form of consciousness different from it, aesthetic pleasure or Rasa. This particular form of cosciousness is coloured (*anurañj*) by the characters of these various causes and hence by the nature of the mental states which they would arouse if they were real. When they are not part of real life but are elements of poetical expression, the causes, effects, and concomitant elements are called respectively Determinants (*vibhāva*), Consequents (*anubhāva*), and Transitory Mental States (*vyabhicāribhāva*). On the traditional etymology of these terms, cf. *infra*, p. 95. *Vibhāva* and *anubhāva* are usually translated by the terms Determinant and Consequent (Jacobi translates *Faktor* and *Effekt*). The Transitory Mental States are 33 in number: Discouragement (*nirveda*), Weakness (*glāni*), Apprehension (*śaṅkā*), Weariness (*śrama*), Contentment (*dhṛti*), Stupor (*jaḍatā*), Joy (*harṣa*), Depression (*dainya*), Cruelty (*ugratā*), Anxiety (*cintā*), Fright (*trāsa*), Envy (*asūyā*), Indignation (*amarṣa*), Arrogance (*garva*), Recollection (*smṛti*), Death (*maraṇa*), Intoxication

has been explained by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, etc., in the following way [1]:—By the term "union" Bharata means implicitely the union of the Permanent Mental State with the Determinants, etc.; Rasa is the product of this union. More precisely, the Determinants are the cause of the birth of the mental movement (*cittavṛtti*) which constitutes the Permanent Mental State (*sthāyibhāva*). In using the term Consequents, Bharata does not mean the Consequents arising from the Rasa (since these obviously cannot be considered as causes of the Rasa) but only the Consequents arising from the mental states [2]. Even though the Tran-

(*mada*), Dreaming (*supta*), Sleeping (*nidrā*), Awakening (*vibodha*), Shame (*vrīḍā*), Epilepsy (*apasmāra*), Distraction (*moha*), Assurance (*mati*), Indolence (*ālasya*), Agitation (*āvega*), Deliberation (*tarka*), Dissimulation (*avahitthā*), Sickness (*vyādhi*), Insanity (*unmāda*), Despair (*viṣāda*), Impatience (*autsukya*) and Inconstancy (*cāpala*). On the nature of these feelings see below, p. 85 ff. In the *anubhāva* are included the eight "Involuntary States" (*sattvabhāva*): Paralysis (*stambha*), Fainting (*pralaya*), Horripilation (*romāñca*), Sweating (*sveda*), Change of Colour (*vaivarṇya*), Trembling (*vepathu*), Weeping (*aśru*) and Change of Voice (*vaisvarya*). Cf. *N.Ś.*, VII, prose after v. 91. It is very difficult to find the exact English rendering of these terms; in general I have followed the terminology proposed by Haas in his *Daśarūpaka*.

The relation between the Determinants, the ordinary mental states, and Rasa is the central problem of Indian poetics.

1) Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa flourished in Kashmir in the IXth or Xth century. He wrote a commentary, now lost, on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata. Kṣemarāja (*Spandanirṇaya*, p. 34) and A.G. (*M.V.V.*, v. 778), quote a Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa who wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*) to the *Spandakārikā* of Vasugupta. In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa are one and the same person; Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa would, in that case, have lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856-83 A.D.; Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or in the reign of his successor, Śaṅkaravarman. This change, also, involves a change in the dates of Śaṅkuka (cf. *infra*, p. 32, n. 4), who could then be identified no longer with the poet Śankuka, who was a contemporary of Ajitapīḍa (early IXth century).

2) Rasa will also produce certain effects in the spectators—it will make them mutter in fear, make their hair stand on end, etc. These effects (lit.: Consequents, *anubhāva*) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of Rasa. The causes of Rasa can only be the effects of the Permanent Mental States.

sitory Mental States, in so far as they are mental movements, cannot accompany simultaneously the Permanent Mental State, Bharata in this *sūtra* means that the Permanent Mental Movement remains nevertheless in a state of latent impression (*vāsanā*) [1]. In the example used by Bharata, again, some flavourings (*vyañjana*) appear in the state of latent impressions, like the Permanent Mental State, and others in an emergent state (*udbhūta*), like the Transitory Mental States [2]. Rasa, therefore, is simply the Permanent Mental State intensified (*upacita*) by the Determinants, the Consequents, etc. The Permanent Mental State in itself has a nature which is not intensified [3]. This state is [perceived] in both the person imitated (*anukārya*) and the actor (*naṭa*), in the person imi-

1) It is a generbl principle of Indian thought that two forms of cognition cannot occur simultaneously (cf. *Nyāyasūtra*, I, I, 16). To avoid a contradiction of this rule, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa remarks that there is nothing to prevent the assumption that the Permanent Mental State is presented in the state of a latent impression (*saṃskāra*, *vāsanā*). The word *saṃskāra* "means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in a sub-conscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (*smṛti*). The word *vāsanā* (*Yogasūtra*, IV, 24) seems to be a later word... It comes from the root "*vas*" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of *saṃskāra*, and in *Vyāsabhāṣya* they are identified in IV, 9. But *vāsanā* generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But *saṃskāra* are the subconscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. *Vāsanās* are innate *saṃskāras* not acquired in this life" (*Dasgupta*, *H.I.Ph.*, I, p. 263).

2) Bharata (ch. VI, prose after v. 33) says that an example of what happens in the aesthetic fact is provided by the different substances of which a dish at table is composed. Each of these (like the Determinants, etc.) makes a contribution in determining the taste of the whole, and a new flavour (*rasa*) results which differs from each of the others taken separately.

3) In other words, Rasa, when not intensified, is simply a Permanent Mental State.

tated (Rāma, etc.) in the primary sense (*mukhyayā vṛttyā*), and in the imitating actor [1] through the visualization (*anusaṃdhāna*) in him of the nature of Rāma, etc. —.

This again reproduces without change the opinion of the ancient [students of poetics]. Daṇḍin, for example, in his definition of the Ornaments [2], said that " in association with a number of other elements, Delight is transformed into the Erotic Rasa (*śṛṅgāra*) ", and " on reaching its extreme height, Anger is transformed into the Furious Rasa (*raudra*) ", etc.

This interpretation, says Śaṅkuka, is mistaken [3]. Why? — *a*) Because, without the Determinants, etc., the Permanent Mental State cannot be known, for the Determinants, etc., are the characteristic signs, *i.e.*, the logical reasons (*liṅga*) by means of which knowledge of it is made possible [4]. *b*) Because, if the thes is of Lollaṭa is

1) Thus according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa the Rasa is a perception of the Permanent Mental State of the character represented by the actor. This *sthāyibhāva*, intensified by the Determinants, etc., is presented to the spectator in the form of a Rasa.

2) Daṇḍin (7th. century?) wrote the *Kāvyādarśa* (this work may be consulted also in the translation of O. Böhtlingk, Leipzig 1890). The same thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa is met with in the *Agnipurāṇa*; cf., for example, ch. 339, *śl.* 4:

abhimānād ratis sā ca paripoṣam upeyuṣī |
vyabhicāryādisāmānyāt śṛṅgāra iti gīyate ||

3) Śaṅkuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. It is doubtful whether he should be identified with the poet Śaṅkuka, author of a poem called *Bhuvanābhyudaya*, who, according to Kalhaṇa (*R.T.*, IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitapīḍa (about 830 A.D.). In this case, his predecessor, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the same name, on the *Spandakārika*, and so his period should be put back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th. Cf. above, p. 30, n. 1. Śaṅkuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A.G. On Śaṅkuka, see De, *S.P.*, I, p. 38; Pandey, *A.G.*, p. 128.

4) H.C. adds: *na hi dhūmaṃ vinā dharādharāntaḥstho vahnir avagamyate* | " If there were no smoke, the fire which is within a mountain could not be perceived ".

right, Bharata should first have expounded the Permanent Mental States and only afterwards the Rasa [1]. *c*) Because the second definition of the Determinants, etc., in their state of full development, [put forward by Bharata in connexion with Rasas, which, according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, are nothing but Permanent Mental States], would become a useless waste of words [2]. *d*) Because every Permanent Mental Movement would come to be subdivided into an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker, weakest, indifference, etc. *e*) Because, as a result of this fact, there would no longer be six grades of Comic Rasa (*hāsya*) [3]. *f*) Because, for the same reason, the ten grades of love (*kāma*) would include an infinite number of Per-

1) If it were true that the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa, why is it that Bharata explained first Rasa (*N.Ś.*, chap. VI) and afterwards (*N.Ś.*, chap. VII) the mental states?

2) If, as Lollaṭa says, Rasa is no more than an intensified Permanent Mental State, why should Bharata have taken the trouble to explain the Determinants of this mental state twice over, once in connexion with it in its non-intensified state (*N.Ś.*, chap. VII) and once again in connexion with it in its intensified state (*N.Ś.*, chap. VI)? It is illogical to explain the causes of the same thing twice over, once when it is not far from its nascent state and once when it has reached its full development. H.C. clarifies: *na cotpattau padārthānāṃ kāraṇam abhidhāya puṣyatāṃ punas tadutpattikāraṇam abhidhātavyam, vaiyarthyāpatteḥ* |

3) In other words, the intensification (*upacaya*) proposed by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa would necessarily have to develop in a succession. Bharata mentions (*N.Ś.*, VI, vv. 61, 62) six kinds of laughter: *smitam*, *hasitam*, *vihasitam*, *upahasitam*, *apahasitam*, and *atihasitam*. Cf. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 144: " a Gentle Smile (*smita*) is opening the eyes wide; a Smile (*hasita*, *avahasita*) is showing the teeth to some extent; Laughing (*vihasita*) is making a soft sound; Laughter (*upahasita*) is the same, accompanied by shaking of the head; Uproarious Laughter (*apahasita*) is [laughter] accompanied by tears; and Convulsive Laughter (*atihasita*) is [laughter] with shaking of the body. Two of these varieties of laughter [are characteristic] of the higher, two of the middling, and two of the lower [characters], in the order named ". On Lollaṭa's thesis, a further infinity of species of laughter would have to be assumed.

manent Mental States and of Rasas [1]. *g*) Because exactly the contrary would have to be assumed to that which is experienced, *i.e.*, that Sorrow (*śoka*) is at first intense and is seen to grow weaker with time, and that in Anger (*krodha*), Heroism (*utsāha*) and Delight (*rati*) a diminution is met with when the Indignation (*amarṣa*), Firmness (*sthairya*) and Affection (*sevā*) decrease [2].

Therefore Rasa is simply a Permanent Mental State, *i.e.*, it consists in the imitation (*anukaraṇa*) of the Permanent Mental State proper to the person imitated—Rāma, etc.; and, just because it consists in an imitation, it is not called a Permanent Mental State but is given the name of Rasa. This imitated mental state is perceived by means of three kinds of elements, *i. e.*, causes (*hetu*), which are called Determinants, effects (*kārya*), which are the Consequents, and accompanying elements (*sahacāri*), which are called Transitory Mental States. The causes, etc., are brought into existence by the conscious effort (*prayatna*) [of the actor], and are thus artificial (*kṛtrima*), but [the spectators] think that they are real. This Permanent Mental State is perceived (and this perception is aroused by the characteristic signs already referred to) as being inherent in the imitating person (*anukartṛ*).

The Determinants are, indeed, visualized (*anusaṃdhā*) through the power (*bala*) of poetry, the Consequents through the skill (*śikṣā*) of the actor, and the Transitory Mental

1) Cf. note above. The ten kinds of love (*kāma*) mentioned by Bharata (*N.Ś.*, XX, vv. 154-6) are Longing (*abhilāṣa*), Anxiety (*arthacintā*), Recollection (*anusmṛti*), Enumeration of the loved one's merits (*guṇakīrtana*), Distress (*udvega*), Raving (*vilāpa*), Insanity (*unmāda*), Fever (*vyādhi*), Stupor (*jaḍatā*), and Death (*maraṇa*). Cf. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 132.

2) Indignation, etc., are Transitory Mental Movements.

States through the actor's ability to reproduce on the stage the effects of his own Transitory Mental States (which effects are called Consequents when they are artificial). A. Bh. I, p. 275
But the Permanent Mental State cannot be visualized even through the power of poetry. The words " Delight ", " Sorrow ", etc., are, in fact, only able to denote (*abhidheyīkṛ*) the Delight, etc., [to which they refer], — for this Delight, etc., is nothing but a verbal form (*abhidhāna*) —, but they are not able to communicate (*avagam*) it [in its fullness] — as if they were forms of Verbal Representation (*vācikābhinaya*) [1]. For Verbal Representation does not consist merely in words, but rather in what effect the words produce; in the same way Gesticular Representation (*aṅgikābhinaya*) does not consist merely in the movement of the limbs but in the effect which this movement produces [2]. In the following stanzas, Sorrow is not an object of Representation but simply of verbal expression: " Great, deep, wide, and unbounded, the ocean is nevertheless drunk by underwater fires: in the same way, Sorrow is drunk by Anger " [3]. Again: " He is paralysed by sorrow, motionless in this state; such Sorrow increases the lamentations of his companions, who, filled with the fear that

1) In other words, the Permanent Mental States (and hence Rasas) can be made known only by the intrinsic evocative force of poetry, not by the words which denote them. On the force of the term " Representation " (*abhinaya*), cf. the next note.

2) Bharata lists four kinds of Representation (*abhinaya*, art of acting, etc.): *vācikābhinaya*, *sāttvikābhinaya*, *aṅgikābhinaya*, and *āhāryābhinaya*. The first of these is based on variations in the intonation of the voice (Śaṅkuka seems to understand it in more or less the same sense as *dhvani*, the evocative power), etc.; the second on the extrinsecation of certain physical phenomena (sweat, etc.); the third on expressive movement of the limbs; and the fourth on the clothes, etc., which the actor wears.

3) Unidentified stanza.

tears their hearts, beg him imploringly to weep"[1]. Examples may be multiplied. But the following stanza, "This multitude of droplets, fine rain of tears falling while she painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration born from the touch of her hand"[2], at the same time that it expresses what is its own sense[3], represents, rather than expresses verbally[4], the Permanent Mental State of Delight (consisting in a form of pleasure [*sukha*]) proper to Udayana[5]. Representation (*abhinayana*), indeed, is nothing but a power of communication (*avagamanaśakti*)—this power differing from the one of verbal expression. Precisely for such reasons, Bharata does not mention at all the word "Permanent Mental State" in the *sūtra*, not even in a different grammatical case[6]. Thus the Erotic Rasa is simply the Permanent Mental State of Delight imitated; so that it may be rightly said both that it consists of, and is animated by, Delight, and that it is born of Delight. It is found, furthermore, that even mistaken cognition is, sometimes, not without Causal Efficiency (*arthakriyā*): "Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without being conscious of what they really are, but] with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of Causal Efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition[7]". Furthertmore, in aesthetic experience none of

1) Unidentified stanza. In both these stanzas the word "Sorrow" occurs. Thus, in these, Sorrow is in the state of verbal expression.

2) Harṣa, *Ratnāvalī*, II, 11.

3) *I.e.*, its literal meaning.

4) The word "Delight" does not occur in this stanza.

5) The chief character of the *Ratnāvalī*.

6) In the genitive; cf. *supra*, p. 30.

7) This stanza is taken from the *P.V.*, II, v. 57. It is also quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 78.

the following perceptions is experienced: *a*) That happy man is really (*eva*) the actor[1]; *b*) Rāma is really (*eva*) that man; he is not happy[2]; *c*) Is that Rāma or not?[3]; *d*) That man is like Rāma[4]. On the contrary, the form of perception experienced differs from correct (*samyak*) perception, mistaken perception (*mithyā*), doubt (*saṃsaya*), and similitude (*sādṛśya*); what is actually experienced—on the principle of the painted horse, etc.[5]—is the percep-

Causal efficiency, the capacity to produce effects (*arthakriyā*, *arthakriyākāritva*), is the basic criterion of every form of right cognition, and, therefore, of the real existence of a thing. When, for example, a man sees a mirage and, on going near it, does not find the water which he expected to find (and cannot, therefore, drink, wash himself, etc.), his perception is a mistaken one; the water which he has seen is not capable of appeasing his desires, of carrying out the functions proper to real water. In some cases, however, even the mistaken perception is endowed with causal efficiency. In the present case, for instance, it allows the observing subject to find a jewel which is real; in other terms, it does not delude the expectations of the perceiving subject. Even a mistake, observes Dharmakīrti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge. Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Śaṅkuka, can be gifted with causal efficiency, then it is all the more reason for a imitated cognition, *i.e.*, the aesthetic cognition to be gifted with it. The spectators do not, in fact, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the accomplishment of their desires.

1) True or real cognition (awareness of having to do with a real thing). The reality of this cognition is indicated in the text by the particle *eva* (precisely, really, etc.).

2) Mistaken cognition. The classical example of mistaken cognition is that of silver and a pieces of mother-of-pearl: a man sees something shine and thinks it is silver, but on approaching this something he finds that, in fact, it is a piece of mother-of-pearl. The first cognition is contradicted, uprooted (*bādhita*, *unmūlita*) by the second. In the present case, there is at first the sensation of being confronted with Rāma in a state of happiness (*i.e.*, when he has found Sītā again, etc.); this is followed by awareness that the actor is not Rāma in a state of happiness and that the first moment was thus a form of mistaken, unreal, or illusory cognition.

3) Sadness, doubt.

4) Consciousness of the resemblance of the actor to the character represented.

5) Colours (minium, orpiment, lake, etc.) when put together give birth to a thing which is different from each of them taken separately and cannot

tion: "This is the happy Rāma" [1]—. Śaṅkuka himself says: ["In aesthetic experience] there is neither doubt, truth, nor error; the notion which appears is: 'This [man] is so-and-so', not the notion: 'This [man] is really (*eva*) so-and-so'. [Aesthetic experience] involves no contradictory notion, and thus it is impossible to say that it is a form of mistake (*viplava* = *bhrānti*); it is an immediate perception (*anubhava*), evident in and by itself. What sort of argument, then, could put it in question?" [2].

This thesis too, my masters say [3], is without intrinsic value and is incapable of resisting a close criti-

be identified with any of them. Śaṅkuka says implicitly that an image, a picture (*citra*), composed in colours,—to represent a horse, for example—arouse in the beholder a state of consciousness which is different from the knowledge that he is beholding a real horse, a horse similar to a real horse, illusory, etc. The same thing happens, says Śaṅkuka, with the words in poetry. These, put together, bring about aesthetic experience, Rasa. A. G., does not agree with this conception. He maintains that a spectator, before a picture, has the sensation of seeing a thing which imitates reality, that is to say, the real horse.

1) In other words: aesthetic cognition differs from every other form of cognition; it is neither real nor unreal (the specificity of this cognition is indicated in the text by the absence of the asseverative particle *eva*, cf. p. 37, n. 1).

2) Aesthetic experience is a form of inner or mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*). It is directly perceptible to the mind or inner sense (*manaḥ*)—in the same way as the sensations of pleasure, pain, etc. Seen in this way, aesthetic experience is certain, immediate, self-knowing and cannot be doubted. "Whatever is known to us by consciousness is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledge of them more certain that it is in itself" (J. STUART MILL, *A System of Logic*, Intr., § 4).

3) The expression "my masters", observes H.C., alludes to Bhaṭṭa Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A.G. and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century. Bhaṭṭa Tota wrote a work of poetry, the *Kāvyakautuka*, on which A.G. wrote a commentary (*vivaraṇa*), which has not yet been found. The confutation of Śaṅkuka, given in the following pages, goes back, therefore, to Bhaṭṭa Tota.

cism [1]. Specifically, from what point of view, we may ask, was Śaṅkuka saying that Rasa has the nature of an imitation? 1) From the point of view of the spectators' perception, 2) from the actor's point of view, 3) from the point of view of the mind of the critics (*vyākhyātṛ*) who analyse the real nature (*vastuvṛtta*) [of aesthetic experience] (for it has been said that "it is, in fact, the critics who analyse in this way") [2], 4) or, finally, from Bharata's own point of view? A. Bh., I, p. 276

1) The first alternative cannot be upheld. For only something perceived by a means of cognition can be said to be an imitation [3]. There is imitation, for example, in the case of a person who drinks some milk (this

1) Śaṅkuka's mistake consists in asserting that aesthetic experience is an experience of a discursive kind (*savikalpa*; it is an imitation), and at the same time saying that it differs from every other kind of discursive cognition. The doctrine which he professes is thus vitiated by an intrinsic contradition. The whole of Bhaṭṭa Tota's confutation, reproduced by Abhinava, reduces in the last analysis to a close and often scholastic examination of this contradiction.

2) This quotation is taken from the *svavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti to the *svārthānumānapariccheda* of the *Pramāṇavārtika* (cf. *supra*, p. 6): *vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ | te tu svālambanam evārthakriyāyogyaṃ manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekīkṛtya pravartante* | Practical life (*vyavahāra*) is based, according to Dharmakīrti, on the identification of the thing *in se* (*svalakṣaṇa*) with its mental image. The mind super-imposes (*ārop*) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the subject believes that he is faced with reality. The difference between the thing itself, which is real, and the illusory character of the mental image which has been superimposed upon it, is a theoretical distinction created by the 'critics' and 'philosophers' (*vyakhyātṛ*, *tattvacintaka*). In confuting this concept, A. G. asserts that it is impossible to explain a thing in the theoretical moment by an explanation which contradicts one's awareness of in the practical moment. In other words, the spectators, while they are immersed in the Rasa aroused by the spectacle, do not know that they are faced with an imitation. The fact automatically confutes those who sustain the theory that there is an imitation. Cf. *infra*, p. 47.

3) The explanation is given a few lines below.

action being directly perceived by the spectator) and says: "Thus did so-and-so drink the wine". In this case, the action of milk-drinking imitates the action of wine-drinking. But in the present case what is it that is perceived in the actor, which might seem to be an imitation [of the Permanent Mental State]? This is the problem. His body, the headwear, etc., that crown it, his horripilations, his faltering words, etc., the raising of his arms, the waving of them, etc., his frowns, his expressive glances, etc., certainly are not taken by anyone for imitations of Delight, which is a mental movement. For *a*) they are [in themselves] insentient (*jaḍa*)[1], *b*) they are perceived by senses other than those which perceive the mental movements (*bhinnendriya*)[2], and *c*) their substrata are made up of totally dissimilar things (*bhinnādhikaraṇa*)[3], and thus are about as different from mental movements as it is possible to imagine. Consciousness of an imitation presupposes, furthermore, perception both of the term of imitation and of the thing which imitates; but none of the spectators has ever in their lives been in a position to witness directly the Delight of Rāma. These arguments suffice to exclude altogether the possibility that the actor is imitating Rāma[4].

If it is answered that the thing called Erotic Rasa, the imitation of Delight, is simply the mental movement

1) *I.e.*, they are not of a mental or spiritual nature.

2) Mental movements are perceived by the internal sense, *manaḥ*, mind. All the acts, etc., listed, however, are perceived by the external senses such as sight, etc.

3) The body, etc. The mental states are based on the mind. M.C., p. 69, comments: *tathā hi naṭavapurādīnāṃ jaḍatvaṃ cakṣurgrāhyatvam, rater ajaḍatvam manogrāhyatvaṃ ca | pratiśīrṣakādīnāṃ vapur adhikaraṇam, rates tu mano 'dhikaraṇam iti |*

4) *I.e.*, these implicitly exclude the second alternative as well; all the same, it is discussed and examined separately (cf. *infra*, pp. 45 ff.).

of the actor, which, as perceived by the spectators, appears to them in the very form of an imitation of Delight, then we may ask: "Of what, when perceived, does it appear to consist?" This is the problem. Our adversaries will doubtless reply that the actor's mental movement appears to the spectators to consist of just those characteristic signs (causes, such as women, etc., effects, such as expressive glances, etc., concomitant elements, such as Contentment, etc.) which serve to render perceptible an ordinary mental movement. To this contention we may immediately reply that, if this were the case, the mental movement of the actor would be perceived simply in the form of Delight[1]; thus such an argument certainly does not help to confirm the thesis which you wish to defend, namely that there is an imitation of Delight. It might be replied that the following distinction must be made: that from the point of view of the person imitated, the Determinants, etc., are real (*pāramārthika*), but in the present case, the case of the imitator, they are unreal. Very well, then! But, even if these Determinants, etc., are not the real causes, effects and concomitant elements of the Permanent Mental State of the actor, even if, that is to say, they are fashioned solely by the power of the poem, the skill of the actor, etc., and are thus artificial, are they so perceived by the spectators or are they perceived as real? And, if they are perceived as artificial, how would it be possible, through them, to perceive Delight? Answer: "But that is just exactly why what is perceived is not Delight but the imitation of Delight"! This answer,

1) *I.e.*, there would be a perception of ordinary nature, not aesthetic cognition.

we reply, could only be made by a man of dull wits [1]. For inference from apparently similar effects of their respective causes is only legitimate in the case in which the effects really are derived from different causes and are recognised as such by a person of experience. An inexperienced person can only infer the more familiar cause which is recognised by everybody. For example, [an experienced person] presented with a scorpion possessing particular characteristics can readily infer that its cause is dung; [an inexperienced person], on the other hand, can only infer—and in this case there is nothing but (*paraṃ*) a false cognition—that it is the offspring of another scorpion. When cognition of the logical reason (*hetu*)—*e.g.*, smoke—is mistaken, inference based on this apparent logi-

1) Bhaṭṭa Tota's reply (set out in the following lines) may be summarised: Assuming that the Determinants, etc., are perceived as unreal or artificial (*kṛtrima*), they cannot legitimise the inference of either Delight or an imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason (*e.g.*, a cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped cloud does not stand in any cause-effect relation with fire, and is thus a mistaken logical reason) we cannot infer either fire (in this case, mistaken cognition would occur) or, still less, anything imitating fire (*e.g.*, as A. G. says, a heap of red roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the layman are apparently the same, the respective causes of each of them (example: the scorpions. According to tradition there are two kinds of scorpion, one kind being born from other scorpions and the other kind from dung); but in the present case the logical reason is nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the Determinants, etc., are perceived as *kṛtrima*) and as such is an effect neither of Delight nor of an imitation of Delight. Thus for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates Delight is impossible. The inference of Delight made by an inexperienced person is a form of mistaken cognition. H.C. explains: *ayaṃ bhāvaḥ prasiddhād ratilakṣaṇāt kāraṇād ratyanukaraṇaṃ nāma kāraṇāntaraṃ tatprabhavāś ced anubhāvāḥ syuḥ | tathaiva ca viśeṣavidā yadi jñāyeran tadā ratyanukaraṇalakṣaṇasya vastvantarasyānumānaṃ samañjasam syāt | na caivam, tat katham iva ratyanukaraṇapratītiḥ | aviśeṣavidā ca tathāvidhānubhāvadarśane ratir evānumīyate tac ca mithyājñānam eveti |*

cal reason will itself be invalid. For it cannot be maintained that anyone could infer from mist (whether it be supposed by the observer to be smoke, or whether he be aware that it is only an imitation of the true logical reason) something which is an imitation of fire. Obviously, a veil of mist—something which imitates smoke and is recognised as an imitaion—does not legitimize the inference of a heap of red roses, namely something that imitates fire.

Someone might perhaps reply that, even if the actor is not himself enraged, still he seems to be enraged. True enough, we answer, he is like someone who is enraged. But this resemblance is due to a contraction of the eyebrows, etc.—in the same way, that is, that the resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like species is due to the shape of the muzzle, etc. In other words, no imitation is involved. Again, the spectators are not conscious of this resemblance; we know that the perception of the spectators, while they perceive the actor, is not without the mental state which he appears to have [1]. If we are told that what occurs is not a real but an apparent imitation, this, we answer, is an argument completely without force [, contradicting the very thesis which you are upholding] [2]. Further, Śaṅkuka said that in aesthetic experience there is the perception: "That is Rāma". Now, if this perception, devoid of every doubt during the play, is not later contradicted by some form of subsequent cognition which invalidates (*bādhaka*) it, what is wrong A. Bh., I. p. 277

1) In other words, the spectators are not aware of a resemblance between the actor and the character he represents, but only of the fact that the actor is immersed in a certain state of consciousness, shared also by them.

2) M.C., p. 71 replaces "*iti riktā vācoyuktiḥ*" by "*iti svavacanavirodhaḥ |*".

with saying it is a true cognition? [1] And, if it is contradicted by a subsequent cognition, why is it not a mistaken cognition? [2] In fact, however, even if no invalidating cognition is subsequently obtained, the case is always [, if we are to keep to Śaṅkuka's point of view,] one of mistaken cognition [3]. Thus Śaṅkuka's contention, namely that this cognition "involves no contradictory notion", is without foundation [4]. Furthermore, the perception "That is Rāma", is repeated as well in the case of other actors; consequently [, accepting Śaṅkuka's thesis,] there should be a "Rāmaness", a genus "Rāma" [5]. Nor can his other assertion, "The Determinants are visualized through the poetry", be successfully explained. Indeed the actor does not have the perception, "Sītā is the woman I love", as if, that is to say, Sītā was inherent in his own real life [6]. If it is replied that this is the meaning of the word "visualization", *i.e.*, that this is how the Determinants are made perceptible to the spectator, then we answer that there ought more reasonably to be, instead, a visualization of the Permanent Mental State. Indeed,

1) Cf. *supra*, p. 37, 38. M.C., p. 71 simplifies: *yac coktaṃ rāmo 'yam ity asti pratītiḥ, tatrāpi yadi na bādhakodayaḥ tat kathaṃ na samyagjñānam, bādhakodayaś cet kathaṃ na mithyā* |

2) Cf. *supra*, p. 37, n. 2.

3) Śaṅkuka says that aesthetic experience consists of an imitation; therefore he maintains implicity that it is unreal.

4) Cf. *supra*, p. 38.

5) According to A.G. aesthetic knowledge is of a different order from logical knowledge and therefore from the concepts of generality, etc., proper to the latter. The concept of *sādhāraṇya* (cf. *infra*, p. 51, n. 1) is completely independent of logical generality (*sāmānya*).

6) The actor does not identify or unite the Determinants taken from the poem with the things which are "causes" in his own real life. In other words, he does not have the perception that they from part of his real life.

the perception of the spectators is concerned, in a primary sense, precisely with this and is presented in the form: "That man [is] in this [Permanent Mental State]". The analysis of the nature of Representation made by Śaṅkuka by the expression, "Verbal Representation... merely in words", etc., will be discussed later at the appropriate time and place. This analysis is very important. In it, in fact, Śaṅkuka emphasises the diversity [both of the Verbal Representation and of the simple verbal expression] [1]. Thus it is wrong to say, that from the point of view of the spectators, Rasa is an imitation of the Permanent Mental State.

2) Nor, again, does the actor have this notion: "I am imitating Rāma or his mental state". For it is not possible to imitate (*i.e.*, to perform actions similar to those of...) someone of whose nature we are ignorant [2]. If, on other hand, they object that imitation only means the fact of doing something after [somebody else has already done it], such imitation, we reply, is also found in ordinary life [3]. This imitation, they reply, is not the imitation of a particular being, but merely the fact of imitating the Sorrow[, etc.,] of a man of elevated nature (*uttamaprakṛti*). But then—we reply—with what is this imitation performed? This is the problem. Certainly not with Sorrow, since this is absent in the actor. It is undoubtedly not done with tears, etc.; for these, as has al-

1) Ch. IX of the *N.Ś.*, in which A.G. discusses it, has unfortunately not yet come to light. Cf. also *N.Ś.*, ch. XIV.

2) It has not been perceived before. Every imitation presupposes a previous perception.

3) In other words, if imitation is felt in this way, there is an imitation. every time someone does something which has already been done by someone else.

ready been said, are of a nature other than that of Sorrow [1]. Well, they might reply, then let us say that the following perception occurs in the actor: "I am imitating the Consequents of a man of elevated nature". But in this case again, we observe, which man of elevated nature? If the answer is any man of elevated nature, then we reply that [the image of] such a man cannot be brought into the mind without further specification [2]. If they say that the perception one has is that of, "I am imitating somebody who is weeping in this way", then we reply that the actor's Self takes an active part in this Sorrow; so that the relation of imitated-imitator no longer exist [3]. Besides, the actor's performance takes place only through three causes: his skill in the art, his memory of his own Determinants, and the consent of his heart (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*) [4] aroused by the state of generality (*sādhāraṇībhāva*) of the mental states [5]; in virtue of this, he displays the corresponding Consequents and reads the work of poetry with suitable accompanying intonations (*kāku*) of his voice. The consciousness of the actor is thus aware of only these three things: he has no consciousness of carrying out an imitation. For imitation of the deeds of Rāma is different from imitation of the dress of the beloved being (*kān-*

1) Cf. *supra*, p. 40.

2) In so far as every cognition is of the particular.

3) M.C., p. 71 paraphrases: *ya evam roditīti cet, tarhi svātmānam api naṭo 'nukarotīty āyātam tasyāpi rodanasadbhāvād iti galito 'nukāryānukartṛbhāvaḥ* | "If, they say, there is the notion 'he who weeps thus', then, we reply, we must assume that the actor is imitating himself as well (for the actor himself would have to be really grieving). Thus the imitated-imitator relation would no longer hold".

4) Cf. *infra*, p. 65, n. 1.

5) Cf. *infra*, p. 51, n. 1.

taveṣānukāra) [1]. All this we explained before in the first chapter [2].

3) Nor can it be said that there is an imitation from the point of view of the nature of things (*vastuvṛtta*). It is impossible, indeed, that a thing of which one is not conscious, can be considered as existing from the point of view of the nature of things [3]. We shall explain further in what the nature of things consists [4].

4) Nor did Bharata ever say in any passage: "Rasa is the imitation of the Permanent Mental States". Such an assertion was never made by him even indirectly by means of an indication. On the contrary, the various sub-divisions of women's dance (*lāsya*), the various musical tempi (*tāla*) and the *dhruvā* songs described by Bharata are an indication of precisely the opposite [5]. All this will be explained later at the end of the chapter on the sub-divisions of the Junctures (*saṃdhyaṅga*) [6]. The expressions met with in Bharata every now and again, "Drama is an imitation of [all the forms of existence in] the seven islands" [7]), etc., can

A. Bh., I, p. 278

1) Cf. *A. Bh.*, p. 37. A person in love, according to the Indian rhetors, is sometimes impelled to imitate or repeat every gesture and attitude, etc., of his beloved. The aesthetic act has nothing to do with this imitation. H.C., p. 424: *vāgveṣaceṣṭitaiḥ priyasyānukṛtir līlā* |

2) *A. Bh.*, ch. I, p. 37.

3) *I.e.*, from the point of view of the analysing mind. Cf. *I.P.V.*, II, p. 179: *saṃvedanatiraskāriṇī kā khalu yuktir nāma anupapattiś ca bhāsamānasya kānyā bhaviṣyati* |

4) In the statement of his own thesis.

5) They do not imitate anything in ordinary life; *infra*, p. 81, n. 4.

6) *N.Ś.*, XIX. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, 11: "The Junctures are the structural divisions of the drama, which correspond with the elements of the plot and the stages in the hero's realization of his purpose". The Junctures are divided into sixty-four sub-divisions (*aṅga*). Cf. *Ind. Th.*, p. 140, etc.

7) *N.Ś.*, I, v. 120: *saptadvīpānukaraṇaṃ nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati* |. In other words, drama can be an "imitation" of all the forms of existence in the world

have also other explanations. Moreover, why is it that to the imitation of the walk, the dress, etc., of the beloved, imitation also of [all the forms of existence in] the seven islands (*tadanukāre*), is given another name [*i.e.*, mimicry, play, counterfeit (*līlā*, cf. *supra*, p. 45, n. 5; *vikāraṇa*, *A. Bh.*, I, ch. p. 37) and not drama]? [1].

Some people say: "The pigments—orpiment, etc.—undoubtedly compose (*saṃyuj*) a cow [2]". Now if the word "compose" is understood in the sense of "manifest (*abhivyaj*)", these people are also in error. For we cannot say that minium, etc., manifest a real (*pāramārthika*) cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp, etc. All they do is to produce (*nirvṛt*) a particular aggregate (*samūha*) similar to a cow. The only object of the image, "it is like a cow", is simply this minium, etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement (*saṃniveśa*) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of Determinants, etc., the situation is different: this—as we have said—cannot be perceived as similar to Delight [3]. Thus it is not true that Rasa is the imitation of mental states.

(the expression "the seven islands", refers to the world with its oceans, continents, etc.; cf. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 42: *saptadvīpabhāvānukaraṇarūpe nāṭye . . .*). The term "imitation" must be interpreted as a "re-telling" (*anukīrtana*) and therefore as a "re-perception" (*anuvyavasāya*). On the meaning of this word, see below, pp. 106 ff.

1) Text and translation both doubtful.

2) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface.

3) The visual arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order from poetry: the pigments, etc., are material things which imitate a material thing. Very well then, says A.G.; all the same, it is impossible that the poetic expression (consisting of Determinants, etc., *i.e.*, of material elements) could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature (the same objection as *supra* p. 40).

Again, other people say:—Rasa is made up of pleasure (*suḥkha*) and pain (*duḥkha*). It is a combination (*sāmagrī*) of various elements [1]. This combination is of an external order and possesses the power of generating pleasure and pain. [From this point of view,] this thesis agrees with Sāṃkhya's doctrine [2]. In this combination, the Determinants take the place of petals. The Consequents and the Transitory Mental States do duty for that which garnishes it. Out of it, again, are born the Permanent Mental States. These are made up of pleasure and pain and are internal—. The supporters of this thesis maintain that expressions such as, "the Permanent Mental States we shall bring to the state of Rasa", etc., must be understood metaphorically, *i.e.*, they are themselves aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bharata's text. Thus the student is preserved from falling into error by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis displays garrulously *ex ore suo* its unsoundness [3]. What use is there in replying to such people? Let us rather state the essential points of the other hypotheses, etc., arising out of this difficult problem, *i.e.*, what is the nature of aesthetic perception.

1) The Determinants, etc., are external (*i.e.*, they are not psychic states). The elements in question are the Determinants, the Consequents, and the Transitory Mental States; the latter are also regarded as external in the present passage.

2) According to the Sāṃkhya, external objects are a modification of *prakṛti*, which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is emphatically confuted by Dharmakīrti, *P.V.*, II, 268 ff.

3) According to this theory there is no longer any difference between Rasas and Permanent Mental States. Its supporters are therefore forced to give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata distinguishes Rasas from Permanent Mental States.

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2) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface.

3) The visual arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order from poetry: the pigments, etc., are material things which imitate a material thing. Very well then, says A.G.; all the same, it is impossible that the poetic expression (consisting of Determinants, etc., *i.e.*, of material elements) could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature (the same objection as *supra* p. 40).

Again, other people say:—Rasa is made up of pleasure (*suḥkha*) and pain (*duḥkha*). It is a combination (*sāmagrī*) of various elements[1]. This combination is of an external order and possesses the power of generating pleasure and pain. [From this point of view,] this thesis agrees with Sāṃkhya's doctrine[2]. In this combination, the Determinants take the place of petals. The Consequents and the Transitory Mental States do duty for that which garnishes it. Out of it, again, are born the Permanent Mental States. These are made up of pleasure and pain and are internal—. The supporters of this thesis maintain that expressions such as, "the Permanent Mental States we shall bring to the state of Rasa", etc., must be understood metaphorically, *i.e.*, they are themselves aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bharata's text. Thus the student is preserved from falling into error by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis displays garrulously *ex ore suo* its unsoundness[3]. What use is there in replying to such people? Let us rather state the essential points of the other hypotheses, etc., arising out of this difficult problem, *i.e.*, what is the nature of aesthetic perception.

1) The Determinants, etc., are external (*i.e.*, they are not psychic states). The elements in question are the Determinants, the Consequents, and the Transitory Mental States; the latter are also regarded as external in the present passage.

2) According to the Sāṃkhya, external objects are a modification of *prakṛti*, which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is emphatically confuted by Dharmakīrti, *P.V.*, II, 268 ff.

3) According to this theory there is no longer any difference between Rasas and Permanent Mental States. Its supporters are therefore forced to give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata distinguishes Rasas from Permanent Mental States.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says [1]:—Rasa is not perceived (*pratī*), nor produced (*utpad*), nor manifested (*abhivyaj*). For if it were perceived as inherent in the perceiver, in the Pathetic Rasa he would necessarily feel in pain [2]. Again, such a perception is not admissible. Why? *a*) Because Sītā, etc., does not play the role of a Determinant in the case of the spectator [3]; *b*) because no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator's consciousness [while he looks at Sītā] [4]; *c*) because [the representation of] deities, etc., cannot logically arouse [in the spectator] the state of generality (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*) [required for the

1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka flourished in Kashmir after Ānandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A.D.), the author of the *Dhvanyāloka*, whom he refutes. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is, therefore, to be placed round about 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with the brāhmaṇa Nāyaka, who lived during the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 A.D.), and who is mentioned by Kalhaṇa (*R.T.*, V, 159). In the *I.P.V.V.*, III, p. 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of *śaiva* inspiration, which he attributes to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, to which he gives the title of *mīmāṃsakāgraṇīḥ* (the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumārila, *mīmāṃsakapravara*). Another stanza of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (taken from a *stotra*) is quoted by Kṣemarāja (*Spandanirṇaya*, p. 18). I am inclined to think that these two Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka were one and the same person. The poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, which [illegible] not yet come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains [illegible] invocation to Śiva, has been preserved in the *A.Bh.*, I, p. 5. The stanzas from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, which recurr a few lines later, are taken, without any doubt, from this work. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka [illegible] been collected by T. R. Chintamani, *J.O.R.M.*, Vol. I, pp. 267-276. [illegible] the poetic doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the confutation of the *dh*[illegible] cf. T. R. Chintamani, *J.B.U.*, Vol. 17, part 2, pp. 267-276. Bhaṭṭa N[illegible]ka's theory is also stated with few variations in the *Dh. Ā. L.*, pp. 180 ff. [illegible] Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in general, see Kane, *S.D.V.*, pp. 212-215; Pandey, [illegible] pp. 128-130.

2) Thus no one would go to see plays on pathetic, etc., subjects any [illegible]

3) The spectators are not Rāma, etc., so that it is impossible to [illegible] that the fortunes of Sītā can play the role of Determinant in their case.

4) At the same time, there is no identification of the image of Sītā [illegible] that of his own beloved.

aesthetic experience] [1]; *d*) ocean-crossing, etc., are extraordinary undertakings, and thus fall short of generality (*sādhāraṇya*) [2]. Finally, it cannot be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rāma, possessing such-and-such qualities [3], in so far as he has not been the object of a

1) *a*) Generality (*sādhāraṇya*) is the principal character of aesthetic experience. The events and facts of which the Determinants, etc., consist are independent of any relation with any particular individual and of any particular association. The situation represented, says Mammaṭa, is independent of the following specifications: "This concerns me"; "This concerns my enemy"; "This concerns a person who is indifferent to me"; "This does not concern me"; "This does not concern my enemy"; "This does not concern a person who is indifferent to me". Generality is thus a state of self-identification with the imagined situation, devoid of any practical interest and, from this point of view, of any relation whatsoever with the limited Self and as it were impersonal. The Determinants and Consequents differ from ordinary causes and effects just on account of this state of generality. The same feelings of Delight, Sorrow and Anger which pervade ordinary life appear in a completely different manner in the aesthetic state of consciousness. The witnessing of a scene of ordinary life (*e.g.*, a love scene) necessarily arouses in the spectator a certain serie of feelings (Anger, Envy, Disgust, etc.) proportionate to the closeness of the ties which bind him to the protagonists of the scene in question. It may be that he is completely indifferent to the actors in the scene and also to the act which they perform; in this case he will be in a state of indifference (*tāṭasthya*), which also is at the very opposite pole to aesthetic experience, which is characterized by just an active participation (*anupraveśa*) of the cognizing subject in the event represented. The same scene represented on the stage is, on the contrary, devoid of all particular associations and free from any extraneous interference (*vighna*)—Anger, Disgust, etc. The spectator is without any pragmatic requirement, any of the interests (desire for gain, etc.), by which ordinary life is characterized. He is immersed in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of everything else; the task of generalisation carried out by the poetic expression [illegible] the barrier of the limited "I" and eliminates in this way the inte[illegible] demands and aims associated with it. Cf. *infra*, p. 77 ff.

b) In this passage Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains that when the Determi[illegible] etc., are divinity, etc., they cannot be perceived as "general"; the [illegible] gods are too different from human affairs.

[illegible] the last note. This assertion is confuted by A.G., *infra*, p. 71.

[illegible]dam, etc. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 181: *na cotsāhadimān rāmaḥ smaryate, ananu-*

previous perception. Even if it is supposed that the spectator infers the perception of Rāma from the words, etc., of which the poem consists, we do not allow that this implies the occurrence of Rasa—this does not happen even in the case of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) [1]. For on the appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting mental movements (shame [*lajjā*], disgust [*jugupsā*], envy [*spṛhā*], etc.); we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa! If, on the other hand, it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as inhering in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference (*tāṭasthya*) [2]. Thus it is not possible to suppose that Rasa can be perceived—whether this perception be a form of direct experience or a form of memory (*smṛti*). The same errors may be imputed to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced. If it is supposed that Rasa first pre-exists in a potential form (*śaktirūpatvena*) and is later manifested, then the Determinants must necessarily illuminate it little by little [3]. Besides, the difficulties already encountered would recur: is Rasa manifested as inhering in the subject in which it is manifested, or as inhering in a

1) In other words, if Rasa could arise from a simple inference, all the more should it arise from a direct perception.

2) Cf. p. 51, n. 1.

3) This objection repeats, *mutatis mutandis*, the objection of the Buddhists and of the *mīmāṃsaka* against the concept of *sphoṭa*, which, according to the grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*), is a vocality, eternal and without parts, distinct from the letters and manifested (*vyaj*) by these. This eternal vocality causes the cognition of the meaning. This objection is as follows: is *sphoṭa* manifested entirely by the first letter of a word or not? *a*) If *sphoṭa* is manifested in its entirety, the letters which come after are unnecessary. In other words, the first letter would be capable of rendering perceptible the meaning of the whole word. *b*) If *sphoṭa* is manifested gradually, then it could no

third party? [1] Our thesis, thus, is as follows [2]: Rasa is revealed (*bhāvyamāna*) by a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (*bhāvanā*)—to be distinguished from the power of denotation—(*abhidhā*) consisting of, and animated by, the action of generalizing the Determinants, etc. This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick pall of mental stupor (*moha*) which cloaks one's own consciousness [3]: in poetry, it is *A. Bh.*, I, p. 279

longer be without parts. This second alternative is, therefore, in contradiction to the very nature of *sphoṭa*. The same reasoning is applied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to Rasa and to the words by which it is manifested.

The gradual manifestation of the Rasas has also been criticised by Śaṅkuka, cf. *supra*, p. 33, 34.

This passage is also to be found, with few variations, in *Dh. Ā.L.*, p. 182: *śaktirūpasya hi śṛṅgārasyābhivyaktau viṣayārjanatāratamyapravṛttiḥ syāt* | The interpretation given by the modern commentator of this work, Rāma Śaraka, differs from mine (cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 182).

1) Cf. p. 51, n. 1.

2) The thesis of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is briefly as follows. In poetic expression, words possess three powers (*vyāpāra*): the first is the ordinary power which they possess in prose as well, the power of denotation (*abhidhā*), *i.e.*, the fact that each word denotes a certain object; the second, which is proper to poetry, is the power of revelation (*bhāvanā*), *i.e.*, of revealing Rasa. This "generalizes" the Determinants, etc. The third is the power of making the spectator enjoy a fruition (*bhogīkaraṇa*, *bhogakṛtva*, *bhogīkṛti*) of the Rasa which they have revealed: *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 182: *anyaśabdavailakṣaṇyaṃ kāvyātmanaḥ śabdasya tryaṃśatāprasādāt* | *tatrābhidhāyakatvaṃ vācyaviṣayam, bhāvakatvaṃ rasādiviṣayam, bhogakṛtvaṃ sahṛdayaviṣayam iti trayo 'ṃśabhūtā vyāpārāḥ* | "The words which make up a poem are of a different character from ordinary words, in that they have three powers. The first of these, the power of denotation, is connected with the things signified; the second, the power of revelation, has as its object Rasa, etc.; the third, the power of bringing about fruition, has as its object all individuals who possess aesthetic sensibility. The words of a poem therefore have three powers". If, says Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, poetic expression possessed only the power of denotation, there would be not the least difference between it and ordinary expression.

3) During aesthetic experience, the consciousness of the spectator is free from all practical desires. The spectacle witnessed is no longer felt in connexion with the empirical "I" of the spectator nor in connexion with any other particular individual; it has the power of abolishing the limited

characterized by the absence of Defects (*doṣa*) and the presence of Qualities (*guṇa*) and Ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) of Expression[1]; in the drama, by the four kinds of Representation[2]. Rasa, revealed by this power, is then enjoyed (*bhuj*) with a kind of enjoyment (*bhoga*), different from direct experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between *sattva* and *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*[3], consists of, and is animated by, the states of fluidity

personality of the spectator, who regains, momentarily, his immaculate being not yet overshadowed by *māyā*. *Moha*, stupor, is the specific state aroused by *tamaḥ*.

1) One classical definition of poetry (H.C., p. 33) says: *adoṣau saguṇau sālaṃkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam* | " Poetry is word and content without defects, possessing qualities and also (but not necessarily) ornaments ".

2) Cf. *supra*, p. 35, n. 2.

3) *a*) The light of the Self, of the consciousness, does not reveal itself, in the *saṃsārika* existence, in immaculate purity, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements (*guṇa*) of mental substance (*buddhi*), *sattva*, light, luminous and pleasant, *rajaḥ*, mobile, dynamic and painful, *tamaḥ*, inert, obstructive and stupid. These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. The state of emergence of the element *sattva*, limpid and mirror-like, coincides with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light and beatitude proper to the Self— these indeed reflect themselves in *sattva*. *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, p. 150: *sattvaṃ prakāśarūpaṃ nirmalanabhaḥprakhyaṃ sarvato jaladapaṭalena iva varaṇātmanā tamasā samāvṛtam āste* | *tatra ca mārutasthānīyaṃ pravṛttisvabhāvaṃ rajaḥ kriyātmakatayā krameṇa tamojaladam apasārayati nyagbhāvayati* | " *Sattva*, which is made up of light and is like the immaculate ether, is completely enshrouded by *tamaḥ*, the principle of obstruction, as by a blanket of cloud. *Rajaḥ*, which is made up of action and is, therefore, imbued with activity, serves as a wind, which, little by little, brushes away, dissipates, the cloud-bank of *tamaḥ* ". The three constituent elements, *sattva*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ* are associated with three states of consciusness called, respectively, expansion (*vikāsa*), provoked by an absolute predominance of *sattva*, fluidity (*druti*), determined by a contact of *sattva* with *rajaḥ*, and dilatation (*vistara*) determined by a contact of *sattva* with *tamaḥ*.

The conception of the three *guṇa*, belonging, in particular, to the *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* systems, is accepted, without notable modifications, by the whole of Indian thought.

b) *Druti*, *vistara*, and *vikāsa* are each connected with certain Rasa by later Indian theorists. *Druti* is the proper state of consciousness of *śṛṅgāra*, *karuṇa*

(*druti*), dilatation (*vistara*) and expansion (*vikāsa*), and is characterized by a resting (*viśrānti*) on one's own consciousness (*saṃvit*), which, due to the emergent state of *sattva*, has the nature of beatitude (*ānanda*) and light (*prakāśa*)[1].

and *śānta*; *vistara* of *vīra*, *raudra* and *bībhatsa*; *vikāsa*, of *hāsya*, *adbhuta* and *bhayānaka*. Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, comm., p. 206. *Rajaḥ* predominates in *druti*, *tamaḥ* in *vistara*, and *sattva* in *vikāsa*. M.C., p. 74: *yadā hi rajaso guṇasya drutiḥ tamaso vistaraḥ sattvasyātivikāsaḥ tādānīṃ bhogaḥ svarūpam labhate* | " It is when *rajah* is in fluidity, *tamaḥ* in dilatation, and *sattva* in full expansion that fruition is realized ".

1) *a*) The expression *sattvodreka°* is reproduced almost without change by Mammaṭa, p. 74: *sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayasaṃvidviśrāntisatattvena*. It has been commmented upon in several ways. I have followed, in the translation, the commentary of Vidyācakravartin (*K.P.*, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, LXXXVII): *sattvodrekād yau prakāśānandau tanmayyāṃ saṃvidi samādhivṛttirūpāyāṃ yā yogināṃ viśrāntir vigalitasakalaśramā nistaraṅgenāvasthitis tatsadṛśena*. M.C., p. 74, comments on: *sattvodrekena prakāśaḥ prakaṭo ya ānandas tanmayī yā saṃvit tasyāṃ viśrāntiḥ, sā satattvaṃ paramārtho yasya sa tathā* | A.G. says in *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 183: *rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhāvanirvṛtiviśrāntilakṣaṇaḥ* The famous definition of aesthetic experience given by Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, adds nothing to the conception of A.G. and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Viśvanātha says:

> *sattvodrekād akhaṇḍasvaprakāśānandacinmayaḥ* |
> *vedyāntarasparśaśūnyo brahmāsvādasahodaraḥ* ||
> *lokottaracamatkārapraṇaḥ kaiścit pramātṛbhiḥ* |
> *svākāravad abhinnatvenāyam āsvādyate rasaḥ* ||

" Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons [*i.e.*, *qui rationem artis intelligunt*]. It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of *sattva*. It is made up of a full Intelligence, Beatitude and Self-Luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of *brahman*. It is animated by a *camatkāra* of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility ". Cf. the translation of A.K. Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard, 1934, pp. 48 ff. Coomaraswamy translates *camatkāra* with " lighting-flash ". According to Viśvanātha, *sattva* is nothing but the mind or inner sense (*manaḥ*) devoid of any contact with *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*.

b) The terminology used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and referred to by A.G. is exactly analogous to that used by Bhoja, in his definition of the *sānandasamādhi*: *yadā tu rajastamoleśānuviddham antaḥkaraṇasattvaṃ bhāvyate tadā guṇabhāvāc citiśakteḥ śubhaprakāśamayasya sattvasya bhāvyamānasyodrekāt*

This enjoyment is of the same order as the Tasting (*āsvāda*) of the supreme *brahman*[1]—. For, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says

sānandaḥ samādhir bhavet | (*Bhojavṛtti*, I, 17). "When the matter of concentration (*bhāvanā* is commented on by Bhoja *bhāvanā bhāvyasya viṣayantaraparihāreṇa cetasi punaḥ punar niveśanam*) is the *sattva* tinged by the *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ* proper to the inner sense, then by virtue both of the subordinate state of the self, and of the emergence of *sattva*, which is made up of bliss and light and is the matter of concentration, that which is called *sānandasamādhi* occurs" This passage is also quoted by Pandey, *I.Aes.*, p. 189.

e) *Viśrānti*, rest, denotes the fact of our being absorbed in something, immerged in it, to the exclusion of every other thing (*vigalitavedyāntaratayā*), without, that is, having any mental movement, any extraneous desire (in other words no obstacle, *vighna*), which comes to break into that state of consciousness. In aesthetic language, *viśrānti* denotes, at the same time, the fact of being absorbed in the aesthetic object, and the sensation of pleasure *sui generis* which accompanies that state of consciousness. In the *śaiva* metaphysics *viśrānti* denotes the repose of everything that exists in the "I" (everything that exists is reposing in the consciousness, but the consciousness does not repose in any other thing different from itself, it is reposed in itself) and, implicitly, the repose of the limited "I" in the consciousness in its original fullness. The terms "solution" (*nirvṛti*), "lysis" (*laya*), "accomplishment" (*samāpatti*), etc., express the same concept (cf. *infra*, p. 77). They recur frequently in the works of the *śaiva* schools of Kashmir. Consciousness manifests and illuminates everything. The appearing of all things presupposes the existence of Consciousness, which is, in this sense, light (*prakāśa*).

On the concept of beatitude (*ānanda*), see *infra* p. 87, n. 2.

1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no longer associated with the limited "I"; during aesthetic experience the subject is completely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the whole of the reality which surrounds him disappears from his view. The same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, occurs in mystical experience; in this sense, aesthetic experience is similar (*savidha*, *sabrahmacārin*, *sahodara*) to experience of the Absolute or of the *brahman*. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and A.G. (A.G. also accepts Bhaṭṭa Nayaka's opinion; *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 190: *parabrahmāsvādasabrahmacāritvaṃ cāstu asya rasāsvādasya*), however, do not fail to emphasize the unmistakable characteristics of each. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 91):

vagdhenur dugdha etaṃ hi rasaṃ yad bālatṛṣṇayā |
tena nāsya samaḥ sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yaḥ ||

"This Rasa (aesthetic pleasure) is poured forth spontaneously by the word, like a cow, for love of her children; for this reason it is different from that which

himself[1]: "Poetry possesses three powers: the power of denotation, the power of revelation, and the power of arousing enjoyment [lit., and these being enjoyed]. The ornamenting of the words and of the content form part of the power of denotation[2]. The various Rasa—the Erotic, etc.—are, according to us, revealed by the power of revelation. Enjoyed, they pervade [the consciousness of] the qualified man[3]".

In this exposition, the theses confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka are not accepted even by us—simply because we do not accept the thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. Thus the errors confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka cannot never be brought to life again[4].

is [laboriously] milked by yogins". Cf. also *A.Bh.*, p. 5. On the opinion of A.G., *infra*, pp. 100, 101. Two stanzas which reflect the same idea and which are certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, are quoted by Mahimabhatta (*Vyaktiviveka*, p. 94):

pāṭhyād atha dhruvāgānāt tataḥ saṃpūrite rase |
tadāsvādabharaikagro hṛṣyaty antarmukhaḥ kṣaṇam ||
tato nirviṣayasyāsya svarūpāvasthitau nijaḥ |
vyajyate hlādaniṣyando yena tṛpyanti yoginaḥ ||

"The recitation of drama and the *dhruvā* songs which accompany it, feed the Rasa in all its fullness and, therefore, the spectator, absorbed in the tasting of this, and turned in towards himself, feels pleasure for the whole time that the spectacle lasts. He, immersed inside his own being, forgets, therefore, everything (belonging to practical life). In him there manifests itself a flux of that pleasure which is inborn, and from which the yogins draw their satisfaction".

The association between these two states also appears in the affinities of the terms which designate them: *viśrānti*, *nirvṛti*, *laya*, *nirveśa*, *samāpatti*, *camatkāra*, etc.

1) The two stanzas which follow undoubtedly formed part of the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*.

2) However, from what has been said one would suppose them to be part of the power of revelation.

3) *Siddhimān* is the man who has attained to success (*siddhi*) in this enjoyment, and who thus possesses the necessary requirements, artistic sensibility, etc.

4) Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 187. The theses confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka do not admit the concept of generality; they distinguish between one's own percep-

As for the rest, we do not see what kind of enjoyment distinguishable from perception, etc., can exist in the world. If, as they say, it is Tasting (*rasanā*), we reply that this too is a perception [1], and is only called by another name on account of the particular means (*upāya*) [2] by which it is called into existence. The same thing happens in the case of direct perception (*darśana*), reasoning (*anumāna*), the revealed word (*śruti*), analogy (*upamiti*), intuition [3], (*pratibhāna*), etc. [, each of which takes a different name]. Besides, if we do not admit that Rasa is produced or manifested, we shall be forced to conclude that it is either eternal or non-existent: no third possibility exists. A thing which cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist at all. The supporters of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka will perhaps reply that the perception of Rasa is just what they call

tion and somebody else's. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 292: *ata eva ca naṭe na rasaḥ, kutra tarhi | vismṛtiśīlo na bodhyate | uktaṃ hi deśakālapramātṛbhedāniyantrito rasa iti |* " '[According to you], then, the Rasa is not in the actor; where is it, then?' If this is what you say, it shows that you are forgetful and not well-informed. For it has been said that Rasa is unaffected by any limitations of time, space, and knowing subject".

1) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 187: *rasāḥ pratīyanta ity odanam pacatītivad vyavahāraḥ, pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ | pratītir eva viśiṣṭā rasanā |* " The expression, 'The Rasas are perceived', is merely a manner of speaking; it may be compared with the expression 'He cooks the cooked rice'. For the Rasa can be perceived only. Tasting is nothing but a particular form of perception". In other words, there does not exist both a Rasa and a perception distinct from it. Cf. *infra*, p. 103.

2) The Determinants, etc.

3) The term *pratibhā*, *pratibhāna*, is used in several sense [cf. Intr., pp. XII ff. *infra*, 65, 66, n. 1, *b*]. In the present passage is has the sense of "an inexplicable intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, 'Tomorrow my brother will come'. It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sound without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal in the world and also the power of having heavenly visions" (Dasgupta, *H.I.Ph.*, V, 127). This particular form of consciousness is discussed by Jayanta, *Nyāyamañjarī* (Benares 1936), pp. 97 ff.

the power of generating enjoyment (*bhogīkaraṇa*) [1]—consisting in the states of fluidity, etc. Very well, then! But it is impossible that it should consist solely in these three

1) If, says A.G., the expression 'enjoyment' is understood in the sense of perception (so that the power of generating enjoyment becomes the power of generating the aesthetic perception, the Tasting), it may certainly be accepted. In this sense, the power of generating enjoyment becomes the same as what followers of the *dhvani* school call the power of evocation (*dhvananavyāpāra*). *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 189: *bhogo 'pi na kāvyaśabdena kriyate, api tu ghanamohāndhyasaṅkaṭatānivṛttidvāreṇāsvādāparanāmni alaukike drutivistaravikāsātmani bhoge kartavye lokottare dhvananavyāpāra eva mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ | tac cedam bhogakṛtvaṃ rasasya dhvananīyatve siddhe daivasiddham | rasyamānatoditacamatkārānatiriktatvād bhogasyeti |*

The theory of *dhvani* was first formulated by Ānandavardhana, the author of the *Dhvanyāloka*, who lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856-883 A.D.). According to Ānandavardhana and his followers, among whom was A.G., the words in poetry take on an additional power, the power to manifest (*vyañj*) aesthetic experience, or Rasa. They conceive Rasa as a form of resonance or suggested sound, evoked but not expressed, which they called *dhvani*. To the power itself they gave the name *dhvananavyāpāra* or *vyañjanavyāpāra*, the power of evocation or manifestation. It cannot be confounded either *a*) with the power of denotation, *abhidhāvyāpāra* (arising from the fact thas each word has a definite corresponding sense) or *b*) with the power of connotation *lakṣaṇavyāpāra*, or, finally, *c*) with the so-called power of intention, *tātparya* (for the nature of these last two powers, cf., for example, De, *S.P.*, II, p. 185 ff.). The passage from the words of the poetry (and therefore from the Determinants, etc.) to the aesthetic experience, *i.e.*, Rasa, or, according to the theorists of *dhvani*, *rasadhvani*, cannot be distinguished. The convention which links the sound and the sense serves only to render perceptible the literal meaning of the poetic word and not the aesthetic experience, which transcends discursive thought and is outside, in this sense, the domain of language. The word, the poetic expression, once perceived, automatically manifests Rasa. The passage from the perception of the words to the perception of Rasa is so rapid as to be imperceptible.

The poetic word is totally different from the prose word. *Dh.Ā.L.*, pp. 158 ff.: *kāvyātmakaśabdaniṣpīḍanenaiva taccarvaṇā dṛśyate | dṛśyate hi tad eva kāvyaṃ punaḥ punaḥ paṭhaṃś carvamāṇaś ca sahṛdayo lokaḥ | na tu kāvyasya tatra 'upādāyāpi ye heyā' itinyāyena kṛtapratītikasyānupayoga eveti śabdasyāptha dhvananavyāpāraḥ | ata evālakṣyakramatā | yat tu vākyabhedaḥ syād iti kenacid uktam, tad anabhijñatayā | śastraṃ hi sakṛd uccāritaṃ samayabalenārthaṃ pratipādayad yugapad viruddhānekasamayasmṛtyayogāt katham artadvayaṃ pratyāyayet | aviruddhatve vā tāvān eko vākyārthaḥ syat | krameṇāpi*

states. For there exist just as many forms of perception—whose nature, according to you, lies in this very power of generating fruition—consisting of, and animated by, Tasting, as there are kinds of Rasa. Besides, the constituent

viramyavyāpārāyogaḥ | punar uccārite 'pi vākye sa eva, samayaprakaraṇādes tādavasthyāt | prakaraṇasamayaprāpyārthatiraskāreṇārthāntarapratyāyakatve niyamābhāva iti

> *lenāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti śrutau |*
> *khādec chvamāṃsam ity eṣa nārtha ity atra kā pramā ||*

iti prasajyate | tatrāpi na kācid iyattety anāśvāsatā ity evaṃ vākyabhedo duṣaṇam | iha tu vibhāvādy eva pratipādyamānam carvaṇāviṣayatonmukham iti samayādyupayogābhāvaḥ | na ca niyukto 'ham atra, karavāṇi, kṛtārtho 'ham iti śāstrīyapratītisadṛśam adaḥ | tatrottarakartavyaunmukhyena laukikatvāt | iha tu vibhāvādicarvaṇādbhutapuṣpavat tatkālasāraivoditā na tu pūrvāparakālānubandhinīti laukikād āsvādād yogiviṣayāc cānya evāyaṃ rasāsvādaḥ | "One notices that this Tasting takes place by virtue, to be exact, of a squeezing out of the essence of the words of the poem. One sees, in fact, that persons 'gifted with heart' read, many times over, the same poem and that they taste it in this way". A poem does not lose its value after it has been perceived. This is in contradiction to the rule: "Those things, which after been accepted must later be abandoned, [when their task is accomplished], are called the means (*V.P.*, II, v. 38)". It is, therefore, necessary to admit that, in aesttetic perception, the words assume an additional power: the power of evocation. It is precisely because of this that the passage from the conventional meaning to the poetic meaning is indistinguishable. The objection put forward by many people, *i.e.*, that, in poetry, a phrase would then come to have many different meanings, is due solely to their ignorance. (This objection is only valid in the case of didactic works). How, in fact, can a piece from a didactic work, which has been pronounced once and the meaning of which has already been perceived by force of convention, lead one to perceive another and different meaning. It is impossible, indeed, that the subject should remember, at the same time, several mutually contrasting conventions. And if these conventions are not contrasting, the meaning of the phrase is, then, one. If it is admitted that the different meanings are perceived one after another, then we can reply that the words, after they have made one meaning perceptible and have thus ceased to be efficacious, have no longer any power to render perceptible any other meaning. And even if the phrase is pronounced a second time, the meaning remains invariably the same.

Should someone object that a prose passage can lead one to perceive another meaning, independently of that perceived through convention or the matter

elements, *sattva*, etc., can be found set out in an infinite number of different ways: one may predominate at one time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit the forms of Tasting to only three.

If the word "revelation" in the expression, "the Rasa are revealed by the poem" (what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says is: "The various Rasa—the Erotic, etc.—are, according to us, revealed by the power of revelation"), is used in the sense [of the power, proper to the poem,] to become the matter of a perception, which consists of a Sampling made up of a Tasting, and which is generated by the Determinants, etc., it may be accepted without any question.

(of the treatise), it can be replied that, then, there is no longer any fixed relation between the word and the meaning. In this way, one falls into the error [denounced by Dharmakīrti]: "Therefore, what reason can one adduce for the fact that, on hearing the phrase, 'He, who desires the sky, must offer the *agnihotra*', one does not perceive the meaning, 'he must eat dog-flesh?' (*P.V.*, III, v. 318)" Moreover, there would be no limit to the number of possible meanings and there would exist a general state of uncertainty. The fact of admitting that a phrase can have several meanings is thus a fallacy.

In the case of aesthetic perception, on the contrary, there is this: that the Determinants, etc., once perceived, tend to become an object of Tasting and, therefore, one has no ulterior application of conventions. Aesthetic cognition is not, in fact, the same as the form of perception proper to a didactic work, *i.e.*, "I am commanded to do this", "I want to do this" and "I have done what I had to do". Such forms of perception tend, in fact, to an extrinsic end, successive to them in time, and are thus of an ordinary (*i.e.*, practical) nature. In aesthetic experience, what happens is, instead, the birth of the Tasting of the Determinants, etc. Such a Tasting is like a flower born of magic; its essence is solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came before nor with what comes after. This tasting of Rasa is, therefore, as different from ordinary tasting as it is from the tasting of yogins".

The nature of the *dhvani* (*dhvani* becomes identified with Rasa) is expressed by Ānandavardhana in the following way (*Dh.Ā.*, I, 4): "In the words of the great poets a new element is to be perceived, different from any other, which transcends all the separately perceptible parts, like that which in women is called beauty".

However, in the stanza, "Rasa is, it is said, the essence of poetry (*kāvyārtha*)[1]; it is a perception (*anubhava*) consisting of a Tasting (*āsvādanā*) and is the matter of cognition by the supreme consciousness (*parasaṃvitti*), manifested (*vyaṅgya*) by the union of the Determinants, etc.", Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to be saying that Rasa is manifested. Thus in this passage no objection seems to be made to the doctrine of manifestation[2]. By the word "perception" we must understand that Rasa is the object of a perception of the kind that has been described.

At this point, perhaps, someone might ask: "Then what is the true nature of Rasa?" Well, what shall we do?[3]

Why repeat truths disclosed already in the Thought handed down by Tradition and thus behave as no one has behaved before? This double, serious and indissimulable error will certainly be imputed to me by audience.

1) *a*) The expression *kāvyārtha* is borrowed from Bharata, *N.Ś.*, VII, p. 343: *kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāḥ*. "[The mental states] are called *bhāva* because they bring into existence (*bhāv*) the essences of the poem". *Artha*, A.G. comments (*A.Bh.*, p. 344), in this expression does not carry the meaning of sense, something expressed (*abhidheya*), but means the final cause, the essence of the poem (*arthyante prādhānyenety arthyāḥ, na tv arthaśabdo 'bhidheyavācī*); in other words, Rasa.

b) Aesthetic experience is associated with the experience of *brahman*, with the supreme consciousness, cf. p. 56, n. 2.

2) The existence of *dhvani* is explicitly denied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (cf. the passage quoted by Jacobi, *ZDMG*, 62, p. 296, Pandey, p. 246 ff.). In some passages, A.G. points out, he seems, nevertheless, to admit its existence implicitly. In this stanza, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka uses, for example, the verb *vyaj* and therefore admits implicitely the theory of *dhvani*, the sense manifested, *i.e.*, not expressed, that words assume in poetry.

3) At this point A.G. interrupts his examination of rejected doctrines with the four following stanzas, which serve as a sort of prelude to the exposition of his own thesis.

Tireless, the mind of man climbs ever higher to gaze on truth. What is the point of dwelling on the doctrines which have succeeded each other on the ladder of thought? *A. Bh.* I, p. 280

The first attempts to establish the reality of things are, I suppose, doubtful and vacillating: but as we advance doggedly along this road, we cease to be amazed by built bridges, city foundations, or anything else.

A rich and fruitful harvest may be culled by posterity from the inheritance of thought left to it by its predecessors. Thus the doctrines of the sages of antiquity will only be refined by us here and not refuted.

Let us then state what is the true nature of Rasa purified of previous mistakes. It has already been stated by Bharata, and we shall add nothing new. For he has said: "The mental states are called *bhāva*, because they bring into existence (*bhāv*) the essence of poetry"[1]. Thus Rasa is simply the essence of poetry. That is to say, immediately after the first perception of the literal sense of the following expressions, "They lay by night", "He gave it [*scil.*, the omentum] to the fire"[2], there occurs (in a qualified person [*adhikārin*], characterized by a certain pragmatic requirement [*arthitā*], etc., and possessed of a keen interest in the object of perception involved) a second perception eliminating the temporal data, etc., contained in the first[3]. This second perception consists in a transfer

1) Cf. p. 62, n. 1.

2) Two quotations taken from revelation (*śruti*) [from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa?]. Cf. p. 64, n. 1.

3) The correct past tense of the two expressions in question.

(*saṃkramaṇā*), etc., of the literal sense and is presented in the form: " I give ", etc. According to different systems, this perception is called propulsion (*bhavanā*), command (*vidhi*), order (*niyoga*), etc. [1]. A similar thing may be said to happen in the case of poetry: there occurs in a qualified person a perception trascending the words of the poem [2]. The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition (*prati-*

1) In other words, some scriptural sentences (*e.g.*, those quoted) awaken in the believer the need to give the omentum to the fire himself, etc. In this sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation: the past tense and the third person, etc., used in these sentences are turned into the present tense, etc. There arises in the heart of the believer the form of consciousness (*pratipatti*), " I give the omentum to the fire ", etc. This passing from one sense to another is given the names of propulsion (*bhāvanā*), order and command (*vidhi*, *niyoga*). The terms *bhāvanā*, *vidhi*, and *niyoga*, are proper to the liturgical speculations of *mīmāṃsā* (the term *bhāvanā* used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was probably taken from the terminology of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā*). The terms *vidhi* and *niyoga*, observes J., *T.Ā.*, I, p. 167, are used above all by the followers of Prabhākara; Kumārila's disciples prefer instead the word *bhāvanā*. The shift of sense involved, of course, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings, his desire to attain certain ends, etc. This shift of sense is clearly explained in three *śloka* quoted by H.C., p. 98 (surely taken from a work on poetics earlier than A.G., perhaps the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka)

ārogyaṁ āptavān śāmbaḥ stutvā devam aharpatim |
syād arthāvagatiḥ pūrvam ityādivacane yathā ||
tatas copāttakālādinyakkāreṇopajāyate |
pratipattir manasy evam pratipattir na saṃśayaḥ ||
yaḥ ko 'pi bhāskaraṃ stauti sa sarvo' py agado bhaved |
tasmād aham api staumi roganirmuktaye ravim ||

" In the sentences ' Śāmba regained his health when he praised the Sun God ', etc., there occurs at first the perception of their literal sense, and then (and on this there is no matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the perceiving subject a perception which eliminates the temporal data, etc., assumed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the following form: ' Everyone who praises the Sun regains his health; so I too will praise the Sun, so as to free myself from disease ' ". Cf. *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, p. 24; *Ī.P.V.*, I, p. 27.

2) Cf. *supra*, p. 59, n. 1.

bhāna) [1]. In such a person hearing the following phrases, " There he [*scil.*, the deer] is now, gracefully by the bend-

1) *a*) Not everybody, A.G. observes, has the intrinsic capacity to taste a poem. Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart, those who have the consent of the heart (*sahṛdaya*, *hṛdayasaṃvādabhāk*). The fact of being possessed of heart is defined in the following way (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 38): *yeṣām kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ* | *yathoktam* (*N.Ś.*, VII, v. 10)

yo 'rtho hṛdayasaṃvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ |
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śuṣkam kāṣṭham ivāgninā ||

" The faculty of self-identification with the events represented [the Determinants, etc.,] demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with and practice of poetry. The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are these who have this faculty. For it has been said: ' the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the Rasa. The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by the fire' ". The mind and heart must be mirror-like (*viśada*, *vimala*), ready to receive all the images which are reflected in them: *vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ*, *A.Bh.*, p. 37. In the *T.Ā.*, III, 200, A.G. says:

tathā hi madhure gīte sparśe vā candanādike |
mādhyasthyavigame yāsau hṛdaye spandamānatā ||
ānandaśaktiḥ saivoktā yataḥ sahṛdayo janaḥ |

" When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal-wood, etc., the state of indifference (non-participation, impersonality, etc.), disappears and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration (*spandamānatā*; for the significance of the term *spanda*, cf. p. 74, n. 1). Such a state is precisely the so-called power of beatitude, thanks to which man is ' gifted with heart ' ". According to the *śaiva* of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc. (cf. p. 87, n. 2).

Elsewhere (*A.Bh.*, II, p. 339), A.G. says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (*kavihṛdayatādātmyāpattiyogyatā*). Of course, people whose nature is " gentle (*sukumāra*) " will have a grater feeling for erotic poetry; people of bolder nature will heroic poetry, etc. Every individual has a particular nature (tendencies, innate instincts, beginningless root desires, *vāsanā*), according to which he will feel himself more drawn to some poets than to others. " Sensibility " (*sahṛdayatva*) also plays an important role in religious experience, but in this

ing of his neck . . . " [1], " Even Umā, dropping the golden *karṇikāra* . . . " [2], " The firmness of Hara . . . " [3], there appears, immediately after the perception of their literal sense, a perception of a different order (an inner [*mānasī*] perception, consisting in a direct experience [*sākṣātkāra*]) [4]

case we may not talk of aesthetic sensibility, the more correct term being religious sensibility; cf. *P.T.V.*, p. 45 ff.

b) The word *pratibhāna* (= *pratibhā*) has the double sense of creative imagination, artistic genius, inspiration (*kārayitrī pratibhā*) and of aesthetic sensibility, of consent of the heart conceived in the terms of an active power which permits the manifestation of Rasa (*bhāvayitrī pratibhā*). In this case, *pratibhā* is just used in this very sense. I translate: power of intuition. The division of the concept of *pratibhā* in *kārayitrī pratibhā* (creative intuition and intelligence) and in *bhāvayitrī pratibhā* (contemplating intuition has first been explicitly stated by Rājaśekhara, *Kāvyamimāṃsā, IV.*) *Pratibhā* means also intuitive cognition, etc., cf. p. 58, n. 3.

1) Kālidāsa, *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*, I, 2: " There he [*scil.*, the deer] is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck casting a glance ever and anon at the chariot which pursues him, by [the contraction of] the hinder half [of his body[repeatedly drawing himself into the fore [part of his] body through fear of the descent of the arrow; strewing the road with grass half-chewed which drops from his mouth kept open from exhaustion. See! by reason of his lofty boundings he goes chiefly in the air, and little on the ground " (Monier Williams, *Śakuntalā*, Hertford, 1853, p. 9).

2) Kālidāsa, *Kumārasaṃbhava*, III, 62: " Even Umā, dropping the golden *karṇikāra* flowers which glowed among her black tresses, deeply bowed her head (while the flowers which adorned them fell from her ears) before Śiva ".

3) *Op. cit.*, III, 67: " The firmness of Hara, even, was somewhat shaken—like the sea when the moon is just about to rise; he cast his eyes in desire towards the face of Umā, towards her lips, red as the fruit of the *bimba* ".

4) Like the sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., aesthetic experience is an inner or mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*, *i.e.*, it is perceived through the mind or inner sense. Such a perception is selfknowing (*svasaṃvedanasiddha*). In the *A.Bh.*, p. 291, A.G. observes that the fact of tasting (*āsvādana*; aesthetic perception being conceived as a particular form of tasting) is of a mental order: it differs from the fact of eating, which is a purely material act (*rasanavyāpārād bhojanād adhiko yo mānaso vyāpāraḥ sa evāsvādanam*). The mind of he who tastes must be *ekāgra*, absorbed in the object of the tasting to the exclusion of all else. On the contrary, he who eats may be also *anyacitta*: he can also think of other things, etc. Aesthetic tasting is of a non-ordinary nature (*alaukika*), *sui generis*, cf. *infra*, with refe-

which completely eliminates the temporal distinctions, etc., assumed by these sentences. In fact, the young deer, etc., which appears in this perception is devoid of its particularity (*viśeṣa*), and at the same time, the actor, who [, playing the role of the deer,] frightens [the spectators] (*trāsaka* . . .), showing to be afraid, is unreal (*apāramārthika*). As a result, what there appears is simply and solely Fear—Fear in itself, uncircumscribed by time, space, etc. [1]. This perception of Fear is of a different order from the ordinary perceptions (" I am afraid, he—my enemy, my friend, anybody—is afraid "); for these are necessarily affected by the appearance of fresh mental movements (of shunning, etc.) [2], consisting of pleasure, pain, etc., and just for this reason are full of obstacles (*vighna*) [3]. The sensation of the Fear above mentioned, on the contrary, is the matter of cognition by a perception devoid of obsta-

rence to the concept of beatitude, p. 87, n. 2. The mind is the organ of tasting; during the tasting the mind must be free of all obstacles, devoid, that is to say, of any other sensory perceptions, etc. The subject is immersed in a *camatkāra* set apart from any distinctions of " self " or " others ". Aesthetic tasting is a " generalised " perception and free, therefore, of obstacles (in the *A.Bh.*, I, p. 291 the expression *āsvādayanti manasā*, *N.Ś.*, VI, v. 36, is commented upon in the following manner: *ā samantāt sādhāraṇībhāvena nirvighnapratipattivaśān manasā indriyāntaravighnasaṃbhāvanāśūnyena svādayanti svaparavivekaśūnyasvādacamatkāraparavaśā*. . . . .).

1) In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness by which he is pervaded) is not in the real time and space either of the deer or of the actor as such. In aesthetic experience, these two temporal and spatial orders cancel each other out. On the one hand, therefore, the deer, etc., is without any temporal or spatial determination (viz. it is not felt as an element of ordinary life but is perceived in a generalised form); similarly, the actor and hence the impression of fear which he suggests is not perceived as a constituent element of practical life. The state of consciousness which does occur is, therefore, unaffected by space and time; it is a generalized Permanent Mental State, a Rasa.

2) " Shunning, etc. ", *i.e.*, shunning, accepting and disregarding.

3) Cf. pp. 77 ff.

cles (*nirvighna*), and may be said to enter directly (*niviś*) into our hearts, to dance (*viparivṛt*)[1] before our eyes: this is the Terrible Rasa. In such a Fear, one's own Self is found to be in a state neither of complete occultation (*tiraskṛ*) nor of particular emergence (*ullikh*)[2]; and the same thing happens with the other Selves. As a result of this, the state of generality involved is not limited,
A. Bh., I, p. 281 (*parimita*), but extended (*vitata*)—as happens at the moment in which is formed the idea of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between smoke and fire or, in fact, between trembling and fear[3]. The combination of actors,

1) *Viparivṛt* signifies to move, to vibrate in various ways, to revolve, etc. A.G. comments on the word *viparivartamānasya* in the following way (*Ī.P.V.*, II, p. 140): *vicitratvena viśvasya bhedābhedātmanā parivartamānasya spandanena sphurato* . . . |

2) In the first case there would not be aesthetic cognition, but mystical cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought and distinct apprehensions (*vikalpa*). In the second case ordinary discursive cognition would occur. Cf. pp. 100, ff.

3) The best explanation of this passage is to be found in *Ī.P.V.*, II, 4, 12: *iha tu darśane vyāptigrahaṇāvasthāyāṃ yāvantas taddeśasaṃbhāvyamānasadbhāvāḥ pramātāras tāvatāṃ eko 'sau dhūmābhāsaś ca vahnyābhāsaś ca bāhyanaye iva, tāvati teṣāṃ parameśvareṇaikyaṃ nirmitan* | K. Ch. Pandey, *Bhāskarī*, vol. III, p. 178. translates: " But, according to this system, at the time of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the images of smoke and fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that place [*i.e.*, in the kitchen, etc.], as according to those who admit the existence of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images, the Lord [*i.e.*, Īśvara, the unlimited Ego, etc.] has made the subjects one ". In other words two or more subjects which see the same thing are in the same psychic condition,etc., *i.e.*, they form a single knowing subject. Such a conception is in contradiction to the doctrine of the *vijñānavādin*, who maintain that mental series (*saṃtāna*) are independent one of the other (*Ī.P.V.*, I, 5, 4-5). During the aesthetic experience, the practical "personalities" of the spectators, different each from the other, are momentarily eliminated; to these there succeeds a state of consciousness, a "knowing subject" which is unique, "generalized", not circumscribed by any determination of space, time, etc. Rasa, aesthetic pleasure, is simply this new state of consciousness. A.G. observes that the pleasure given by a spectacle increases when there are a large number

etc., thus serves to nourish (*paripuṣ*) the sensation of having the event represented directly in front of one (*sāk-*

of spectators. In other words, when each spectator is conscious that the spectacle is being seen at the same time by a number of other people. *T.Ā.*, X, v. 85 ff.:

tathā hy ekāgrasakalasāmājikajanaḥ khalu |
nṛttaṃ gītaṃ sudhāsārasāgaratvena manyate ||
tata evocyate mallanaṭaprekṣopadeśane |
sarvapramātṛtādātmyaṃ pūrṇarūpānubhāvakam ||
tāvanmātrārthasaṃvittituṣṭāḥ pratyekaśo yadi |
kaḥ saṃbhūya guṇas teṣāṃ pramātraikyaṃ bhavec ca kim ||
yadā tu tattadvedyatvadharmasaṃdarbhagarbhitam |
tadvastu śuṣkād prāgrūpād anyad yuktam idaṃ tadā ||

" The spectators who watch, absorbed, a spectacle of dancing, of singing, etc., feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J. comments: " anyone, in fact, can observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time generate a greater pleasure than those which are seen by a single individual). It is for this reason that those who teach the true nature of spectacles of wrestling and acting, say that, in these, a real state of identity of all knowing subjects takes place; this state generates a perception of a full and perfect beatitude (J. comments: *pūrṇarūpeti iyad eva hi pūrṇaṃ rūpaṃ yad vigalitavedyāntaratayā tatraivānanyākāṅkṣatvena parāmarśanaṃ nāma*). If the mere consciousness of what they see on the stage (without, that is, the realisation that the spectacle is seen by other people) were sufficient to satisfy the spectators taken one by one, how then can the different state of consciousness, which arises when they are together, be explained? And how could it still be sustained that a state of identity of knowing subjects exists? When, instead, the spectator is aware that the spectacle is seen at the same time by all the others also, one can say with reason that it appears in a different form from the arid aspect it had before (this spectacle, then, observes J., takes on another nature which generates a very high *camatkāra*) ".

The annullment of every distinction between one's own Self and the Self of other people, and the actuation of a generalised state of consciousness also occurs, observed A.G., during certain religious ceremonies (for example, the tantric *cakra*), which must be celebrated in common. *T.Ā.*, XXVIII, v. 373 ff.:

saṃvit sarvātmikā dehabhedād yā saṃkucet tu sā |
melake 'nyonyasaṅghaṭṭapratibimbād vikasvarā ||
ucchalannijaraśmyoghaḥ saṃvitsu pratibimbitaḥ |
bahudarpaṇavad dīptaḥ sarvāyetāpy ayatnataḥ ||
ata eva nṛttagītaprabhṛtau bahuparṣadi |
yaḥ sarvatanmayībhave hlādo na tv ekakasya saḥ ||

ṣātkārāyamāṇatva) [1]; this combination—in which the real limiting causes (*niyamahetu*) (time, space, the particulari-

ānandanirbharā saṃvit pratyekaṃ sā tathaikatām |
nṛttādau viṣaye prāptā pūrṇānandatvam aśnute ||
īrṣyāsūyādisaṃkocakāraṇābhāvato 'tra sā |
vikasvarā niṣpratighaṃ saṃvid ānandayoginī ||
atanmaye tu kasmiṃścit tatrastho pratihanyate |
sthapuṭasparśavat saṃvid vijātīyatayā sthite ||
ataś cakrārcanādyeṣu vijātīyam atanmayam |
naiva praveśayet saṃvitsaṃkocananibandhanam ||

"The consciousness, which consists of, and is animated by, all things, on account of the difference of bodies, enters into a state of contraction. But, in public celebrations, it returns to a state of expansion – since all the components are reflected in each other. The flow of one's own consciousness in ebullition (*i.e.*, when it is tending to come out of itself) is reflected in the consciousness of all the bystanders, as if in so many mirrors, and, inflamed by these, it abandons without effort its state of individual contraction. Just for this reason, in meetings of many people (at a spectacle of dancers, singers, etc.), fullness of joy occurs when every bystander, not only one of them, is identified with the spectacle. The consciousness, which, considered separately also, is innatedly made up of beatitude, reaches, in these circumstances—during the execution of dances, etc.—a state of unity, and so enters into a state of beatitude which is full and perfect. In virtue of the absence of any cause for contraction, jealousy, envy, etc. [the causes of contraction are the *vighna*, obstacles; cf. pp. 77 ff.] the consciousness finds itself, in these circumstances, in a state of expansion, free of obstacles, and pervaded by beatitude. When, on the other hand, one of the bystanders does not concentrate on the spectacle he is looking at, and does not share, therefore, the form of consciousness in which the other spectators are immersed, this consciousness is disturbed, as at the touch of an uneven surface. This is the reason why, during the celebration of the *cakra*, etc., no individual must be allowed to enter who does not identify himself with the ceremonies and so does not share the state of consciousness of the celebrants; this would cause, in fact, a contraction of the consciousness".

Everything, observes J., *T.Ā.*, IX, p. 133, is consciousness, and consciousness is one. The diversity (*bheda*) is nothing but an illusion aroused by the *māyā* of Thought, of Śiva. In aesthetic experience, etc., when all the spectators are absorbed in the same thing to the exclusion of all other things, this diversity ceases momentarily to exist, to give place to the manifestation of unity, of the unlimited consciousness.

1) *I.e.*, that the perception of events represented (in other words, aesthetic perception) is like a direct cognition (*sākṣātkārāyamāṇa* = *sākṣātkārakalpa*, *pratyakṣakalpa*, cf. *infra*, p. 84, n. 3). The direct cognition or experience

zed cognizing subject, etc.) on the one side, and those afforded by the poem on the other, cancel each other out and completely eliminate each other—readily nourishes (*puṣ*) the state of generality in question [1]. Therefore this very density (*ekaghanatā*) [2] of the spectator's perception nourishes the Rasa of all of them readily, because the latent impressions of their minds concord with each other, the minds being varied by beginningless latent impressions [3]. This [form of] consciousness without obsta-

(*sākṣātkāra, pratyakṣa*) is in a necessary connexion with the concept of realityf In this sense, aesthetic perception, which is not dependent on the concepts o. reality and unreality, is not a direct perception, but, A.G. says, is "like" a direct perception (cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 43: the drama is *pratyakṣakalpānuvyavasāyaviṣayo lokaprasiddhasatyāsatyādivilakṣaṇatvāt* | On the meaning of the word *anuvyavasāya*, cf. *infra*, pp. 106 ff.). In other terms, it is a direct perception *sui generis*, free of every relation with practical reality, etc.

1) Cf. p. 67, n. 1.

2) The word *ekaghanatā* derives from *ghana*. "*Ghana*, from *ghan*, to strike, hinder, etc., has a primary sense of "dense mass", implying a condensation of multiple factors without extension in space" (A.K. Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard 1934, p. 209). Hence *ekaghana* comes to mean "dense", "compact", "uniform", etc., in the sense of a state of consciousness which does not allow the interference of "obstacles" (*vighna*). On the obstacles, cf. pp. 77 ff.

3) A.G. replies with this argument to the objection of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, according to whom the spectator can identify himself only with a person similar to himself but not with a being of a non-ordinary nature, as Rāma, deity, etc. The identification and therefore the state of generality required for the aesthetic experience postulates an affinity of nature (latent impressions, tendencies, instinct, etc.) between the spectator and the person represented. A.G. replies to this objection saying that no being (animal or deity) exists with which man has not affinity of nature. The *saṃsāra* is beginningless and every man, before being that which he actually is, has been all the other beings as well. The consciousness of the spectator thus possesses (in other words, is varied by ...) the latent impressions of all the possible beings and therefore is susceptible of identifying himself with each of them. The same concept is expounded in the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 187: *rāmādicaritaṃ tu na sarvasya hṛdayasaṃvādīti mahat sāhasam | citravāsanāviśiṣṭatvāc cetasaḥ | yad āha "tāsām anāditvam āśiṣo nityatvāt", "jātideśakālavyavahitānām apy ānantaryaṃ smṛtisaṃskārayor ekarūpatvāt" iti* (*Yogasūtra*, IV, 9, 10) |

cles [1] is called *camatkāra* [2]; the physical effects (trembling,

1) Cf. p. 55, n. 1 *c*. The "obstacles" are discussed below, pp. 77 ff.

2) The term *camatkāra* means aesthetic experience, the state of fruition of the Rasa. *Camatkāra* is aesthetic experience or Tasting. This word pervades the whole of Indian aesthetics and religions speculation, from the *Yogavasiṣṭha* to the *Agnipurāṇa*, from Abhinava to Jagannātha. It is compounded of the *camat* and *kāra*: *camat*, which occurs only in this expression, is probably no more than an interjection, expressing surprise or wonder, while *kāra* (from *kṛ*) means the act of emitting such an interjection, of finding oneself in this state of consciousness. This sense of wonder or surprise at the presence of something which suddenly invades our field of consciousness is never absent from the word *camatkāra* (in this connexion cf. for example Ruyyaka's commentary on the *Vyaktiviveka* of *Mahimabhaṭṭa*, p. 53: *ālekhyalekhyādau santamasāvasthite pradīpādinā prakāśite jhaṭiti adbhutārthaprakāśanāc camatkāro jāyate tadvad rasādau*). Traditional etymology prefers the derivation of *camat* from *cam*, taste, eat and hence enjoy (*bhuj*). According to this interpretation *camat* is the present participle of *cam*. The fact of being *camat* (*camattvam*), in this sense, means being immersed in the Tasting or enjoyment of something, particularly of an aesthetic or mystical kind. A.G. accepts both interpretations, *I.P.V.V.*, III, 251: *camatkāro hi iti svātmany ananyāpekse viśramaṇam|evaṃ bhuñjānatārūpaṃ camattvam, tad eva karoti saṃraṃbhe vimṛśati nānyatrānudhāvati|camad iti kriyāviśeṣaṇam, akhaṇḍa eva vā śabdo nirvighnāsvādanavṛttiḥ|camad iti vā āntaraspandāndolanoditaparāmarśamayaśabdanāvyaktānukaraṇam|kāvyanāṭyarasādāv api bhāvicittavṛttyantarodayaniyamātmakavighnavirahita evāsvādo rasanātmā camatkāra ity uktam anyatra* | "The term *camatkāra* means a state of rest in one's own self, which is independent of anything else. Thus the state of being *camat* is equivalent to the state of being about to enjoy something. The agent of this action is only doing this, is intensely (?) thinking of this only and does not run off towards anything else. *Camat* designates a particular action; the whole word has the sense of a Tasting, free from obstacles. It may be said equally that *camat* is a non-discursive phonic expression [*avyaktānukaraṇa*, lit.: interjection] consisting of a vocality animated by a form of consciousness which arises from the very rhythm of our interior movement. The Tasting or Sampling, totally free of limiting obstacles (the apperance of other mental movements) which occurs in the Rasa aroused by poetry and the drama, is also a form of *camatkāra*. All this is discussed elsewhere". Thus *camatkāra* is a state of consciousness, free of obstacles and without pragmatic requirements. It presupposes the complete elimination of every particular element of one's own personality. From this point of view it migh be said that *camatkāra* is a kind of dilatation or expansion of the Self (cf. for example Viśvanātha, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, III: *camatkāras cittavistārarūpo vismayāparaparyāyaḥ*). *Camatkāra* is often mentioned, before A.G. and the school of the *pratyabhijñā*, in the *Yogavasiṣṭha* (cf. the expression *cittacamatkāra*; Dasgupta, *H.I.Ph.*, II, p. 236, translates

horripilation, vibrations of joy (*ullukasana*) [1], etc., are also *camatkāra* [2]. For example: "Viṣṇu is still today in a state of a *camatkāra*: how, oh how is it that limbs of Lakṣmī, which are like the borders of a limb of the moon, have not been convulsed by mount Mandara?" [3]. That is to say, what is called *camatkāra* is an uninterrupted

"self-flashing of thought"). The term *camatkāra* is met with in *Agnipurāṇa*, ch. 339, śl. 1-2:

akṣaraṃ paramam brahma sanātanam ajaṃ vibhu |
vedānteṣu vadanty ekam caitanyaṃ jyotir īśvaram ||
ānandas sahajas tasya vyajyate sa kadācana |
vyaktis sā tasya caitanyacamatkārarasāhvayā ||

"It is said, in the vedāntas that the *brahman* is immutable, supreme, eternal, innate, omnipresent, and unique; it is consciousness, light and lord. When the innate beatitude of this principle is manifested, this manifestation is what is called consciousness, *camatkāra* or Rasa".

In the philosophical language of the *pratyabhijñā*, *camatkāra*, in the broad sense of the word, may mean every kind of consciousness, the soul of consciousness itself, the element which distinguishes consciousness or spirit from inanimate matter; *P.T.V.*, 49: *sarvato hy acamatkāre jaḍataiva, adhikacamatkārāveśa eva vīryakṣobhātmā sahṛdayatā ucyate, yasyaiva etadbhogāsaṅgābhyāsaniveśitāṇantabṛṃhakavīryabṛṃhitaṃ hṛdayaṃ tasyaiva sātiśayacamatkriyā* |

"The complete lack of all *camatkāra* is the state of inanimateness. The fact of being possessed of heart [cf. p. 65, n. 1] (which consists in a perturbation of the Force [of consciousness]) is simply, it is said, a state of immersion in an intense *camatkāra*; only those whose hearts are nourished by the infinite nourishing Force [of consciousness], engaged in the constant practice of enjoyment [of aesthetic or mystical order], enjoy an intense *camatkāra*".

Aesthetic experience or *camatkāra* reappears in the consciousness every time the Determinants, etc. (the poetic expression), by which it is aroused, are evoked. Cf. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 37 (App. II). The example offered by A.G. (of Viṣṇu who is still under the influence of a *camatkāra*) exemplifies just this character of aesthetic pleasure.

1) The term *ullukasana* is explained by A.G. (*A. Bh.*, I, p. 331) *gātrasyordhvaṃ sāhlādaṃ .ghūrṇanam*.

2) *A. Bh.*, III, ch. XXII, p. 152: *iha cittavṛttir eva saṃvedanabhūmau saṃkrāntā deham api vyāpnoti* | "The mental movements, which are phenomena of consciousness, are also transmitted to the body and pervade it".

3) Unidentified stanza.

(*acchinna*) state of immersion (*āveśa*) in an Enjoyment, characterized by the presence of a sensation of inner fullness (*tṛpti*). It might be said indeed that *camatkāra* is the action proper to a tasting (*cam*) or enjoying subject, *i.e.*, to a person immersed in the inner movement (*spanda*)[1] of a magic (*adbhuta*) enjoyment[2]. This may be presented under the aspect either of a form of mental cognition (*mānasādhyavasāya*), consisting of a direct perception (*sākṣātkāra*)[3], or of imagination (*saṃkalpa*), or of a form of memory, which, nevertheless, is manifested in a different manner to its ordinary nature. For as Kālidāsa has said: "Often a man, in the act of admiring in happiness beautiful shapes or listening to sweet sounds, feels in himself a strange, intense disquiet. Does he, perhaps, recall, in his soul, affections of his past lives, affections which remain fixed in his spirit without his knowledge?"[4]. The form of

1) *Spanda* means movement, vibration, energy, etc. According to the *śaiva* schools of Kashmir, consciousness is vibration, the ceaseless force from which springs all that exists. The modes of discursive thought are the fruits of the solidification of this first, incandescent principle. This force manifests itself in the instinctive motions of consciounsees (fear, joy, etc.). It is the energy that consents to go from word to word, from thought to thought. It is the first moment of will (*icchā*), the initial motion of the spirit, which is presupposed by any form of cosciousness. Thee terms 'heart' (*hṛdaya*), thought (*vimarśa*), bliss (*ānanda*), vibration, (*sphurattā*, *ghūrṇi*), etc., express the same concept. On consciousness as movement, etc., see, above all, the *Spandakārikā* by Kallaṭa, *passim*; Somānanda, *Śivadṛṣṭi*, p. 11; *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, 5, v. 14. In the present case, *spanda* is the movement, the inner rhythm of the aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is an inner perception (*manaḥkāra*), like pleasure, pain, etc., and, in this sense, is, not of a discursive order (*vikalpaka*).

2) Cf. *infra*, p. 97, n. 1.

3) *I.e.*, it is a mental or inner perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*; see *supra*, p. 38, n. 2; p. 66, n. 4. *Adhyavasāya* is used in the sense of *anuvyavasāya* (*N.Ś.*, I, 1, 4); cf *infra*, pp. 106 ff.

4) Kālidāsa, *Śakuntalā*, V, 96. This stanza is quoted by A.G., also in *Ī.P.V.V.*, III, p. 252. The disquiet, to which Kālidāsa alludes, is, observes A.G., an unobjectified desire; it corresponds to what is, metaphysically, the desire

memory referred to in this stanza by means of the expression, "Does he, perhaps, recall...", is not of the same kind as ordinary memory as recognised by logicians (*tārkika*). The object of such memory, indeed, has never been perceived in the past. In fact, we might say that its nature is that of direct perception, *i.e.*, of that form of direct perception otherwise known as intuition[1]. In any case, it is beyond question that it is a form of perception, in which appears [a Permanent Mental Movement, (in this case] Delight) consisting of, and animated by, a Tasting[2]. For this reason, *i.e.*, because it is not limited by further specifications[3], this perception can be the object of a Tasting:

which induces consciousness to deny its original fullness and to crumble in time and space, *i.e.*, the *āṇavamala*. *Ī.P.V.V.*, III, 252: *camatkāritā hi bhuñjānarūpatā svātmaviśrāntilakṣaṇā sarvatra icchā | kvacit tu svātmaviśrāntir bhāvāntaraṃ anāgūritaviśeṣam apekṣya utthāpyate yatra sā icchā rāga ity ucyate, āgūritaviśeṣatāyāṃ tu kāma iti | ādigrahaṇād abhilāṣamalo yatra bhāvāntaraṃ sāmānyākāram api vāsanāvaśesamātreṇāste yathāha "bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntarasauhṛdāni" iti |* "The fact of being in a state of *camatkāra*, of being on the point of enjoying something (characterized by a rest in one's own Self) is, without any exception, a form of will [the will is the first moment of Consciousness, before it crystallizes in the forms of the discursive cognition;]. Sometimes such a rest in one's own Self appears in connexion with an object in general, without any further determinations; in this case, the will is called 'attachment'. At other times it appears in connexion with a determined object and, in this case, there is what is called 'love'. By the word, 'etc.', Utpaladeva hints at the maculation of the desire [the *āṇavamala*, etc.; cf. *supra*]; it is obtained when the objectiveness considered is not only indefinite, but in a state of latent impression [that is, when it is not yet developed and appears in a state of potentiality; the *āṇavamala* is therefore an unobjectified desire, *akarmakam abhilāṣamātram*. *T.S.*, p. 75: "The maculation is an eager agitation consisting in the presumption of one's own non-fullness, a mere desire without an object, a predisposition to the future limitations"]. For example: "... the affections of his past lives... remain fixed in his spirit...".

1) Cf. p. 58, n. 3.

2) In other words, characterized by the presence of a generalised Permanent Mental State (Delight, Anger, etc.).

3) By no temporal, spatial, individual, etc., specification. In other words, by no obstacle.

that is to say, it is neither a form of ordinary (*laukika*) cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception [1], nor does it consist of a super-imposition (*āropa*) of the latter [2]. To conclude, we may say equally *a*) that it consists of a state of intensification (*upacaya*) [3]—using this term to indicate that it is not limited by spatial data, etc.; *b*) that it is an imitation [4]—using this expression to mean that its operation temporally follows that of real life; and *c*) that it is a combination of different elements [5]—this conception being interpreted in the

1) *I.e.*, an imitation of it (Śaṅkuka's doctrine).

2) *A. Bh.*, I, p. 36: *teṣu na tattvena dhīḥ, na sādṛśyena yamalakavat, na bhrāntatvena rūpyasmṛtipurvakaśuktirūpyavat, nāropeṇa samyagjñānabādhānantaramithyājñānarūpam, na tadadhyavasāyena gaurvāhīkavat, notprekṣyamāṇatvena candramukhavat, na tatpratikṛtitvena citrapustavat* (Read; G: °*pastavat*), *na tadanukāreṇa guruśiṣyavyākhyāhevākavat, na tātkālikanirmāṇenendrajālavat, na yuktiviracitatadābhāsatayā hastalāghavādimāyāvat, sarveṣu eteṣu pakṣeṣu asādhāraṇatyā draṣṭur audāsinye rasāsvādāyogāt* |

" With regard to the personnages moving on the stage, one has neither the idea of being concerned with reality, nor of being concerned with a similitude—as in the case of two similar things—, nor with an illusion, as when a piece of mother-of-pearl reminds one of a piece of silver—, nor with a super-imposition—as when wrong knowledge follows the denying of the right—, nor with an ascertainment—as when one says ' this peasant is a cow [*i.e.*, is foolish as a cow]—, nor with a comparison—as between a face and the moon—, nor with a copy—as in the case of a painted image—, nor with an imitation—as in the case of masters and disciples, who seek to explain the scriptures in the same way—, nor with a sudden apparition—as in magic—, nor with a skilfully conjured-up apparition—as in sleight-of-hand, etc. In all these cases, that which emerges does not appear, in fact, in a generalized form and, therefore, the subject does not actively share in what he sees. In consequence, the Tasting of Rasa does not take place ".

The words *āropa* and *adhyavasāya* are used in the sense given them by the Buddhists, according to whom discursive knowledge is an arbitrary and illusory super-imposition on reality, on the thing *in se* (cf. *I.P.V.*, p. 40).

3) Lollaṭa's doctrine.

4) Śaṅkuka's doctrine. Cf. *A.Bh.*, p. 38: *yadi tv evaṃ mukhyalaukikakaraṇānusāritayānukaraṇam ity ucyate tan na kaścid doṣaḥ* | .

5) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's doctrine. The different elements are the Determinants, etc. Cf. (*supra*, p. 62) the stanza " Rasa is, it is said, the essence of

light of the doctrine of the *vijñānavādin*. From whichever point of view it is examined, Rasa is, in any case, simply and solely a mental state which is the matter of cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and consisting in a Tasting.

The elements which eliminate the obstacles to aesthetic perception are the Determinants, etc. To specify: here, the words *camatkāra*, Immersion (*nirveśa*), Tasting (*rasanā*), Sampling (*āsvādana*), Enjoyment (*bhoga*), Accomplishment (*samāpatti*), Lysis (*laya*), Rest (*viśrānti*), etc., mean simply a form of consciousness completely free from any obstacles. The obstacles to Tasting are seven in number [1]: 1) unbecomingness (*ayogyatā*) of perception, called lack of verisimilitude (*saṃbhāvanāviraha*); 2) immersion in temporal or spatial determinations which are exclusively one's own or exclusively those of another; 3) the fact of being at the mercy of sensations of pleasure, etc., which inhere solely in one's own person; 4) defective state (*vaikalya*) of the means of perception; 5) lack of evidence (*asphuṭatva*); 6) lack

poetry... ". Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says that Rasa is not perceived but enjoyed. Well, says A.G., this theory is also true if it is interpreted in the light of the *vijñānavāda*,, the idealistic Buddhism, according to which everything that exists is pure consciousness or perception (according to which, therefore, every fruition, etc., is simply a form of perception).

1) In the following lines A.G. explains the *vighna*, the obstacles to aesthetic perception. The *vighna*, obstacles, are all the extraneous elements which break the unity of a state of consciousness (desires for gain, worry of all kinds, etc.). The same conception is met with in connexion with religious experience. The *vighna* are defined in the *I.P.V.V.*, I, p. 18: *vighnanti vilumpanti kartavyam iti vighnāḥ adhyātmikādayo 'navadhānadoṣādayas trividhopaghātāḥ tadadhiṣṭhātāraś ca devatāviśeṣāḥ* | " The obstacles obstruct or hinder what one does; this is why they are called obstacles. They are of three kinds (inherent in the perceiving subject, etc.): lack of attention, etc. The divinities which preside over them are also called obstacles ". Their principal source is lack of attention (*anavadhāna*), *i.e.*, the absence of a total rest of the whole being on the object of perception.

of preeminence (*apradhānatā*) and 7) the fact of allowing admission to doubts. That is to say:

1) A man who considers that what constitutes the object of cognition (*saṃvedya*) [the subject of performance]
A. Bh., I, p. [illegible] is lacking in verisimilitude is obviously not able to immerse (*viniviś*) his consciousness in it [1]. Thus the spectator will not be able to rest in it [2]. This is the first obstacle. The means by which it is eliminated are the consent of the heart [3] and the representation of an event of an ordinary nature (*lokasāmānya*) [4]. If there is any question of representing on the stage events which transcend ordinary life (*alokasāmānya*), it is necessary to resort to the device of bringing on to the stage people whose names are famous—Rāma, etc.—to produce in the spectator a flow of trust (*pratyaya*) deeply rooted in himself, aroused by the uninterrupted fame (*prasiddhi*) which the character represented has enjoyed since antiquity [5]. For the same reason, it is said that *nāṭaka* [6], etc., whose purpose is the illustration (*vyutpatti*) and teaching (*upadeśa*) of deeds transcending ordinary life, necessarily requires to deal with famous

1) In other words, to identify oneself with it, to partake actively in the events represented.

2) *I.e.*, identifying oneself in it to the exclusion of everything else.

3) Cf. p. 65, n. 1.

4) An event of an ordinary character finds a more ready response in the spectator's heart.

5) If the same extraordinary events (crossing of the ocean, etc.) which are, in fact, attributed to a legendary figure (Rāma, etc.) were referred to an ordinary man, they would arouse the incredulity of the spectators. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 331: *rāmādes tu tathāvidham api caritaṃ pūrvaprasiddhiparamparopacitasaṃpratyayopārūḍham asatyatayā na cakāsti* | " But when such undertakings are referred to Rāma, etc., they lose all appearance of falsehood; for they are rooted in the spectator's confidence, the cumulative result of the uninterrupted fame enjoyed from antiquity by the character in question ".

6) Cf. p. 79, n. 1.

events, etc. This requirement however, is absent in the case of comedies (*prahasana*). All this will be explained at a suitable time and place [1]. What has been said will suffice for the present.

2) One of the principal obstacles regularly occurs when the spectator is at the mercy of the tasting of pleasures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person. This obstacle consists in the appearance of other forms of consciousness, due variously to the fear of being abandoned by these sensations of pleasure, etc., to concern for their preservation, to a desire to procure other similar sensations, to the desire to get rid of them, give them open expression, hide them, etc. Even when someone perceives pleasures, pains, etc., as inhering exclusively in other persons, other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him (pleasures, pains, mental stupor, indifference [*mādhyasthya*], etc.) which naturally constitute an obstacle. The means of

1) *A. Bh.*, ch. XVIII. The appropriate subjects for the ten kinds of play are described and commented upon in *N.Ś.*, XVIII. *Nāṭaka* are plays on elevated subjects. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 4: " [The ten chief varieties of drama] are: the *Nāṭaka*, the *Prakaraṇa*, the *Bhāṇa*, the *Prahasana*, the *Ḍima*, the *Vyāyoga*, the *Samavakāra*, the *Vīthī*, the *Aṅka* (= *Utsṛṣṭikāṅka*), and the *Īhāmṛga*". Cf. *Ind. Th.*, p. 139 ff. In the *A.Bh.*, p. 27, A.G. makes the general remark: *na ca vartamānacaritānukāro yukto vineyānāṃ tatra rāgadveṣamadhyasthatādinā tanmayībhāvābhave prīter abhāvena vyutpatter apy abhāvāt, vartamānacarite ca dharmādikarmaphalasaṃbandhasya pratyakṣatve prayoge vaiyarthyam* | " It is not fitting to imitate an event of actual life; for in this case the spectators would be affected by passions (hatred, partisanship, indifference, etc.) [extraneous to aesthetic experience] and would thus be unable to identify himself with the event represented. Pleasure being thus absent, instruction would be absent as well. Besides, in the case of an actual event, the relation between the action (its merit, etc.) and the fruits which result from it is discerned by direct experience; it is, therefore, useless to put it on the stage ".

The word imitation (*anukāra*) must be understood in a broad sense. Teaching or knowledge is an accessory aim (*prayojana*) of art; its principal aim is aesthetic pleasure (*prīti*, *ānanda*, etc.). Cf. App. II, pp. 109 ff.

eliminating this obstacle are the actor's changing of dress—headwear, etc.—which hide his true identity. This is revealed to the spectators both during the preliminaries (*pūrvaraṅga*) (cf. the strophe: "It is best not to insist too much...") and in the initial presentation (*prastāvanā*) (defined in the strophe: "The actress, or the jester...")[1]. It is with the same purpose in view—that of eliminating this obstacle—that [all] the theatrical conventions [*nāṭyadharmī*] (including a number of things which transcend ordinary life: the zones [*kakṣyā*] dividing the pavilion [*maṇḍapa*], the stage [*raṅgapīṭha*], the various types of women's dance, the various dialects [*bhāṣā*], used[2], etc.) are brought into play[3]. For the presence of all these elements eliminates the perception: this particular individual, in this particular place, at this particular moment, feels pain, pleasure, etc.[4] This elimination takes place is so far as the theatrical spectacle implies the ne-

1) The "preliminaries" (*pūrvaraṅga*) include the whole body of rites, ceremonies, etc., celebrated at the beginning of a play. They end with the benediction stanza, *nāndī*. There is a risk of distracting or boring the audience by a long-drawn-out performance of these rites. Bharata himself recommends that they should not be too much insisted on (*N.Ś.*, V, 165-166: "It is best not to insist too much on ritual dances and songs for the very reason that if the songs, the instrumental music and the dances are performed too long the actors as well as the spectators will get tired of them and, in this case, they are not able to seize, with all their evidence, the Rasas and the mental states which will be represented"). The *nāndī* stanzas are immediately followed by the "prologue" (*prastāvanā*), giving the name of the play, of the author, etc. The prologue generally consists of a dialogue between the producer of the play and an assistant (*pāripārśvika*); the latter may be replaced by an actress, by the jester, etc.

2) The term *nāṭyadharmī* (*N.Ś.*, VI, v. 25; XIII, v. 70 ff.) refers to all the specific expedients, etc., of the theatre (scenery, costumes, traditional conventions, etc.). Cf. *Ind. Th.*, p. 15 and *Lokadharmī and Nāṭyadharmī*, by V. Raghavan, in *J.O.R.*, Madras, vol. VII, pp. 359-375, vol. VIII, pp. 57-74.

3) The different *prakṛti*, etc. Cf. *Ind. Th.*

4) In other words, it eliminates the limited subject, space, and time.

gation both of the real being of the actor and of the real being of the character he is playing[1]. Indeed, on one side there is the negation of the real being of the actor, and, on the other, the spectator's consciousness does not rest entirely on the being represented (*pratibhāsa*, the represented image, etc.)[2], who[se representation] therefore does not succeed in hiding completely the real being of the actor[3]. To specify: dances such as *āsīnapāṭhya*, *puṣpagaṇḍika*[4], etc., are not met with in ordinary life; but, on the other hand, it cannot be said that they are nothing, because it is undeniable that they exist in some way[5]. For this reason—*i.e.*, with a view to

1) The time, space, etc., of the actor as such and of the character represented by him cancel each other out.

2) Otherwise, aesthetic experience would become part of practical reality. The person represented is seen on the contrary indipendently of the concepts of reality and irreality.

3) *I.e.*, the actor does not become Rāma, etc. (as Rāma really was in empirical life).

4) *Daśarūpa*, Haas, 99: "The tenfold enumeration of the sub-divisions (*aṅga*) in the Gentle Dance (*lāsya*; I translate: women's dance) is: the *Geyapada* (Song), the *Sthitapāṭhya* (Recitation by one standing), the *Āsīnapāṭhya* (Recitation by one seated), the *Puṣpagaṇḍikā*, the *Pracchedaka*, the *Trigūḍha*, the one called *Saindhava*, the *Dvigūḍha*, the *Uttamottamaka*, and the *Uktapratyukta* (Amoebean Song)".

Each of these terms is definited by Bharata, *N.Ś.*, XIX, vv. 119-135. The dance, A.G. remarks, does not imitate anything in real life but is a self-subsistent creation, free from any practical aim. It is the natural expression, through the movements of the limbs, of a given state of mind. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 21; *nartanaṃ nṛttaṃ gātrāṇām aṅgopāṅgānāṃ vilāsena kṣepo na tu kenacit kartavyāṃśena* | The dance of Śiva is the natural expression of his complete and perfect bliss, free of all obstacles (*nirvāra* = *nirvighna*): *śaṅkarasyeva bhagavataḥ paripūrṇānandanirbharībhūtadehoccaladāntaranirvārasundarākārasya...*, *A. Bh.*, I, p. 21.

5) Thus, even if the character represented is a negation of the actor as such and of the real character represented by the actor, it cannot be said that he does not exist, that he is a nonentity; his existence in fact is a datum of one's own consciousness.

producing a state of generality—Bharata has expounded all this system of relative and connected matters, which serve just to realize the tasting of Rasa. All this will be clarified in the chapters which explain these dances [1], etc. For the present, let us bow to his words. Thus we have explained the way to eliminate the obstacles, consisting of the perception of temporal, etc., data as inhering exclusively in one's own person or in others.

3) In a similar way, the consciousness of a person who is under the influence of a sensation of pleasure, etc., cannot rest on anything else. Thus, in order to eliminate this obstacle, Bharata has shown the necessity of the colouring work [2] of well accomplished courtesans (*gaṇikā*), various kinds of pavilions, instrumental music (*ātodya*), vocal music, etc. (this work thus consists in various expedients, phonic, etc.). All these elements, used at suitable times and places, are such as to be enjoyed by all the
A. Bh., I, p. 283 spectators—in virtue of the state of generality [of which we have spoken]. Thanks to these, even a person who is not in a state of aesthetic receptivity (*ahṛdaya*) reaches a perfect limpidity of heart, as a result of which he becomes "possessed of heart" [3]. In fact it has been said "poetry may be visible or audible" [4].

4) Moreover, if the means of perception are absent, perception itself will also naturally be absent.

1) *N.Ś.*, XIX, ff.

2) *I.e.*, which colours the consciousness of spectators and draws their attention.

3) Cf. p. 65, n. 1.

4) *N.Ś.*, I, v. 11. The empirical division of aesthetic beauty into visibile and audible is not unfamiliar to Indian thought. Only sense data taken in through hearing and sight can be tasted, independently of any association with the ego, in a generalized way (*sādhāraṇīkṛta*). The other senses "ferment

5) The presence of characteristic signs of a phonic order [1] is sometimes not enough to make the perception rest [on the object represented, to the exclusion of every other object]; for they provoke an inevident (*asphuṭa*) perception. In fact such a resting requires the immediate certainty proper to direct experience, which consists in an evident perception. For as Vātsyāyana has said: "All these forms of consciousness (*pramiti*) are based on direct perception" [2]. Indeed, it is an immediate datum of self-consciousness itself (*svasaṃvedana* . . .) that what has been directly perceived cannot be changed even by all the holy writings (*āgama*) and all the inductions, etc., in the world. In the case, for exemple, of a firebrand which is being rapidly turned, what excludes the perception that this is a circle of fire (*alātacakra*), is in fact simply a second direct perception, stronger than the first: all this is met with even in connexion with the forms of ordinary consciousness. Thus in the case of that which is vitiated by these two obstacles, the method consecrated by tradition to eliminate them is made up of the four modes of Representation [3], beautified by the Styles of Procedure (*vṛtti*) [4], the

solely in one's own Self (*svātmany evocchalanāt*, *P.T.V.*, p. 48)", *i.e.*, are unable to break the barrier of the limited "I".

1) *I.e.*, the presence of the words alone, by means of which the spectator infers the acts narrated, is not enough to make the spectator identify himself with the subject and the characters of the play. To avoid this danger, says A.G., recourse is had to visual representation.

2) *Nyāyasūtra*, *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, I, I, 3: *sā* (A.G. reads *sarvā*) *iyaṃ pramitiḥ pratyakṣaparā* |

3) Cf. p. 35, n. 2.

4) The Styles of Procedure (*vṛtti*) are four in number: *kaiśikī*, *sattvatī*, *ārabhaṭī* and *bhāratī*. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 74: "The Gay Style (*kaiśikī*) [is to be used] in [expressing] the Erotic Rasa; the Grandiose Style (*sāttvatī*) in [expressing] the Heroic Rasa; the Horrific Style (*ārabhaṭī*), on the other hand, in [expressing] the Furious and Odious Rasa; The Eloquent Style (*bhāratī*)

Local Styles (*pravṛtti*) [1] and the Realistic Representation (*lokadharmī*) [2]. The operation (or power, *vyāpāra*) of Representation is, indeed, of a different character from that of characteristic signs of a phonic order; on the contrary, it is like the one of direct perception (*pratyakṣavyāpārakalpa*) [3]. All this will be explained later on.

everywhere". On the *vṛtti* see *The Vṛttis*, by V. Raghavan, *J.O.R.*, Madras, vol. VI, pp. 346 ff.; vol. VII, pp. 33 ff.

1) The local colours (*pravṛtti*) are four in number: *āvantī*, *dākṣiṇātyā*, *auḍramāgadhī*, *pāñcālī*. Cf. *N.Ś.*, VI, v. 26, 27; XIII, v. 37 and prose, pp. 205-207. *Ind. Th.*, p. 16: "Local usages regarding costumes, languages, manners and professions differ in the different countries of the world. They are the *pravṛtti* or local colours in drama".

2) Cf. p. 80, n. 2.

3) For the best explanation, see *A. Bh.*, I, 292: *tatra ye svabhāvato nirmalamukurahṛdayās ta eva saṃsārocitakrodhamohābhilāṣaparavaśamanaso na bhavanti | teṣāṃ tathāvidhadaśarūpakākarṇanasamaye sādhāraṇarasanātmakacarvaṇāgrāhyo rasasaṃcayo nāṭyalakṣaṇaḥ* (G: *°lakṣaṇa°*) *sphuṭa eva | ye tv atāthābhūtās teṣāṃ pratyakṣocitatathāvidhacarvaṇālābhāya naṭādiprakriyā svagatakrodhaśokādisaṅkaṭahṛdayagranthibhañjanāya gītādiprakriyā ca muninā viracitā |* "In this connexion, the mind of those who have by nature hearts like an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger, or stupor proper to *saṃsārika* existence [that of everyday life]. The mere fact of hearing the play read is sufficient [in itself, independently of any acting] to induce in them with the greatest clearness the perception of the various Rasas which animate it; this perception consists in a Sampling animated by a generalized Tasting. To make this Tasting (which needs a direct perception) available to people who have not this faculty, Bharata has, on the one hand, explained the discipline of the actors, etc., and, on the other, to cut the knots of the heart obscured by Anger, Sorrow, etc., inherent in one's own Self, has explained the discipline of vocal music, etc.". Representation (and therefore drama in general which is founded upon Representation) consists of a form of direct perception, is an *adhyavasāya* (mental cognition, etc.; also *vyavasāya*, *anuvyavasāya*, cf. App. I) that is like the direct perception (*sākṣātkārakalpa*, *pratyakṣakalpa*). *A. Bh.*, XXII, 150: *abhinayanaṃ hi cittavṛttisādhāraṇatāpattiprāṇasākṣātkārakalpādhyavasāyasampādanam |* "Representation arouses a mental cognition which is like a direct perception; it consists in causing the generalization of mental movements". *A. Bh.*, XXII, 148: *vighnasaṃbhāvanāvihīnasakalasādhāraṇaspaṣṭabhāvasākṣātkārakalpādhyavasāyasampattaye sarveṣām prayoga ity uktam |* "It is said that the acting (*prayoga* = *parṣadi prakaṭīkaraṇam*, *A. Bh.*, I, 16) of the four forms of Representation aims

6) Does there exist a man whose consciousness rests on anything of a secondary order (*apradhāna*)? Such a perception would find no rest in itself and would thus run (*anudhāv*) automatically towards something occupying a pre-eminent position. Thus only the Permanent Mental States can be the object of Tasting: the Determinants and the Consequents which are [in themselves] insentient (*jaḍa*), and the Transitory Mental States, which, though their nature is consciousness, nevertheless necessarily depend on the Permanent Mental State, occupy a secondary position [1]. Among these Permanent Mental States, some can be found in a more elevated position than others: these are the forms of consciousness based on the four purposes (*artha*) of life [2]. To specify, Delight is based on Love

just at arousing a mental cognition, which is like a direct perception. It consists of a generalized state of evidence common to all the spectators and devoid of every possible obstacle". Drama is the object of cognition by an *anuvyavasāya* (about this word cf. App. I) which is like a direct perception, *A. Bh.*, I, 43.

1) Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 177: *taccarvaṇāpi cittavṛttiṣv eva paryavasatīti rasabhāvebhyo nādhikaṃ carvaṇīyam |* "The Tasting of the Determinants, etc., necessarily terminates in the mental movements; thus apart from the *bhāva* (the matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted.

A. Bh., I, p. 268: *sa ca yady apy anantavibhāvātmā tathāpi sarveṣāṃ jaḍānāṃ saṃvidi tasyāś ca bhoktari bhoktṛvargasya ca pradhāne bhoktari paryavasānān nāyakābhidhānabhoktṛviśeṣasthāyicittavṛttisvabhāvaḥ |* "Though [drama, etc.] is constituted by an infinite number of Determinants, etc., all the elements, which compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness [the Permanent Mental State]. This rests in the enjoying subject [the limited enjoying subject, the practical Self] and the whole of the enjoying subjects rests, in their turn, in the principal enjoying subject [the generalised knowing subject]. Therefore, we may say that drama consists in a Permanent Mental State of a particular enjoying subject, called an actor, etc.". Such a mental state, continues A.G., is unique, generalized, devoid of the notions "own", "of others", etc., and, therefore, it pervades also the spectactors: *ata eva sādhāraṇībhūtatayā sāmājikam api svātmasadbhāvena samāveśayantī...*

2) According to a pan-Indian conception, human life is motivated by four purposes: *kāma*, *artha*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa*. *Kāma* is pleasure and love. *Artha*

and, in the second place, on the forms of Profit (*artha*) and Right Action (*dharma*) which may depend on Love Anger, in people in which it predominates, is based on Profit—but can also rest in Love and in Right Action. Energy rests in all three, Right Action, etc. Serenity is the means of Liberation; its predominant element is the disgust which arises from the knowledge of reality [1]. These four Permanent Mental States are thus to be found in a pre-eminent position. Of course, they will not be found in a predominant position all four together: the emergence of one of them naturally postulates the subordination of the other three. In every drama these constitute the dominant elements, but all the same one of them must necessarily be in a leading position. Thus, according to the character of the various dramas, all of these may be said to be found in a leading position. If, on the other hand, things are more closely examined, all four of them will be

is material property (economics, politics, etc., are directed to the fulfilment of this end). *Dharma* embraces moral and religious duty. *Mokṣa* is the liberation or redemption of the soul from the corrent of existence; it is the *paramārtha*, the supreme purpose of man. For an excellent account of the four *artha*, see H. ZIMMER, *Les Philosophies de l'Inde*, Payot, pp. 35 ff. The principal forms of consciousness (*sthāyibhāva*) are those which are necessary to the fulfilment of these purposes; they are Delight (*rati*), Anger (*krodha*), Energy (*utsāha*), and Serenity (*śama*). The end of Delight is Pleasure; however, through Pleasure, it can bring us to the achievement of Profit and Rigth Action (Bharata, *N.Ś.*, XVIII, v. 72 ff., distinguishes three kinds of Erotic Rasa, *kāmaśṛṅgāra*, *arthaśṛṅgāra*, and *dharmaśṛṅgāra*). Anger and Energy are associated with *artha* and *dharma* respectively, but both of them may also contribute to the realization of all three purposes (cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 393: *vīraraudrayos tv atyantavirodho 'pi nāsti | samānaṃ rūpaṃ ca dharmārthakāmārjanopayogitvam*). Spiritual Freedom is the fruit of Serenity.

1) The characteristics of this *sthāyibhāva* are discussed by A.G. in the *A.Bh.*, pp. 333-42. Abhinava Gupta's text is edited with a commentary by V. RAGHAVAN, *The Number of Rasas*, Adyar, 1940.

seen to be present in the same drama, in various passages, in a preeminent position.

In this connexion, all Rasas are dominated by pleasure; for the essence of light—closely dense (*ekaghana*) [1] light, consisting of the Tasting of one's own consciousness—is beatitude [2]. For example: in ordinary life also, women,

1) Uniform, without obstacles (*vighna*).

2) The intimate essence of consciousness or the "I", according to the *śaiva*, is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering are due to a need, privation, or desire for something separated from the Self. Beatitude is the absence of this desire, the resting in oneself to the exclusion of everything else. The "I" contains all things; everything that exists arises from its unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and can desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's own consciousness and, therefore, of one's own essential beatitude. In this sense, Rasa is single. This Tasting is coloured (*anurañjita*, *ruṣita*) by latent impressions (*vāsanā*, *saṃskāra*) of the mental processes of Delight, etc., aroused by the Determinants, etc., *i.e.*, by poetic expression. From this point of view the plurality of the Rasas is due to the diversity of the *vibhāva* (*vibhāvabhedaṃ rasabhede hetutvena sūcayati...*, *A.Bh.*, p. 293). Cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 293: *asmanmate tu saṃvedanam evānandaghanam āsvādyate | tatra kā duḥkhaśaṅkhā | kevalaṃ tasyaiva citratākaraṇe ratiśokādivāsanāvyāpāras tadudbodhane cābhinayādivyāpāraḥ |* "According to us, that which is tasted is consciousness alone which is saturated with beatitude. This fact excludes, therefore, any suspicion of pain. This consciousness which is single in itself, is nevertheless differentiated by the operation of the latent traces of Delight, Sorrow, etc., which are awaked by the operation of the Consequents, etc. (*abhinaya* = *anubhāva*). For the nature of this "colouring" infused into the consciousness by the mental processes of Delight, etc., cf. *infra*, p. 100, n. 4.

The best exposition of the concept of beatitude occurs in *I.P.V.V.*, II, pp. 177 ff.: *svarūpasya svātmanaḥ paripūrṇanijasvabhāvaprakāśanam eva parāmarśamayatām dadhad ānanda iti ucyate | tathā dehādisaṅkocakaluṣāparipūrṇapratyagātmāhaṃbhāvaniṣṭhatvena śarīrasya riktatayā kṣudhāturasya vyatiriktānnābhilāṣavivaśīkṛtamater ātmaparāmarśo 'yam ekaghanavṛttyā yato na saṃbhavati, tato 'yam anānanda iva āste, sati ātmaparāmarśamaye svānande | yadā tu annaparipūrṇajaṭharatā asya tadā tadriktatodrekarūpā tāvad apūrṇatā vinaṣṭā | saṃskārarūpatayā tu tadānīṃ yad abhilāṣaṇīyaṃ kāntāliṅganādi parāmarśanīyaṃ sthitaṃ yad āha guruḥ patañjaliḥ 'na hi caitra ekasyām striyāṃ rakta iti anyāsu viraktaḥ' ityādi, tadyogād apūrṇo 'yam ānanda iti paramānando 'yaṃ na bhavati | sāṃsārikaś ca sarvo 'syānando 'lābhe bhāviviyogabhīruḥ' iti 'viṣayo viṣayāntarārthitāṃ janayan vā janayet kathaṃ sukham' iti ca nyāyena vyatiriktākāṅk-*

even when they are immersed in the compact (*ekaghana*) Tasting of the form of consciousness called Sorrow, find

ṣāvicchedamayatāṃ sarvātmanā na svīkurute iti tato 'pi apūrṇa eva | yas tu ānandatāṃśas tatra svātmaparāmarśarūpataiva prayojiketi, tata evoktaṃ

'trailokye 'py atra yo yāvān ānandaḥ kaścid īkṣyate |
sa bindur yasya taṃ vande devam ānandasāgaram ||'

iti śrībhaṭṭanārāyaṇena | tathā ca madhurādau rase audarikābhyavahāravailakṣaṇyena pravṛtta idam ittham iti pramātari viśramayan pramātṛbhāgam eva pradhānatayā vimṛśan bhuñjāna iti ucyate | yatrāpy atyantam anyathābhāvam atikramya sukham āsvādyate arjanādisaṃbhāvyamānavighnāntaranirāsāt vaiṣayikānandavilakṣaṇaṃ [Read; the printed text has *°vilakṣaṇa°*] *śṛṅgārādau nāṭyakāvyādiviṣaye tatra vītavighnatvād eva asau rasanā carvaṇā nirvṛtiḥ pratītiḥ pramātṛtāviśrāntir eva, tata eva hṛdayena parāmarśalakṣaṇena prādhānyāt vyapadeśyā vyavasthitasyāpi prakāśabhāgasya vedyaviśrāntasya anādaraṇāt sahṛdayatā ucyate iti nirvighnāḥ svādarūpāś ca rasanātadgocarīkāryāś cittavṛttayo rasā nava ity ayaṃ artho 'bhinavabharatyāṃ nāṭyavedavivṛtau vitatya vyutpādito 'smābhir iti tatkutūhalī tām evāvalokayet | iha tu prakṛtavighnakāritvāt na vitataḥ | tasmād anupacaritasya saṃvedanarūpatānāntarīyatvena avasthitasya svātantryasya* [I propose; the printed text has *svatantrasya*] *eva rasanaikaghanatayā parāmarśaḥ paramānando nirvṛtiś camatkāra ucyate | tasmād yuktam āha 'camatkṛter abhāvāt' | madhurādirasāsvāde tu viṣayasparśavyavadhānam | tato 'pi kāvyanāṭyādau tadvyavadhānaśūnyatā tadvyavadhānasaṃskārānuvedhas tu | tatrāpi tu tathoditavyavadhānāṃśatiraskriyāsāvadhānahṛdayā labhanta eva paramānandam | yathoktam*

'jagdhipānakṛtollāsarasānandavyavasthiteḥ |' ityādi |

"What we call beatitude is nothing but a full illumination of one's own being, accompanied by a form of intellection which pervades all one's own nature, one's own Self. For example: he who is hungry feels a sense of vacuity in his body; his mind (the state in which he is, is due, of course, to the not full limited egoness, maculated by the contraction of the body etc.) is really longing for something (food etc.), distinguished from himself, and, therefore, the intellection of the Self, of which we have spoken, cannot be verified in him in all its complete fullness. Therefore, it is said that such a person is devoid of beatitude (beatitude consists, in fact, in the full intellection of the Self). But, when the belly of that very person is full of food, the previous state of unfullness, consisting in the emergence of vacuity, ceases to exist. Soon after, however, he begins to have new longings (he desires to embrace women, etc.) that, until that moment, were in a state of latent impression; Patañjali has in fact said: 'the fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others', [*Yogasūtra, Vyāsabhāṣya*, 2, 4] etc. Owing to this very contact with other desires,

rest in their own heart, in so far as their consciousness, even then, consists of, and is animated by, a rest without

such beatitude is incomplete [not full] and, therefore, it is not the supreme beatitude. In fact, according to the principle that, 'in the union one fears the future separation', and, 'one thing breeds the longing for another; therefore how can it be a source of happiness?,' the forms of beatitude which we can enjoy in practical life [*i.e.*, the saṃsāric beatitudes] are unable to cut off completely the desire of a thing disjoined from one's own Self and this is why they are incomplete [not full]. As to the part 'beatitude' which is in them, its determinant elements is, however, as before, the intellection of one's own Self. In effect, because of this, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa has said: 'Let us give a praise to Śiva! All the forms of beatitude which may be found here in this three worlds, are only his drops, belonging to him, who is an ocean of beatitude!' [*Stavacintāmaṇi*, v. 61]. To specify: he who is tasting a sweet drink, etc., is in a state quite different from the one of a hungry man who eats up its food greedily. What there is in his consciousness is just the idea 'this is thus' and therefore that which, in his thinking, is in a state of emergence is exactly the part 'knowing-subject'. He who is in such a condition is called 'enjoying subject'. A further form of pleasure, different from the former, devoid of any extrinsic modification [obstacles, etc.], is obtained when one, either by a poem or a drama, etc., is absorbed in the Erotic Rasa, etc. Owing to the absence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning, etc.), this pleasure is different from the forms of beatitude of practical life, and just because it is devoid of obstacles, it is called Tasting, Delibation, Solution, Perception, and Rest in the nature of the knowing-subject. Owing to this very fact, the expression which designates this pleasure more adequately is the heart, which, characterised by intellection, is just what predominates in it; at the same time, the part 'light' which consists and rests in the knowable, though continuing to exist, is [in the aesthetic pleasure] in a state of non-evidence: these are the very reasons to which we due the expression 'condition of possessing a heart'. The mental movements, devoid of obstacles, consisting of a Sampling, made the matter of such Tasting, are the nine Rasas. This subject has been much dealt with by us in *Abhinavabharatī*, our comment to the Nāṭyaveda; those who wants to know more about it may be satisfied in reading this treatise. In this work it would represent an obstacle to the matter we deal with and, therefore, we think that it is much better not to dwell on it. What is called supreme beatitude, Solution and *camatkāra* is, therefore, nothing but Tasting, *i.e.*, an intellection, in all its compact density, of the *realissima* [*i.e.*, not metaphorical] liberty, inseparable from the nature of consciousness. Therefore, Utpaladeva is right in saying: 'because of the lack of *camatkāra...*'. We must not forget that in tasting a juice of sweet flavour, etc. the relative form of beatitude is perceived through the screen of a direct con-

obstacles [1]. Pain is, simply and solely, an absence of rest. This is precisely the reason for which the disciples of Kapila, in explaining the activity of *rajaḥ*, say that the soul of pain is mobility (*cāñcalya*) [2]. All the Rasas thus consist of beatitude. But some of them, on account of the objects by which they are coloured [3], are not free from a certain sense of harshness; this happens, for example, in the Heroic Rasa. For this consists of, and is animated by, precisely the ferm endurance of misfortunes. Delight, etc., thus occupy a pre-eminent position. Laughter, etc., again, also occupy a pre-eminent position; for these—whose Determinants are easily accessible to all types of people—possess an extremely high power of colouring [4]. For this very

tact with the objects of the exterior reality. Again, in poetry, in drama, etc., there is not such a screen, nevertheless it remains in the form of latent impression. Also in these cases, however, those people whose hearts are carefully devoted to cancel the part which performs the functions of a screen, succeed in reaching the supreme beatitude. In fact, it has been said: 'The supreme beatitude may take place, disclosed by drinking and eating' [*Vijñānabhairava*, v. 72. Cf. *T.Ā.*, III, pp. 218 ff.; Kṣemarāja, *ad Stavacintāmaṇi*, p. 71: *ittham ca tattatparimitānande' pi ekāgrībhāvitacittaḥ paramānandam āviśati yogijanaḥ*...]".

1) The concept is as follows: women, even when they are being bitten, scratched, etc., by their lovers (and therefore experiencing pain) find in the pain itself the fulfilment, the realization of all their desire: "they rest in their hearts" or consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. Therefore, this pain is pleasure, beatitude. Pain occurs only when the consciousness finds no rest in what it contemplates, is not totally absorbed in the object of contemplation, *i.e.*, when it desires something different from the thing in which it is and from what it is. These desires, etc., which interrupt the homogeneity and compactness (*ekaghanatā*) of consciousness, are the *vighna*, the obstacles.

The same concept occurs in the *Pratāparudrīya* (Madras, 2th. Ed., 1931), comm., p. 209: *saṃbhogasamaye strīṇām adharadaṃśanādau kṛtrimaduḥkhānubhāvasītkāravad atrāpy upapattiḥ* |

2) Cf. *S.Kā.*, 13.

3) The Determinants, etc.

4) *I.e.*, they are widely diffused, easily make an impression on the consciousness.

reason, Laughter, etc., are mostly encountered in people of inferior nature (*anuttamaprakṛti*). Every man of low caste laughs, grieves, is afraid, tends to despise others, and is astonished at the poorest attempt at a fine saying. All the same, these depend on Delight, etc., and as such may also be of help in attaining the ends of man [1]. The division between the ten types of drama is itself based on the different positions occupied by these mental states. All this will be explained later. The mental states of permanent nature are solely these nine. Indeed every creature from its birth possesses these nine forms of consciousness. In fact, on the basis of the principle that all beings "hate to be in contact with pain and are eager to taste pleasure" [2], everyone is pervaded by sexual desires [Delight]; believes himself to be superior to others, whom he is thus led to deride [Laughter]; grieves when he is forced to part from what he loves [Sorrow]; gets angry against the causes of such separation [Anger]; gets frightened when he finds himself powerless [Fear]—but still is desirous of overcoming the danger which threatens him [Heroism]; is attacked, when judging a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of revulsion directed just towards this ugly object [Disgust]; wonders at the sight of extraordinary deeds done by himself or others [Astonishment]; and, lastly, is desirous of abandoning certaing things [Serenity]. No living creature exists without the latent impression of these mental movements. All we can say is that some predominate in some people and others in others, and that in some people they originate from the usual causes and in

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1) The Comic, Pathetic, Marvellous and Terrible Rasas depend on the Erotic, Furious, Heroic and Odious Rasas respectively.

2) Unidentified verse.

others from causes different from the normal. Thus only some mental movements are such as to realize the purpose of man[1]; therefore these are rightly the object of teaching[2]. The current division of men into men of elevated nature, etc., is determined by the different position occupied by these states. Some mental movements (Weakness, Apprehension, etc.)[3], however, can never possibly be manifested if the corresponding Determinants do not exist. For example: a *muni* who practices *rasāyana*[4] is immune from Weakness, Indolence, Weariness, etc. Even in one in whom, by virtue of the Determinants[5], these are present, they regularly disappear without leaving any trace of themselves when the causes of manifestation cease[6]. Heroism, etc., however, even when they apparently disappear after their tasks are completed, do not cease to remain in the state of latent impressions—for other forms of heroism, inherent in other tasks, remain intact. Indeed, as Patañjali has said, "The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others", etc.[7]. Thus these Transitory Mental Movements follow one another,

1) Only the nine Permanent Mental States are able to contribute to the realization of the four ends of man. The Transitory Mental States have not this faculty. Cf. H.C., *viveka*, p. 139 (certainly a quotation from A.G.): *ayaṃ ca nirvedaḥ svayaṃ puruṣārthasiddhaye vā utsāharatyādivat, atyantānurañjanāya hāsavismayādivan na prabhavatīty atyantamukhaprekṣitvād vyabhicāry eva* |

2) The object of the play is to illustrate and teach the means of realisation of the four ends of man.

3) The Transitory Mental States.

4) *Rasāyana* (the science or art of the rasas or vegetable juices, etc.) is, more or less, the Indian equivalent of alchemy.

5) *I.e.*, in virtue of the presence of their causes.

6) *I.e.*, without remaining in the state of latent impressions.

7) *Yogasūtra*, *Vyāsabhāṣya*, 2, 4. Caitra stands for any name whatever. The same quotation is used in the *Ī.P.V.V.*, II, p. 178; cf. *supra*, p. 87, n. 2.

threaded on the thread of the Permanent Mental State. They rise and set an infinity of times. They may be compared to beads of crystal, glass, mica, topaz, emerald, sapphire, etc., continuously changing their position, threaded, so as to be set rather far apart, on a red or dark blue thread[1]. These beads on such a thread leave no trace of themselves, but all the same they nourish the ornamental composition animated by this thread[2]. Themselves varied, they vary in turn the thread of the Permanent Mental State. Although the permanent thread does not appear in all its purity, it is still left visible at intervals by them. It nevertheless remains obviously affected by the polychrome reflections of the jewels, which, being "transitory", follow one another: it is for this very reason that these mental movements are called "transitory". When, that is to say, someone says, "This is a form of Weakness", it is natural to ask: by what is it provoked? This question shows up precisely the instability of this mental movement. But in the case of the expression, "Rāma is full of Heroism", it is not usual to ask for the cause. The Determinants (the elements which awaken the mental states) are limited, therefore, to bringing to actuality the Permanent *A. Bh.*, I, p. 285

1) These still allow the thread of the permanent mental state to appear here and there. For a similar image, see *A.Bh.*, p. 341: *viralombhitaratnāntarālanirbhāsamānasitatarasūtravat*... The colours (red, dark blue, etc.) of the thread allude to the *sthāyibhāva*. The various Rasas are each associated by Bharata with a different colour (the Erotic with green, the Comic with white, the Pathetic with ash-grey, the Furious with red, the Heroic with orange, the Terrible with black, the Odious with dark blue, and the Marvellous with yellow).

2) In other words, they are the ornamental elements of the thread. *Bhṛ* = *puṣ*, nourish; cf. the often-quoted stanza (*e.g.*, *Kāvyapradīpa*, comm., p. 61):

sraksūtrabhāvād anyeṣām bhāvānām anugāmakaḥ |
na tirodhīyate sthāyī tair asau puṣyate param ||

Mental States (Delight, Heroism, etc.) corresponding respectively to their nature—and they do this by infusing in them their own colouring. Even when their corresponding Determinants are absent, it cannot be said that the Permanent Movements are completely unobservable; for it has been said that these, in the state of latent impressions, are present in all beings. Of the Transitory Mental States, however, when their corresponding Determinants are absent, not even the names remain—all this will be explained more extensively at the suitable time and place [1]. In this way the necessity of elements occupying a pre-eminent position has been demonstrated. This necessity was also, implicitly, mentioned by Bharata in his description of the Permanent Mental States, which begins: "The Permanent Mental States we shall bring to the state of Rasas" [2]. This description is the consequence of the definition of the general marks [of Rasas] and constitutes the definition of their particular characteristics.

7) The Consequents, the Determinants and the Transitory Mental States considered separately are in no definite relation with a given Permanent Mental State. It is, indeed, found that tears, etc. [3], may be aroused indiffe-

1) In the ch. VIII of the *A.Bh.* (which has not yet come to light).

2) *N.Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 50 (in a note). In this sentence, Bharata says implicitely that only the *sthāyibhāva* (*i.e.*, the elements of principal order) and not the a *vibhāva* etc. are brought to the state of Rasa. The general definition (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) begins with the *sūtra*: *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāri-saṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*. The particular definition (*viśeṣalakṣaṇa*) consists of the description of the characters of each Rasa. Cf. *I.P.V.V.*, I, 57. *A.Bh.*, 301: *ye sthāyino bhāvā loke cittavṛttyātmano bahuprakāraparīśramaprasavanibandhanakartavyatāprabandhābhidhāyinas tān api nāma rasatvaṃ viśrāntyekāyatanatvenopadeśadiśānveṣyāmaḥ* |

3) Tears are Consequents.

rently by a great Delight, a pain in the eyes, etc. A tiger [1] may arouse Anger, Fear, etc. As we know, Weariness (*śrama*) or Anxiety (*cintā*) [2] may accompany the Permanent Mental States of Heroism, Fear, etc. The combination of these elements, however, has an unmistakable significance. For example, when the Determinants consist of the death of a friend, the Consequents of wailing, tears, etc., and the Transitory Mental States are Anxiety, Depression (*dainya*), etc., then the Permanent Mental State which results cannot be other than Sorrow. For this reason, when it appears that a doubt might arise, one has recourse to the combination of these elements (simply to eliminate the obstacle of doubt).

The Determinants, etc. (which consist of gardens, expressive glances, mental states of Contentment [*dhṛti*], etc.), transcend the state of causes, etc., as these are understood in ordinary life. Their function consists solely in the fact that they colour [the consciousness of the spectator]; this function is called *vibhāvanā*, *anubhāvanā*, etc. [3]. Thus these take the name, of a non-ordinary character, of Deter-

1) The tiger is an example of a Determinant.

2) Weariness, etc., are Transitory Mental States.

3) The Determinants, properly speaking, awaken in the spectator the latent traces of the mental movements corresponding to their nature. Aesthetic experience or Rasa is coloured by these latent traces. The exact meaning of *vibhāvanā*, etc., is explained by Viśvanātha, *S.D.*, III: *vibhāvanam ratyāder viśeṣena āsvādāṅkuraṇayogyatānayanam* | *anubhāvanam evambhūtasya ratyādeḥ samanantaram eva rasādirūpatayā bhāvanam* | *saṃcāraṇam tathābhūtasyaitasya samyak cāraṇam* | In other words, according to Viśvanātha, *vibhāvana* is the first manifestation of the germination of Rasa; *anubhāvana* is the gradual corroboration of the Rasa which is on the point of appearing; and *saṃcāraṇa* (which is not mentioned by A.G.) is the intensification or consolidation of Rasa. *Saṃcāraṇa*, according to Viśvanātha, is the specific operation of the *vyabhicāribhāva* (*saṃcāri* = *vyabhicāri*). The elaboration of these three stages is due, of course, to the necessity of allotting

minants, etc. [1], and this denomination is aimed at expressing their dependence on the latent traces left by the corresponding preceding causes, etc. [2] The particular nature of the various Determinants will be explained later [3]. The operation of the Determinants, etc., presupposes, of course, that the spectator, in the course of his ordinary life, has not neglected to make a close observation of the characteristic signs (effects, causes and concomitant elements) of other people's mental processes, in other words to deduce the one from the other. In the mind of such a spectator, the Determinants, etc. (let us remember that any work of poetry is dominated at times by one of them and at times by another), reach a state of perfect union, connexion and identity [4]. That which, in this state, they make the matter of Tasting—Tasting consisting of a form of consciousness free from obstacles, differing from ordinary forms of consciousness—is precisely Rasa. It differs from the Permanent Mental States, and consists solely in this state of Tasting—it is not, that is to say, something already realized [5]—and lasts exactly as long as the Tasting, *i.e.*,

specific functions to the *vibhāva*, etc. Rasa is, in reality, single, and its manifestation does not have earlier and later stages. This division is of a purely didactic nature.

1) In so far as they are different from ordinary causes.

2) The Determinants, etc., arouse the latent traces of the mental processes of Delight, etc., provoked by ordinary causes. They, thus, demand the presence of these traces and depend upon them.

3) *N.Ś.*, VII; Abhinava Gupta's commentary on this chapter has not yet come to light.

4) The word used by Bharata, *saṃyoga*, union, implies both that the Determinants, etc., unite with each other to form a single whole, and that the mind of the spectator is identified with them or participates actively (*anupraviś*) in the situation which they determine.

5) *I.e.*, it is not an already realized, self-subsistent thing which can exist independently of this Tasting. Rasa is simply the particular form of perception called Tasting.

it does not lean on any time separate from it [1]. Our thesis is thus different from that of Śaṅkuka, who says that what is called Rasa is simply a Permanent Mental State, brought to our knowledge by the Determinants, etc., and that, because this is the object of a Tasting, it takes the name of Rasa [2]. For, if things were so, why should Rasa not exist also in everyday life? For if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of Tasting [3], a real thing has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus it is legitimate to say that the perception of a Permanent Mental State consists in an inference; but we certainly cannot rightly say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the real reason [4] why Bharata has made no mention in the *sūtra* of the word "Permanent Mental State"; on the contrary, if he had mentioned it, this would have been a source of difficulties [5]. Only by analogy is it said: "The

1) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 160: *iha tu vibhāvādicarvaṇā adbhutapuṣpavat tatkālasāraivoditā na tu pūrvāparakālānubandhinī* | "In aesthetic experience, what happens is, instead, the birth of the Tasting of the Determinants, etc. Such a Tasting is like a flower born of magic; its essence is solely the present [*i.e.*, it appears and disappears suddenly], it is correlated neither with what came before nor with what comes after". In other words, aesthetic experience is without pragmatic demands, is not directed towards an extrinsic end but is an end in itself.

2) Rasa, says A.G., does not consist in the inference (in inferential cognition) of someone else's mental state (in which case it would be a cognition of a discursive order, *savikalpa*), but is a personal experience—the spectator identifies himself with this mental state and lives it himself. This observation is aimed at Śaṅkuka, who maintained that Rasa is simply a Permanent Mental State deduced by the spectators by means of the Determinants, etc., and that the mental state perceived in this way is nothing but an imitation by the actor of the Permanent Mental State of the character he represents.

3) Therefore the imitated Permanent Mental State is unreal.

4) *I.e.*, Śaṅkuka's reason is not the real one; cf. *supra*, p. 36.

5) Bharata did not say "The production of Rasa is provoked by the union of the Permanent Mental State [of someone else, *i.e.*, the character represented,] with the Determinants, the Consequents, and the Transitory Mental

Permanent Mental State becomes Rasa"[1]. This analogy, to specify, is caused by the fact that the very same things which were previously considered to be causes, etc., inherent in a given Permanent Mental State, now serve to realize the Tasting, and thus are presented in the form of Determinants, etc.[2]. That is, it is quite impossible to say that the inference of an ordinary mental state is a source of
A. Bh., I, p. 286 Rasa. For this reason, the Tasting of Rasa (which consists in a *camatkāra* different from any other kind of ordinary cognition) differs from both memory, inference and any form of ordinary selfconsciousness[3]. To be precise: a per-

Movements". If he had, Rasa would simply be a perception of someone else's Permanent Mental Movement.

1) Bharata says sometimes (cf. *e.g.*, *N.Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 50 [in a note]) that the Permanent Mental States becomes Rasa; such expressions, A.G. remarks, are only due to the "correspondence (analogy, etc.)". Cf. the next note.

2) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 89: *loke hi sthāyibhāve ye vibhāvānubhāvās tatsamucitā cittavṛttiś carvyamāṇātmā rasa ity aucityat sthāyino rasatāpattir ity ucyate* | "Rasa is simply the Tasting of the mental movement, corresponding, for example, with the Determinants and the Consequents of the mental state of Sorrow. The expression: 'the Permanent Mental States become Rasas', arises solely, therefore, by analogy (= correspondence)".

3) Forms of "ordinary selfconsciousness" are, *e.g.*, pleasure, pain, etc. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 55: *nanv evaṃ dhūmāvagamanānantarāgnismaraṇavad vibhāvādipratipattyanantaraṃ ratyādicittavṛttipratipattir iti śabdavyāpāra evātra nāsti* | *idaṃ tāvad ayaṃ pratītisvarūpajño mīmāṃsakaḥ praṣṭavyaḥ* | *kim atra paracittavṛttimātre pratipattir eva rasapratipattir abhimatā bhavataḥ* | *na caivam bhramitavyam* | *evaṃ hi lokagatacittavṛttyanumānamātram iti kā rasatā* | *yas tv alaukikacamatkārātmā rasāsvādaḥ kāvyagatavibhāvādicarvaṇāprāṇo nāsau smaraṇānumānādisāmyena khilīkārapātrīkartavyaḥ* | "Objection: 'the perception of the mental perception processes of Delight, etc., is born, thus, immediately after the perception of the Determinants, etc.,—in the same way as the memory of fire that is born immediately after the smoke is perceived. For this reason, this perception is not the fruit of the power of the words [*i.e.*, it is not aroused by the power of evocation, *dhvananavyāpāra*]". To such an inquirer, who knows the nature of perception so well, we would put this question: do you consider that the perception of Rasa is nothing but the perception of another's mental state? One must be careful not to fall into this error. For in this case, there would exist, indeed, only the induction of a

son assumed to possess latent traces of the ordinary inductive processes, will certainly not perceive [the representation of] a young woman, etc.[1], in a manner devoid of active participation[2]. On the contrary, just in virtue of his possessing heart (the latter quality consisting in a consent of the heart),[3] this perception will be, as it were, the seed in him, from which the Tasting of the Rasa will develop, of the Rasa about to appear in all its fullness (*pūrṇībhaviṣyat*). This Tasting will unfold in complete indipendence of every kind of ordinary cognition (induction, memory, etc., and will consist of, and be animated by, a Tasting characterized by a state of identity with the image seen[4]. This Tasting does not of course arise from another cognition previously unfolded; for in that case it would be a form of memory. Nor is it the fruit of the operation of ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, etc.)[5]. It is aroused solely by the union of the Determinants, etc., which, as has been said, are of a non ordinary nature. Tasting is distinguished *a*) from perception of the ordinary mental states (Delight, etc.)

given mental process of an ordinary nature—and this certainly is not Rasa. The Tasting of Rasa—which consists in a *camatkāra* of a non-ordinary nature—is animated, in fact, by a Tasting of the Determinants, etc., which are of poetical nature. It is quite impossible to identify this Tasting with memory, inference, etc!".

1) "A young woman" is a Determinant; "etc." here includes the Consequents and the Transitory Mental States.

2) Impersonally. *Tāṭasthya* or *mādhyasthya*, indifference, is the exact opposite of *anupraveśa*, personal or active participation. Cf. p. 55, n. 1.

3) Cf. p. 65, n. 1.

4) *I.e.*, it is perceived in a generalized manner; cf. p. 55, n. 1.

5) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 153: *na cāsau carvaṇā pramāṇāntarato jātā pūrvam, yenedānīṃ smṛtiḥ syāt*|*na cādhunā kutaścit pramāṇāntarād utpannā, alaukike pratyakṣādyavyāpārāt* | The operation of direct perception, etc., refers only to things of an ordinary, i.e., practical nature.

aroused by the ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, inference, the revealed word, analogy, etc.); *b*) from cognition without active participation (*taṭastha*) of the thoughts of others, which is proper to the direct perception of the yogins[1]; *c*) from compact (*ekaghana*)[2] perception of one's own beatitude, which is proper to *yogin* of higher orders (this perception is immaculate, free from all impressions [*uparāgā*] deriving from external things)[3]. For these three forms of cognition are without the beauty (*saundarya*), [which is proper to the aesthetic experience]. The causes of this privation are *a*) the appearance of other obstacles (practical desires, etc.), *b*) the lack of evidence, due to the absence of active participation, and *c*) the fact of being immersed in complete abandonment within the [adored] object[4]. In aesthetic experience, on

1) Telepathy, the knowledge of other people's minds, is one of the *yogin* powers (*Yogasūtra*, III, 19: *pratyayasya paracittajñānam*; this *sūtra* is quoted and commented by A.G. in *Ī.P.V.*, I, 4, 5). This phenomenon, observes A.G., is of a totally different order to aesthetic experience. In this, in fact, the distinction between one's own self and the self of others (*svaparavibhāga*) continues to exist, while the aesthetic experience postulates the generalization of the mental states and therefore the suppression of every limited self.

2) Cf. p. 71, n. 2.

3) Abhinava Gupta alludes, in this passage, to the highest degree of mystical experience (cf. *supra*, p. 56, n. 2) which is free of any trace of ordinary things.

4) Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair of opposites; everything is reabsorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun and moon, night and day, beautiful and ugly, etc., no longer exist in it. The limited "I" is completely absorbed into Śiva or Bhairava, the adored object; everything vanishes from the field of consciousness. Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, requires the presence of the latent traces of Delight, etc., (aroused by the operation of the Determinants, etc.). In other words, aesthetic experience presupposes a pre-constituted knowledge on the part of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc., which are normally felt before a given situation. This knowledge is, in part, innate (it forms, that is, an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired through the experience of one's own reaction and one's observation of the reactions of others.

the contrary, *a*) the fact of being immersed in complete abandonment within the [adored] object, *b*) the lack of evidence, due to the absence of active participation, and *c*) the presence of obstacles, are absent. The reasons for this absence are *a*) the absence of abandonment to one's own self to the exclusion of everything else, *b*) an active participation in one's own self, and thus the absence

Aesthetic experience, Rasa, manifested by a poetical description of a beautiful woman is, for example, coloured by the mental state of Delight, which is aroused by the description itself. Such a mental state is supposed to preexist in the spectator in a latent state, in the form, that is, of *saṃskāra* or *vāsanā*. The Determinants, which manifest aesthetic experience awaken, implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also. For this concept, cf. *supra* also, p. 87, n. 2.

The beauty, the pleasantness proper to aesthetic experience is due to the colouring of these mental processes; cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 291: ...*laukikāt pratyayād upārjanādivighnabahulād yogipratyayāc ca viṣayāsvādaśūnyatāparuṣād vilakṣaṇākārasukhaduḥkhādivicitravāsanānuvedhopanatahṛdyatātiśayasaṃviccarvaṇātmanā bhuñjate budhāḥ*... | "Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the Tasting of one's own consciousness; this Tasting is endowed with extreme pleasantness (beauty), which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces of pleasure, pain, etc. It differs both from ordinary perception, which is full of obstacles (pragmatic requirements, etc.), and from the perception of the yogins, which is not free from harshness, on account of the total lack of any tasting of external objects". Thus, by comparison with aesthetic experience, the compact homogeneity (*ekaghanatā*) of mystical experience possesses a certain harshness. Its pursuit, that is to say, calls for uncommon force and energy (cf. the concept of *vīra*, *hero*). Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, is easily attained. It is particularly suitable for people endowed with "gentle mind" (*sukumāramati*). In the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 51, A.G. defines Rasa in the following terms: *śabdasamarpyamāṇahṛdayasaṃvādasundaravibhāvānubhāvasamucitaprāgviniviṣṭaratyādivāsanānurāgasukumārasvasaṃvidānandacarvaṇāvyāpārarasanīyarūpo rasaḥ* | "Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting the beautitude of one's own consciousness. This tasting is pleasant [and not *paruṣa*, as in mystical experience] in that the consciousness is coloured by the latent traces of the mental states of Delight, etc., pre-existing [in the minds of the spectators]. Such traces are aroused by the corresponding Determinants and Consequents, which—pleasant [beautiful, etc.,] by virtue of the consent of the heart—are afforded by the words". Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 81: *anubhāvavibhāvāvabodhanottaram eva tanmayībhavanayuktyā tadvibhāvānubhāvocitacittavṛttivāsanānurañjitasvasaṃvidānandacarvaṇāgocaro 'rtho rasātmā sphuraty eva*... |

of the character of otherness proper to cognition of the thoughts of others, and *c*) immersion in the latent traces left by the mental states of Delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding Determinants, etc., which are generalized [1]. All this has been said over and over again.

Thus the Determinants are not the causes of the birth of the Rasa; otherwise, the Rasa should continue to exist even when they no longer fall under cognition. Nor are they the cause of its cognition (if they were, they would have to be included among the means of cognition); for a Rasa, already realized and standing by itself, which could function as an object of a cognition, does not exist [2]. What is it, then, which is designated by the expressions Determinants, etc.? We reply: the expressions Determinants, etc., do not designate things of an ordinary character; they denote what serves to realize the Tasting. Does any such thing occur elsewhere? The fact that it does not occur elsewhere, we reply, can do nothing but strengthen the thesis of their non-ordinary character, which is the thesis we uphold. Does the taste of the Rasa of *pānaka* perhaps occur in molasses, peppers, etc. [, of which, however, it consists]? [3] The case is perfectly analogous.

1) The Determinants, etc., are perceived in independance of any association with a particular person, in a generalised way. They eliminate the 'obstacles', (*vighna*), *i.e.*, the pragmatic needs associated with the limited "I".

2) Cf. *supra*, p. 58, n. 1; *infra*, p. 103.

3) The example of *pānaka* is to be found fairly frequently in Indian philosophy. Cf. for example, *N.M.*, p. 341: *evaṃ padārthebhyo 'nya eva vākyārthaḥ pānakādivat, yathā pānakaṃ śarkarānāgakeśaramarīcādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva yathā ca sindūraharitālalakṣādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva citram, yathā vā ṣaḍjarṣabhagāndhāradhaivatādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva grāmarāgaḥ tathā padebhyo vākyam, padārthebhyo vākyārthaḥ* | "The meaning of a sentence is different to the meanring of the words (as happens with *pānaka*, etc.). Just as *pānaka* is different from sugar, spice, pepper, etc., just as a painting is different from minium,

Someone might object: "According to your thesis, then, Rasa is not an object of cognition; this is a logical consequence of what you say, *i.e.*, that Rasa consists solely of a Tasting and has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc. How then do you think the expression which Bharata uses in the *sūtra* can be justified, when he says: 'The birth of Rasa?'" This expression, we reply, must be understood in the sense of a birth not of the Rasa, but of the Tasting which refers to the Rasa. For if the expression "The birth of Rasa" is understood in the sense of the birth of a Rasa, consisting solely of, and animated solely by, the Tasting in question, our thesis is not beset by any difficulty [1]. This Tasting, in fact, is neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cognition nor of the means of action. On the other hand, it cannot be said that, in itself, this Tasting is devoid of authoritativeness: for its real existence is an inconfutable datum of our own consciousness. Besides, this Tasting is nothing but a form of cognition—which is however different from any other form of ordinary perception. This difference is due to the fact that the means which arouse the Tasting (the Determinants, etc.) are of a character different from the normal. To conclude: what is aroused by the union of the Determinants, etc., is simply the Tasting; the form of existence, of a non-ordinary cha-

orpiment, lake, etc., or as a piece of music is different from the various notes of which it is composed, so the meaning of a phrase is different from the meaning of the words".

1) *I.e.*, this expression might lend itself to interpretation in the sense that Rasa is something different from the act of cognition by which it is known, so that it would be an object of cognition. A.G.'s reply to this objection is that Rasa is the perception itself, and that the word Rasa does not denote anything distinct from the perception by which it is known.

racter, which is the matter of this Tasting, is called Rasa. This is the sense and purport of the *sūtra*.

All this may be summarized in the following way: in the first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed by tiaras, headwear, etc.; in the second place, the idea that this is Rāma, etc., aroused by the power of the poem, never theless does not succeed in resting altogether in the being of the actor, for the consciousness of the spectators is intensely coloured by the latent traces of real life [1]. Just for this reason, the spectator is no longer living either in the space and time of Rāma, etc., nor in the space and time of the actor as such [2]. Acts of horripilation, etc., which have repeatedly been seen by the spectator in the course of everyday life as indexes of Delight, etc., serve, in this case, to make known a Delight, etc., uncircumscribed by either time or space. In this Delight, just because he possesses the latent traces of it in himself, the Self of the spectator also actively participates. For this very reason, this Delight is perceived neither with indifference, from

1) Therefore he does not see Rāma as a real individual. If he did, the spectator would be immersed in Rāma's own time, space, etc. (would be a contemporary of Rāma). Latent traces of his ordinary life, which is affected by particular temporal, spatial, etc., data prevent the total immersion of the spectator in Rāma's time and space, *i.e.*, prevent him from feeling Rāma as part of his real life. The figure of Rāma impersonated by the actor is not perceived as an element of real life. "The spectator of a drama has the consciousness more or less distinct, more or less clear, that what happens on the stage is not true, with the truth of real life, but only represented—that what is happening there has no consequence for him, does not insert itself into his practical life—that the people acting there are not real persons but just actors" (A. Tilgher, *Estetica*, Roma 1931, p. 62). Therefore, the spectator is immersed neither in the time and space of the actor as such (and therefore in the time and space connected with his practical life), nor in the time and space of Rāma as a real person.

2) Therefore, in the space and time of his own real life.

the outside, nor as if it were linked with a particular [ungeneralized] cause—for, in this case, intrusion by pragmatic requirements, interests of gain, etc., would occur—, nor as if it belonged only to a third person—for, in this case, sensations of pleasure, hatred, etc., would be manifested in the spectator [1]. Thus the Erotic Rasa is simply the mental state of Delight generalized and made into a matter of perception by a form of cognition, which may either develop consecutively or be single [2]. The task of generalization is carried out by the Determinants, etc.

1) Cf. *supra*, p. 51, n. 1.

2) In the case of a play, long poem, etc., various states of soul occur in alternation with each other (Delight, Sorrow, etc.); in the case of a short poem there is generally speaking only one dominant motif.

Appendix I.

The nature of drama and the concept of *anuvyavasāya* (*A.Bh.*, I, p. 37).

anuvyavasāyaviśeṣaviṣayīkāryaṃ nāṭyam | tathā hy āhāryaviśeṣādinā nivṛtte taddeśakālacaitramaitrādinaṭaviśeṣapratyakṣābhimāne viśeṣaleśopakrameṇa ca vinā pratyakṣāpravṛtter āpāte[1] rāmādiśabdasyātropayogāt prasiddhatadarthatayādaraṇīyacaritavācakasyāsambhāvanāmātrani-rākaraṇenānuvyavasāyasya pratyakṣakalpatā[2], hṛdyagītādyanusyūtatayā camatkārasthānatvād dhṛdayānupraveśayogyatvam, abhinayacatuṣṭayena svarūpapracchādanam, prastāvanādinā naṭajñānajasaṃskārasācivyam, tena rañjakasāmagrīmadhyānupraviṣṭena pracchāditasvasvabhāvena prākpravṛttalaukikapratyakṣānumānādijanitasaṃskārasahāyena naṭajñānasaṃskārasacivena hṛdayasaṃvādatanmayībhavana[3]sahakāriṇā prayoktrā dṛśyamānena yo 'nuvyavasāyo janyate sukhaduḥkhādyākāratattaccittavṛttirūṣita[4]nijasaṃvidānandaprakāśamayo 'ta eva vicitro rasanāsvādanacamatkāracarvaṇa[5]nirveśabhogādyaparaparyāyaḥ, tatra yad avabhāsate vastu tan nāṭyam |

[1] G: *āyāte*, quite nonsensical, but my conjecture in the text is hardly the true reading; I suppose the author wrote °*pravṛttāv āyāte* ‖ [2] Read (cf. *e.g.*, *A.Bh.*, p. 43: *pratyakṣakalpānuvyavasāyaviṣayo*); G: *pratyakṣakalpanā*° ‖ [3] G: °*bhāvana*° ‖ [4] G: °*(rūpa)rūṣita*° ‖

Drama is matter of cognition by a special form of re-perception, (*anuvyavasāya*)[1]. Namely, 1) in the first

1) Cf. *supra*, p. 47, n. 7; p. 84, n. 3.

place, in virtue of the different kinds of Representation, the presumption of a direct perception of a particular actor (Caitra, Maitra, etc.,) and of his particular space and time ceases to exist[1]; in the second place, since direct perception cannot take place without at least a minimum of particularization, recourse is had to such names as Rāma, etc. The fact that Rāma, etc., are the names of famous characters eliminates the possibility that one who declaims their venerable exploits might provoke [in the spectators] the obstacle of unverisimilitude[2]. Owing to all this, this re-perception is like a form of direct perception. 2) The scene represented is accompanied by pleasure-giving vocal music, etc., and, for this reason, is a receptacle of *camatkāra*[3]. In virtue of this it has a natural suitability to enter the heart[4]. 3) The four forms of representation hide the true identity of the actor. 4) The prologue, etc., give to the spectator the awareness that he has to do with an actor[5]. In this connexion, the actor is immersed in the colouring combination [of Determinants, etc.]; his real identity is hidden; he possesses mental impressions arising from direct, inferential and other forms of ordinary perception which have occurred in the past; he possesses mental impressions of the awareness of being an actor; and he partakes in creating a state of identity [of the spectators] with the representation, and this through their heart's consent. His appearance arouses a [particular form of] re-perception, which consists in the light and the

1) Cf. *supra*, pp. 80, 81.
2) Cf. *supra*, p. 78.
3) Cf. *supra*, pp. 72, ff.
4) Cf. *supra*, p. 65, n. 1.
5) Cf. *supra*, p. 80.

beatitude proper to consciousness, which is coloured by the various mental states—made up of pleasure and pain—and which is therefore varied[1]. This re-perception has also other names: Tasting, Sampling, *camatkāra*, *Delibatio*, Immersion, Enjoyment, etc. Drama is nothing but the matter of this form of re-perception[2]. '

1) Otherwise, it would be a form of mystical cognition; cf. p. 68.

2) Bharata (*N.Ś.*, I, v. 106 or 107) says that "Drama is the re-telling (*anukīrtanam*) of all the forms of existence in the three worlds (*trailokyasyāsya sarvasya nāṭyaṃ bhāvānukīrtanam*)". According to A.G., the words "re-telling" and "imitation" (*anukaraṇa*, *anukāra*), used by Bharata, must be interpreted in the sense of a "re-perception *sui generis*" (*anuvyavasāya*, *anuvyavasāyaviśeṣa*) and not in the proper sense of *anukaraṇa*, imitation. This *anuvyavasāya* is "like a direct perception" (*pratyakṣakalpa*, *sākṣātkārakalpa*); see *supra*, p. 70, n. 1.

The term *anuvyavasāya* is one proper to logic; it defines the activity of the mind which works on data furnished by the senses. It is, therefore, the mental re-perception (*anu* = *paścāt*, afterwards) of the sensible perception (*vyavasāya*). *Ī.P.V.V.*, III, p. 43: *manaḥ* (= *antaḥkaraṇam*) *anuvyavasāyaṃ sākṣātkāravimarśasya paścādbhāvinaṃ vimarśaṃ vidadhat kriyāsaṃbandhādiviṣayāḥ kalpanā vikalpajñānāni pramātṛvyāpāraprādhanyena karoti* | The oldest text in which the term *anuvyavasāya* is found is the *Nyāyasūtra*, *Vatsyāyaṇabhāṣya*, I, 1, 4: *sarvatra pratyakṣaviṣaye jñātur indriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ, paścān manasā'nuvyavasāyaḥ* | In aesthetics, *anuvyavasāya* has come to mean aesthetic re-perception (without, that is, any association with the concepts of reality and irreality [cf. supra, p. 70, n. 1] and therefore with the limited "I", but generalised) of things perceived in practical life. The expressions *anukaraṇa*, *anukīrtana*, etc., used by Bharata (cf. *N.Ś.*, I, pp. 36, 40, 43, etc.), observed A.G., should not be interpreted literally, in the sense, that is, of imitation, *i.e.*, of a replica of reality, but in the sense of *anuvyavasāya*, of aesthetic re-perception of the facts of practical life.

APPENDIX II.

The nature of aesthetic experience and the cognitive value of art (*A.Bh.*, I, pp. 36-37).

etad uktaṃ bhavati | etādṛśaṃ te[1] rāmādayo na kadācana pramāṇapatham avātaran | yadāgamena varṇyante tadā tadviśeṣabuddhir yady api rāmāyaṇaprāyād ekasmān mahāvākyād ullasati tathāpi vartamānatayaiva viśeṣāṇām saṃbhāvyamānārthakriyāsāmarthyātmakasvālakṣaṇya[2]paryavasānān na ca teṣāṃ vartamānatety upagatā tavad viśeṣabuddhiḥ[3] | kāvyeṣv api hṛdaya eva tāvat sādhāraṇībhāvo vibhāvādīnāṃ jātaḥ | tatrāpi kathāmātre sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ saṃbhavati yady api tathāpy 'evaṃ ye kurvanti teṣām etad bhavati' itivākyavad rañjanātiśayābhāvān na cittavṛttir nirṇayagatā bhavati | kāvye tu guṇālaṃkāramanoharaśabdaśarīre lokottararasaprāṇake hṛdayasaṃvādavasān nimagnākārakā tāvad bhavati cittavṛttiḥ | kiṃ tu sarvasya pratyakṣasākṣātkārakalpā tatra na dhīr udeti | nāṭye tu paramārthikaṃ kiṃcid adya me kṛtyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyevaṃbhūtābhisaṃdhisaṃskārābhavāt sarvapariṣatsādhāraṇapramodasāra[4]paryantavirasanādaraṇīyalokottaradarśanaśravaṇayogī bhaviṣyāmītyabhisaṃdhisaṃskārād ucitagītātodyacarvaṇāvismṛtasaṃsārikabhāvatayā vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ sūcādyabhinayāvalokanodbhinnapramodaśokatanmayībhāvaḥ pāṭhyākarṇa-

[1] Read. G has *tai* [2] Read. G has °*sālakṣaṇya*° ‖ [3] P p. 432 quotes partially this passage; his correction *apagatā* for *upagatā* is wrong. Cf. *supra*, p. 106: *viśeṣaleśopakrameṇa ca vinā pratyakṣapravṛtter āpāte . . .* *A.Bh.*, I, p. 43: *nirādhārasya vṛttasya darśayitum aśakyatvāt* ‖ [4] I propose; G: °*sārā*° ‖

napātrāntarapraveśavaśāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeṣāveśānāliṅgini samyaṅmithyāsaṃśayasaṃbhāvanādijñānavijñeyatvaparāmarśānāspade rāmarāvaṇādiviṣayādhyavasāye tatsaṃskārānuvṛttikāraṇabhūtatatsahacarahṛdyavasturūpagītātodyapramadānubhavasaṃskārasūcitasamanugatataduktarūparāmādhyavasāyasaṃskāra eva bhavan pañcaṣair divasaiḥ sacamatkāratadīyacaritamadhyapraviṣṭasvātma[5]rūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreṇa viśvaṃ tathā pasyan pratyekaṃ sāmājiko deśakālaviśeṣaṇāparāmarśena evaṃkāriṇām idam iti liḍhātmakavidhisamarpitam saṃvijjātīyam evārthaṃ[6] saṃvidviśeṣarañjakaprāṇavallabhāpratimarasāsvādasahacararamyagītātodyādisaṃskārarasānubhavavaśena hṛdayābhyantaranikhātaṃ tata evotpuṅkhaśatair api mlānimātram apy abhajamānaṃ bhajaṃs tattacchubhāśubhaprepsājihāsāsatatasyūtavṛttitvād eva śubham acaraty aśubhaṃ samujjhati |

[5] Read; G: °svātva° || [6] The insertion of the word *artham* (which does not exist in the published text) after *saṃvitsajātīyam eva* seems to me indispensable. Cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 288: . . . *niyatadeśakālādyaspṛṣṭabhūta idam phalam iti vidhisthānīyo 'rtho vyutpattiṃ vitarati* |

These personages, *i.e.*, Rāma, etc., have never descended into the sphere of our means of knowledge. When these [Rāma, etc.,] are described in the scriptures, even if the idea of the particularity of each of them (*tadviśeśabuddhi*) arises from a Great Sentence such as the Rāmāyaṇa, etc., nevertheless, only when these are [felt as] contemporary (*vartamāna*), do they amount to a real individuality (*svālakśaṇya*) animated by the power (*sāmarthya*) of a corresponding Causal Efficiency (*arthakriyā*). Now, this contemporaneity does not exist and therefore there is no contradiction in the idea of their particularity (per-

sonality) being accepted in drama [1]. This state of generality of the Determinants, etc., occurs also in proper poems; in this case, it penetrates directly into the heart. Even if this state of generality can also occur in mere tales (*kathāmātre*), nevertheless in this case (cf. for example the sentence, " Such-and-such happens to people who do so-and-so ") it has only a weak power of colouring and therefore the corresponding mental movement does not obtain a state of convinction (*nirṇaya*). But owing to the consent of the heart every mental movement remains completely submersed, in the case of a poem (let us remember that poetry is made up of words embellished by Qualities and Ornaments and consists of, and is animated by, a Rasa of a non ordinary nature)[2]. Not in every person, however, does arise through poetry an idea similar to a

1) *a*) The perception of the particular names and shapes of Rāma, etc. (therefore of their qualifications of time, space, etc.), does not involve that they cannot be perceived in a generalised form. A personality, etc., inserts itself into our practical life (develops, so to say, his Causal Efficiency) only when it is contemporary with us, *i.e.*, connected with the present and therefore with the practical interests, etc., of our own Ego. When these personalities are not contemporany they cannot develop their natural Causal Efficiency. In the aesthetic perception, they are independent from the concepts both of reality and non reality and are thus perceived as " generalised ". In this sense, their particularity (*viśeṣa*) is not contrasting with the concept of generality.

b) In this context, *svālakṣaṇya* is a simply synonym of *svarūpa*, one's own form or shape, one's own peculiar nature and thus individuality, etc. *Svālakṣaṇya* is commented on by A.G. in this way in the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 538. The Causal Efficiency (*arthakriyā*; on this concept, cf. p. 36, n. 7) in the sense of practical or pragmatical functionality belongs to the real individuality (*i.e.*, contemporary with the spectator) only. The generalized image of the aesthetic experience has no practical efficiency, *i.e.*, does not insert itself in practical life. The concept of Causal Efficiency in connexion with the one of individuality (in the sense of a particular essence contrasting with the general essence, the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) has a buddhist origin and, freely interpreted, became part of the common philosophical vocabulary.

2) Cf. *supra*, p. 54.

direct perception. In drama this difficulty does not arise [1]. [What is the true nature of drama?] In drama there is the absence of the mental trace of the intention, 'Today I must do something practical', and the presence, in its place, of the intention, 'Today I am going to enjoy venerable sights and sounds of a non-ordinary character, which arouse, in the end, a state of freedom from worldly interests [2] and whose essence is a generalized pleasure shared by all the spectators'. During the spectacle, the spectator forgets about the *saṃsārika* existence and immerses himself in the Tasting of the vocal and instrumental music which accompanies the play being acted [3]. The heart of such a spectator has, of course, to be as clear as a spotless mirror; only if it is, will he be able to identify himself with the mental states of Sorrow, Delight, etc., aroused by the sight of the [four species of] Representation (gesticulation, etc.). By listening to the play which is being performed the spectator enters into the life of a character different from himself, and, for this reason, there grows up in him a cognition whose object is Rāma, Rāvaṇa, etc. [4].

1) Some individuals whose aesthetic sensibility (consent of the heart, etc.) is poor need visual illustration of what is suggested by the power of the poem; such visual illustration (consisting of the actors, etc.) contributes to bring about the immersion of the spectator in the events represented to the exclusion of everything else. Cf. *supra*, p. 84, n. 3.

2) The type of drama to which A.G. refers in these lines is the *nāṭya*, which is, in general, inspired by the facts and personnages taken from the *Mahābharata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. A.G. observes that the murders, deaths and tragical occurrences which are raccounted, f. i., in the Mahābharata give the reader a feeling of the vanity of human life (cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 530: *yady api dharmārthakāmānāṃ sarvasvaṃ tādṛk nāsti yad anyatra na vidyate, tathāpi paryantavirasatvam atraivāvalokyatām* |).

3) Colouring power (*rañjakatva*) *par excellence* belongs to the music accompanying the performance of the play.

4) In other words, the spectator lives the life of the characters represented (Rāma, Rāvaṇa, etc.).

This cognition is not circumscribed by space and time and is free from all notion of the things which are the matter of real, mistaken, uncertain, probable, etc. [1], forms of knowledge. The spectator is accompanied by the impressions of this cognition (whose object is Rāma, etc.) for several days; they are evidenced, in their turn, by impressions of the direct perception of the vocal and instrumental music and of the images of the women [2]. These pleasure-producing things accompanying the spectacle are themselves the cause of the continuation of these impressions. The spectator, whose awareness of his own self (*svātmarūpa* = *svarūpa*, identity, etc.) is lost in the events rêpresented endowed with *camatkāra*, continues, by means of his own self to see everything in this light [3]. The spectators, therefore, remain in possession of a particular from of consciousnes afforded to them by the following affirmation, which remains, as it were, on their lips to be licked and tasted (*līḍhātmaka*) [4]: 'Such-and-such happens to people who do so-and-so'. This form of consciousness is free of every spatial and temporal specification. By virtue of the perception of Rasa, aroused by the traces of all the pleasure-producing things—vocal and instrumental music, etc.—which accompany its Tasting (Rasa colours the consciousness in a special way, differing from that of the heart's beloved), this form of consciousness remains deeply fixed in the heart, like an arrow, in such

1) Cf. *supra*, p. 37.

2) Cf. *supra*, p. 82.

3) Cf. *Mṛcchakaṭikā*, III, 5: *yat satyaṃ virate 'pi gītasamaye gacchāmi śṛṇvann iva* || "To tell the truth, although the song is ended, I seem to ear it as I walk".

4) Cf. the verse quoted in the *Rasapradīpa* by Prabhākara Bhaṭṭa, Benares 1925: *sāmājikās tu lihate rasaṃ pātraṃ naṭo mataḥ* |

a way that by no possible effort can it be disregarded, let alone extracted [1]. Thus the subject who enjoys it (and this happens simply because the mind is naturally desirous of attaining to the good and abandoning the bad) does good and avoids evil [2].

1) I have not been able to find the word *utpuṅkha* in any dictionary. The sense, however, shows, without any possibility of doubt, that *utpuṅkha* is a synonym of *utpāṭana*, which denotes the act of extracting an arrow (*puṅkha* is the shaft or feathered part of an arrow). The same expression is to be found in the *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, p. 37: *prasiddhiśatapūrṇe jīvaloke kasyacit kācid eva prasiddhiḥ* "*līneva pratibimbiteva likhitevāntarnikhāteva ca* (*Mālatīmādhava*, 5, 10)" *iti nyāyena hṛdayabhittau utpāṭanaśatair api hṛdayam anunmūlya nāpasarpati* |

2) A.G. accepts the traditional Indian view of art as a means of instruction, but tends to give the word instruction a meaning of his own. Such instruction, according to A.G. is of a different character form any other, and of an unmistakable nature. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 190: *vyutpādanaṃ ca śāsanapratipādanābhyāṃ śāstretihāsakṛtābhyāṃ vilakṣaṇam* | *yathā rāmas tathāham ityupamānātiriktām rasāsvādopāyasvapratibhāvijṛmbhārūpāṃ vyutpattim ante karotīti kam upālabhāmahe* | "The knowledge imparted by poetry differs from the injunctions and instruction of religious treatises and historical narrative. However, if it is meant that poetry ultimately produces instruction consisting in the enrichment of one's aesthetic sensibility (this being the instrument which allows of the tasting of Rasa), different from ordinary analogy (as with Rāma, so with me), we have no objection to make". *A.Bh.*, I, p. 41: *nanu kiṃ guruvad upadeśaṃ karoti, netyāha, kintu buddhiṃ vivardhayati, svapratibhām evam tadṛśīṃ vitarati* | Elsewhere (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 40) A.G. says that the principal element is not knowledge (for in that case there would be confusion with works on ethics and historiography) but pleasure (*prīti*, *ānanda*). The pleasure and knowledge, both *sui generis*, aroused by poetry are not distinct from each other but two aspects of the same thing (*na caite prītivyutpattī bhinnarūpe eva, dvayor apy ekaviṣayatvāt*, *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 336).

GENERAL INDEX

The numbers refer to pages. Italic type figures indicate the chief references.

ADDENDA

P. 19, line 21. Should one read *aloka*°– or *alaukikadharmī* (= *nāṭyadharmī*) for *lokadharmī*? In this case the translation (cf. p. 84) would be "Theatrical Conventions" and not "Realistic Representation".

P. 32. The word *anusaṃdhāna* is commented upon by Prabhākara, *Rasapradīpa*, Benares 1925, p. 23: *anusaṃdhānaṃ ca kavivivakṣitasyārthasya vāsanāpāṭavavaśāt sākṣād iva karaṇam* | In my opinion, the best translation of this term is therefore "visualization".

P. 34. In this passage, Firmness and Affection are considered as Transitory Mental Movements. They, however, are not in the traditional list of *vyabhicāribhāva* (cf. p. 29).

CORRIGENDA

A revision of the book has unfortunately brought some misprints, etc., to light. I have preferred not to leave them unnoticed, but to register all that are of any consequence.

P. XXII, line 12, read: interferences
P. XXV, line 24, read: Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas*, Adyar 1940, p. 104
P. XXX, line 1, read: consciousness
P. XXXI, line 28, read: *viśiṣṭam* and *rūpam*. Line 31, read: °*śabdā*°
P. XXXII, line 8, read: to
P. XXXII, line 16, read: interests
P. 5, line 26, read: *vākyena*
P. 8, line 25, read: °*numānam*
P. 14, lines 11, 12, read: °pratiṣṭhāpita° and °pratiṣṭhā°
P. 17, line 33, read: H.C.; C, D: *prahasanād eva* |
P. 20, line 14, read: eṣām
P. 21, line 27, read: '*śakta*[*tayā*]
P. 22, last line, read: °*dharmāṇam*
P. 23, line 29, read: p. 11, n. 1 (for note 102)
P. 25, last line, read: *bhūṣaṇam*
P. 30, line 7, read: *sthāyibhāva*
P. 33, lines 2, 15, 16, read: Rasas
P. 39, line 33, read: of it
P. 48, line 6, read: ch. I
P. 53, line 16, read: Rāmaśāraka
P. 58, line 30, read: pp. XXVII ff.;
P. 59, last line, read: *artha*° and *syāt*
Pp. 60, 61, 65, read: sentence (for phrase)
P. 68, line 3, read: that
P. 71, line 12, read: non reality
P. 71, line 30, read: instincts
P. 72, line 3 and line last but one, read: *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. Line 21, read: *saṃrambhe*
P. 72, line 39, read: might
P. 76, add in reference to line 4: Perhaps we must translate: "Nor does it consist of a super-imposition of the foregoing forms of cognition". In other words, aesthetic experience does not consist of an ineffable thing *in se* (*svalakṣaṇa*), on which one super-imposes arbitrarily the concepts of mistake, reality, similitude, etc.
P. 76, line 18, read: *asādhāraṇatayā*
P. 79, line 25, read: °*bhāve*
P. 80, line 36, after *Ind. Th.*, add: pp. 127 ff.
P. 80, read: stanza (for strophe)

P. 81, line 9, read: *puṣpagaṇḍikā*
P. 81, line 17, read: non reality
P. 86, read: Heroism (for Energy)
P. 87, line 4, read: *tatra*. Line 18: read *nāntarīyakatvena*
P. 98, line 25, read: *°vṛtti°* and *śabda°*
P. 106, line 18: reference to note 5 suppressed
P. 109, line 17, read: pāramārthikaṃ
P. 110, line 10, read: °samarpitaṃ

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